From: Mitchell, Charles <charles.mitchell@ucl.ac.uk>
To: Robert Stevens <robert.stevens@law.ox.ac.uk>
Andrew Tettenborn <A.M.Tettenborn@swansea.ac.uk>
obligations@uwo.ca
CC: RDG <enrichment@lists.mcgill.ca>
Date: 29/10/2013 16:43:04 UTC
Subject: Re: Interest / Limitation

I agree that Benedetti itself was a failure of consideration case with the limitation consequences you describe, Rob, although on the facts there would still have been a problem in dating the moment when the consideration failed if a limitation issue had arisen, since the shared basis on which the services were rendered was that they would be paid for, but the court did not identify any shared understanding between the parties that the payment should be made at a particular time. But the more general point that I was trying to make was that some 'pure services' (i.e. not leading to an end-product) can be more plausibly characterised as 'continuous' than others, so that it seems more sensible to say of these than it does of the others that there is only one claim on which time starts to run. On your view, this should always be on the date when performance begins, but what if the services are not 'complete' until a later date, in the sense that C's performance does not enrich D until it is completed? Best wishes, Charles

From: Robert Stevens <robert.stevens@law.ox.ac.uk>
Date: Tuesday, 29 October 2013 09:34
To: Charles Mitchell <charles.mitchell@ucl.ac.uk>, Andrew Tettenborn <A.M.Tettenborn@swansea.ac.uk>, "obligations@uwo.ca" <obligations@uwo.ca>
Cc: RDG <enrichment@lists.mcgill.ca>
Subject: RE: Interest / Limitation

The last scenario is, of course, also subject to section 32(1)(c) of the Limitation Act.
Rob

From: Robert Stevens [robert.stevens@law.ox.ac.uk]
Sent: 29 October 2013 09:31
To: charles.mitchell@ucl.ac.uk; Andrew Tettenborn; obligations@uwo.ca
Cc: RDG
Subject: RE: Interest / Limitation

In Benedetti v Sawaris the enrichment of the defendant only became unjustified at the moment at which the defendants failed to pay for the work. That moment occurred when the work was complete, and that is when time starts to run. The claim does not arise at the moment when the enrichment is conferred. 

[As it happens, I think Benedetti should have been treated as a claim for a contractual quantum meruit. If the services provided by Benedetti had not been exercised with reasonable skill so that the opportunity had been lost, would Sawaris have had no claim against him? Nobody argued that though.] 

It (should be/is?) different if the enrichment by the conferral of the service is unjustified from the get go. So, if I mistakenly abate a nuisance for which you are the party actually responsible, and I do so over 15 years, the only claim should be for the last six years of work. 
Rob

From: Mitchell, Charles [charles.mitchell@ucl.ac.uk]
Sent: 29 October 2013 08:49
To: Robert Stevens; Andrew Tettenborn; obligations@uwo.ca
Cc: RDG
Subject: Re: Interest / Limitation

Thinking more about the second benefit identified by Lord Nicholls in Sempra, he describes this as one benefit - 'the opportunity' - and this makes sense if we compare the situation to taking out a loan – the lender buys one right to use the money and how much it costs him will then vary according to how long he has the right. So on reflection, I think the best way to understand what Lord Nicholls says is to distinguish between the identification of the benefit received by D – the opportunity to use the money received from C – and the valuation of the benefit – the saved cost of paying a lender for the opportunity, calculated by reference to the length of time that C has the use of the money at his disposal. That would then mean that there is only one moment in time when C receives the opportunity to use the money – the date of payment – and that is the date from which the limitation period should run. So I don't agree with Rob that Lord Nicholls went wrong on this issue, but I do agree with Andrew that Males J has gone haywire.

Here's another limitation question: suppose C performs services for D over a period of time, and the benefit received by D is not the end-product of the services but the services themselves. When does time start to run on a claim in UE to recover the value of the services? Does the answer to this question vary according to whether the services are not 'complete' until some particular act of performance has been rendered? Cf Benedetti v Sawiris, where the SC said that the claimant's services should be valued as at the date when there was nothing more for him to do. Should the valuation date be the same as the date when time starts to run?

Best wishes
Charles

From: Robert Stevens <robert.stevens@law.ox.ac.uk>
Date: Monday, 28 October 2013 17:34
To: Charles Mitchell <charles.mitchell@ucl.ac.uk>, Andrew Tettenborn <A.M.Tettenborn@swansea.ac.uk>, "obligations@uwo.ca" <obligations@uwo.ca>
Cc: RDG <enrichment@lists.mcgill.ca>
Subject: RE: Interest

On 1, I can understand how there can be contractual obligations of performance that are continuous, so that on every day where performance is not rendered a fresh claim for breach arises. The example in the case is a tenant's duty to repair. So he will be in breach in not repairing on day 1. And again on day 2. And again on Day 3. And so on. So, the fact that the claim for breach based upon Day 1 is time barred may not bar a claim for breaches of the same obligation on days within the time period. New liabilities are accruing on each day, although the underlying obligation remains the same.

Males J says that  there is "no need to distinguish between duties in contract, tort and restitution" for the purpose of determining whether a duty is continuous. But is this right? If I pay you £1m by mistake your liability to make restitution arises then. My understanding had always been that no new liability accrued the next day or the day after that, as there is no fresh claim in unjust enrichment on days 2, 3 etc. The claim in unjust enrichment is to a return of the capital sum paid over, and that was paid over once at the start.

Sempra Metals v IRC  contradicts that. It assumes that on day 2, 3, 4 etc there is a fresh claim in unjust enrichment to the use value of money. I don't myself see why there should be, as there is no transaction between the parties on days 2, 3, 4 etc that requires reversal. Yes, the recipient is better off on day 2 by not repaying the money, and the payor is worse off by its not being repaid, but should that be enough? If my not fulfilling an obligation I owe to you leaves you worse off than you ought to be, and me correspondingly better off, is that enough for a claim in unjust enrichment? If so, why should it matter whether (as in Sempra itself) the obligation you are not fulfilling is an obligation in unjust enrichment (or contract, or tort or whatever)?  

The claim in unjust enrichment in Sempra to the use value of money must have been envisaged as continuous. On the day of payment we have no idea how much time will elapse until the money is repaid, and so the liability for the use value cannot have crystallised then.

In Sempra Nicholls said


Rob

From: Mitchell, Charles [charles.mitchell@ucl.ac.uk]
Sent: 28 October 2013 16:35
To: Andrew Tettenborn; obligations@uwo.ca
Cc: RDG
Subject: Re: Interest

Two further points by way of addendum to Andrew's post:

(1) in Equitas Males J also appears to say that claims in unjust enrichment for the use value of money can never become time-barred because a new cause of action arises each day for the value of the previous day's use (why each day, rather than each minute, or each second?) - I can't think that this is right but I'd be happy for someone to explain why.

(2) in Sempra the claimant did not ask for, and so the HL did not make, an award of the time value of the capital sum paid as unlawful ACT for the period running between the date when the unlawful ACT payment was set off against C's lawful MCT liability and the date of judgment, but Lord Nicholls and Lord Walker both said they would have awarded this if it had been asked for, and Henderson J has now made an award of this kind in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v HMRC [2013] EWHC 3249 (Ch) - a case in which he also holds that awards of compound interest as the time value of money will lie in cases where the face value of the capital sum paid is also claimed (unlike in Sempra, but as in Westdeutsche where such a claim was denied). Online at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2013/3249.html 

Best wishes
Charles

From: Andrew Tettenborn <A.M.Tettenborn@swansea.ac.uk>
Date: Monday, 28 October 2013 16:11
To: "obligations@uwo.ca" <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: Interest

An interesting decision in the English High Court from Males J today, Equitas Ltd v Walsham Bros & Co Ltd [2013] EWHC 3264 (Comm). A complex claim arising out of the Lloyd's débâcle by a syndicate's assignee to make brokers account for payouts under reinsurance policies. One curious holding is that the duty to account is a continuing duty, so that apparently it never gets time-barred. More intriguing, however, is a claim for compound prejudgment interest on the basis of LIBOR + 1. This is made under Sempra v IRC [2007] UKHL 34, [2008] 1 AC 561. Defendants say, with some justification, that this is essentially a common-law claim for interest as of course for late payment, and that in the admitted absence of any detailed evidence this is exactly what Sempra says you can't have. On the contrary, they argue: under Sempra you've got to prove exactly how much you personally have had to pay to borrow, or how much interest you would have made and now haven't.

Males J is having none of it. Looking at the facts of Sempra, he says it is "a case where, despite what was said about the need to plead and prove a loss, the damages actually awarded were determined by taking a conventional rate and awarding compound interest. This did not depend on any evidence as to the taxpayer's actual loss, but was simply the interest which a substantial commercial company would have to pay to borrow the amount in question in the market at the relevant time, regardless of what the taxpayer had actually done. Although it may be that this approach was not the subject of specific argument in the House of Lords, it was clearly an approach which the House endorsed" ... and he duly follows the same approach in regard to Equitas.

Do list members share my impression that if this is right, in debt claims the statutory jurisdiction under the Senior Courts Act 1981 to award prejudgment interest is now close to redundant?


Andrew

 
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Andrew Tettenborn
Professor of Commercial Law, Swansea University

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Andrew Tettenborn
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Lawyer (n): One versed in circumvention of the law (Ambrose Bierce)



 

 

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