Date:
Sat, 13 Aug 2005 12:02:49 +0100
From:
Eoin O'Dell
Subject:
Misfeasance of public office in the Irish Supreme Court
Hi
there,
Those
interested in misfeasance of public office after Three Rivers
DC v Bank of England [2003] 2 AC 1 (here
and here)
and Odhavji
Estate v Woodhouse [2003] 3 SCR 263 might be interested
to see how the former - at least - fared in the Irish Supreme Court
in Kennedy
v Law Society of Ireland [2005] IESC 23 (21 April 2005).
An
investigating accountant had been entrusted by the Law Society with
what a two-pronged investigation of the appellant firm's accounts.
One prong was the ascertainment of whether the appellant had complied
with the Accounts Regulations. That was the only disclosed purpose
of the investigation. The other prong, however, which was not originally
disclosed, was the investigation of suspect litigation processed
by the appellant. In earlier stages in the litigation, the Supreme
Court had held that this second prong was ultra vires; see: [2001]
IESC 35 (4 April 2001) and [2001]
IESC 103 (20 December 2001).
In
this stage of the litigation, the question was whether the Law Society
was liable to the appellant for misfeasance of public office for
setting the ultra vires, undisclosed, prong of the investigation
in motion. There is some procedural skirmishing about pleadings,
but on misfeasance issue, both the High Court (Kearns J, who has
since been elevated to the Supreme Court) the Supreme Court adopted
the approach of Lord Steyn in Three Rivers and held that
the tort had not been made out on the facts. In particular, both
courts held that there was no evidence of bad faith on the part
of the Law Society which would support an allegation by the appellant
of deliberate or reckless behaviour. In passing, Geoghegan J for
the Supreme Court (Denham, McGuinness, Hardiman and Fennelly JJ
concurring) observed:
"A
feature of advocacy in this court in recent years, largely due to
the internet, has been the extensive citing of case law from common
law jurisdictions such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada quite
apart from UK decisions. In cases therefore involving pure common
law unmodified by either the Constitution or Irish statute law it
would seem to me to be particularly important that considerable
respect be paid to any consensus that may have emerged in these
common law jurisdictions without in any way surrendering the right
to disagree. I do not think that there is any Irish authority which
prevents the element of subjective recklessness being introduced
into the ingredients of the tort of misfeasance in public office
(a tort which has not received much judicial consideration in this
jurisdiction at any rate). I would, therefore, favour acceptance
in this jurisdiction of that concept in the context in which it
is introduced by Clarke J and ultimately in the House of Lords by
Lord Steyn."
[I
would point out, parenthetically, that this is the third time in
10 years that the tort has been before the Supreme Court, the previous
two occasions are Callinan v VHI (Supreme Court, unreported,
28 July 1994) and McDonnell v Ireland [1998] 1 IR 134, though
only McDonnell was cited; presumably because it is reported
whereas Callinan is not; but neither seems to be available
on Bailii].
All
the best from Dublin.
Eoin.
|
Dr
Eoin O’Dell
Fellow
Trinity College
Dublin 2
Ireland |
voicemail: +353-1-608 1178
Law School: +353-1-608 1125
mobile: +353-87-2021120
fax: +353-1-677 0449 |
--------------------------------------------------------------
(All opinions are personal. No legal responsibility whatsoever
is accepted.)
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