Date: Thu, 15 Sep 2005 10:23:06 +0100

From: Charles Mitchell

Subject: Apportionment and causative potency

As I understand David Cheifetz's position, he takes a sceptical view of claims that one person's actions can ever meaningfully be said to have been a more potent cause of harm than another's. I am less sceptical, although I accept that apportionment on this basis is a more or less rough and ready process, depending on the facts of a case. I'm sure that David can point to examples where efforts to apportion on this basis are obviously doomed to failure, but that doesn't mean that it can never be meaningfully done. There was a case in the English CA last year where this problem was touched on: Barker v Saint Gobain Pipelines plc [2004] EWCA Civ 545.

CM

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