Dear All,

If you're interest extends to American law, one of the more famous and influential cases in the U.S. is Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 383 P.2d 441 (1963). Tunkl addresses the validity of an express contractual release of liability for future negligence imposed as a condition for admission to a charitable research hospital. The contract was invalidated under Section 1668 of the Field Code, which declares "[a]ll contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent are against the policy of the law." The Field Code is California's codification of the Common Law of New York as the Common Law of California in the 1860's. It's a statute which is interpreted as though it were common law. Cases under the provision had held that exculpatory clauses could be enforced only if they did not affect the "public interest." The court wrote that "[n]o definition of the concept of public interest can be contained within the four corners of a formula," but that certain criteria helped to define the category.

The criteria were:

1. Urgency. “The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance, which is often a matter of necessity for some members of the public.”

2. Public Invitation. “The party holds himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain established standards.”

3. Inequality of Bargaining Power. The urgency of the need met by the service provided by the party seeking exculpation gives that party “a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against the member of the public who seeks his services.”

4. By virtue of its superior bargaining power the party seeking exculpation may be able: (a) to get exculpation without giving adequate consideration in return; and (b) to coerce consent (“the releasing party does not really acquiesce voluntarily”).

5. Incapacity to Assume the Duty. The purchaser relieves the seller of its duty of care and then subjects himself to the seller’s control. Because of this the purchaser is in a poor position to assume the duty disclaimed by the seller—to protect him or herself against those risks that the seller no longer has a duty to control through the exercise of reasonable care

Tunkl is cited heavily in American case law addressing the validity of releases of negligence liability. The concept of a contract affected with the public interest is narrower than the concept of "public policy" but you might find the case and the body of law it's part of to be of some use.

Best,

Greg

Gregory Keating
Florence Rogatz Visiting Professor

Yale Law School
127 Wall Street, Room K41
New Haven, CT 06510
(203) 436-3530



-----Original Message-----
From: Stapleton, Jane [mailto:JStapleton@law.utexas.edu]
Sent: Friday, November 01, 2013 1:01 PM
To: Thomas, Sean R. (Dr.); 'Harrington Matthew P.'; Hedley, Steve
Cc: obligations@uwo.ca
Subject: RE: Research Help: Definition of Public Policy

You might find diverting the tort of 'wrongful discharge in violation of public policy' (subject of draft Chapter 5 of Restatement of the Law Third: Employment Law) and its relation to the employment at will doctrine.

________________________________________
From: Thomas, Sean R. (Dr.) <srt10@leicester.ac.uk>
Sent: 01 November 2013 16:47
To: 'Harrington Matthew P.'; Hedley, Steve
Cc: obligations@uwo.ca
Subject: RE: Research Help: Definition of Public Policy

Interestingly enough, I’m looking (askew) at this general issue vis-à-vis commercial law. Some materials that come to mind (ie cut and pasted from my current draft) are John Bell, Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions (Clarendon Press 1983); the symposium ‘The Role of Policy in Private Law Adjudication’ (2006) 25 U Queensland LJ 213-347; Graham Hughes, ‘Rules, Policy and Decision Making’ (1967-68) 77 Yale L J 411; A Robertson, ‘Policy-based reasoning in duty of care cases’ (2013) 33 LS 119, and of course Dworkin's stuff and the responses thereto.

Personally, I agree with your problem Matthew: the use of 'policy' (and, to my mind, the use of 'principle' also) is merely that of a legitimation rhetoric. This is why you don't see any explanation of the policy at hand, for to attempt to explain it would be pointing out that law's emperor is naked.

Sean.

Dr Sean Thomas
Senior Lecturer in Commercial Law
LLM Course Director (Campus)

School of Law
University of Leicester
University Road
Leicester
LE1 7RH
+44 (0) 116 252 2332


-----Original Message-----
From: Harrington Matthew P. [mailto:matthew.p.harrington@umontreal.ca]
Sent: 01 November 2013 16:42
To: Hedley, Steve
Cc: obligations@uwo.ca
Subject: Re: Research Help: Definition of Public Policy

Thanks very much. I need to think about it more. But, here’s something of where I’m coming from:

I’m working in trusts cases right now. I see all sorts of restrictive clauses being discarded by courts on the grounds that the clause violates public policy. So, for example, we have a court in Newfoundland that takes a clause in a will that requires the beneficiary to be an RC or CofE. The clause is not uncertain. Yet, the court --- in a one-sentence opinion --- voids the clause because “it violates the public policy of Canada.” No explanation as to what, exactly the public policy of Canada is.

Now this is an egregious example, but there are others. Courts that destroy provisions because they “violate Ontario public policy that all religions ought to be treated equally” or that toss a provision because it violates the public policy ”in favour of protecting marriage.”

In almost every one of these cases, other than stating the public policy in broad form, we get no analysis of what the public policy actually is. (For example, if Ontario’s public policy is really “in favour of protecting marriage,” why are there divorce laws? Or, if Ontario’s public policy is that all religions are to be treated equally, then why do we have government-supported denominational schools?)

None of these courts actually say: The public policy is this. Here are its origins. Here are its outlines. Here is why the clause violates it.

My hostility is that it seems all so very arbitrary, to the point that public policy is merely makeweight to hide personal preference. It’s a way of saying, “I don’t like this. I don’t have real concrete reasons, so I’ll just say it violates policy.” To my mind, it creates a results-based jurisprudence. It’s difficult to challenge or understand the opinions because one never gets the reasoning behind it.

I realise I sound a bit like a third-year student unhappy that no one is giving me a clear rule, but in the area I’m working, I’m seeing two centuries of precedent tossed with just the vaguest explanation.

Nonetheless, I take your point. It’s really helpful and I’m not sure where to go.

Best regards.
Matt


-----------------------------------------
Matthew P Harrington
Professor of Law
University of Montreal
-----------------------------------------

Sent from Windows Mail

From: Hedley, Steve
Sent: ‎Friday‎, ‎November‎ ‎01‎, ‎2013 ‎12‎:‎26‎ ‎PM
To: Harrington Matthew P.
Cc: obligations@uwo.ca


Matthew





Dare I suggest that you may be looking at the problem the wrong way up? At any one time, there will be a considerable number of matters on which any particular legal system can be said to have a well-defined public policy, which could be proved by reference to judicial decisions, to statute, or to clearly demonstrable public attitudes. Whether there is a coherent overall conception of “public policy” might be a difficult question, but you don’t always need one to make sense of particular references to “public policy” – as Jason says, very often it refers to principles that are perfectly well-established, but only rarely encountered in the particular neck of the woods that the court happens to end up in. The law’s attitude to parental rights (to use your example) may be perfectly clear, just not often encountered in books and cases on contract and tort.






Steve Hedley
Faculty of Law
University College Cork

9thlevel.ie<http://9thlevel.ie/>
private-law-theory.org<http://private-law-theory.org/>





-----Original Message-----
From: Harrington Matthew P. [mailto:matthew.p.harrington@umontreal.ca]
Sent: 01 November 2013 15:45
To: obligations@uwo.ca
Subject: Research Help: Definition of Public Policy



I hope list members won’t mind my using the list in this way, but I’m in a bit of a quandary. I’m looking into a particular problem in which courts use “public policy” to overturn long-standing rules. In the particular area in which I’m working, the cases are completely vague as to what they mean by public policy or even what the precise public policy at issue is. The series of cases just says, “these provisions violate public policy.” I'm finding things like broad statements of a “public policy in favour of parental rights” or “a public policy of equality.”



I’m looking for some detailed, in-depth or even moderately coherent discussion of the theory of public policy. How do or should courts define it? Are there limits? If so, what are they?



So far, I view public policy as an excuse for arbitrariness. I’m hoping to be convinced otherwise. So, what I’m really wanting to know is whether there are any jurisprudential studies or discussions out there that would be helpful.



Regards.



Sent from Windows Mail