Date: Thu, 15 Sep 2005 12:29:05 -0400

From: Allan Axelrod

Subject: Apportionment and causative potency

Economists may have something in the way of nothing to contribute -- when you acquire an item worth $xy+ by spending $x on one component which has a Latin name, happens to weigh fourteen tons and sits on 20 square yards of dirt, and $y on another which has a Greek name, happens to weigh three ounces but covers thinly a football field, I believe there is no economic theory which purports in any sense to apportion the acquired value between the two inputs -- neither by weight bulk name cost or any other creative variable which occurs to you.

Charles Mitchell wrote:

As I understand David Cheifetz's position, he takes a sceptical view of claims that one person's actions can ever meaningfully be said to have been a more potent cause of harm than another's. I am less sceptical, although I accept that apportionment on this basis is a more or less rough and ready process, depending on the facts of a case. I'm sure that David can point to examples where efforts to apportion on this basis are obviously doomed to failure, but that doesn't mean that it can never be meaningfully done. There was a case in the English CA last year where this problem was touched on: Barker v Saint Gobain Pipelines plc [2004] EWCA Civ 545.

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