Dear all,

Again many thanks to you all for the insightful comments.

Having just re-read Hawkins case again, it strikes me as a lot harsher
on the solicitors than I had recalled - though not on the limitation
point necessarily.

Limitation defences are pleaded as a matter of routine by solicitors
(perhaps more accurately by their PI insurers) in this jurisdiction,
despite occasional adverse comments in judgments.

Kind regards

Ger

On 3/9/16, Joe Campbell <j.campbell@sydney.edu.au> wrote:
> I should admit that as counsel for the solicitor's professional indemnity
> insurer I was responsible for the unattractive limitation argument in
> Hawkins v Clayton. it is spelled out in more detail in the Court of Appeal
> judgment of Hawkins v Clayton. I am way from Sydney at the moment, so don't
> have he reference at my fingertips, but it is published in NSWLR.
>
> Joe
> ________________________________
> From: Barbara McDonald
> Sent: Wednesday, 9 March 2016 9:55 AM
> To: Joe Campbell; Neil Foster; Gerard Sadlier; Jason Neyers
> Cc: obligations@uwo.ca
> Subject: RE: Limitation Period for Negligently Caused Financial Loss
>
> As well as comments on when the plaintiff's cause of action for pure
> economic loss arose in this case, there are also some interesting comments
> In Hawkins v Clayton on the solicitors' attempt to use the Limitation Act as
> a defence- described by Brennan J as "not an attractive argument".
> The solicitors had kept their client's will, after she had executed it, "for
> safe keeping" but only made perfunctory attempts to find the nominated
> executor when they were informed that the client had died. Proceedings were
> commenced more than 6 years after her death, once the plaintiff executor was
> notified and discovered the loss the estate had suffered over the preceding
> 7 years. As it turned out, the majority held that the cause of action was
> only complete when the executor took office so they didn't have to decide
> that the solicitors would be barred from using the defence because their
> continuing negligence prevented the plaintiff from learning of the potential
> claim for PEL, as in my view they should be.
>
>
>
> Hawkins v Clayton [1988] HCA 15; (1988) 164 CLR 539 (8 April 1988)
> Brennan J
> 22. ...In my opinion this Court should now find that there was a breach of
> duty and that it caused some loss. But that finding will prove a Pyrrhic
> victory for the plaintiff if the action is statute barred. That leads us to
> the final question.
> 23. The solicitors in their defence pleaded that the action was statute
> barred and in argument they rely on the Limitation
> Act<redir.aspx?REF=IuEUGf9PgSQnsMvROqPTMbVpL0q_Rb4fi4jIhzQjucgh1NePbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9eTNpaDZ5cjBSTEN2TWJxQWc0eTJ6UmI5dEhyemVBN0FRVUVFM3J3eHV1aDVLejNhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk4Lg..>
> as an ultimate defence if it should be found that they were otherwise liable
> for breach of duty. The submission made on their behalf is that the damage
> caused by any breach of duty on their part began in 1975 or, in any event,
> not later than six years before the action was commenced on 22 November
> 1982. By November 1976 at the latest, so the argument goes, the period of
> limitation had commenced to run so that the plaintiff's cause of action was
> extinguished by the time the solicitors told him of the will or within a
> relatively short time afterwards. Of course, the injustices occasioned by
> statutes of limitation have been seen in many cases (see, for example,
> Cartledge v. E. Jopling & Sons Ltd. (1963) AC
> 758<redir.aspx?REF=VPbvHgWOUXMUfjF2LSu8w4RMM3MgrbaLLw59Ck9Q90wh1NePbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9cHJIZWUxbmwzek5jd0d0TTlYSWxhRmxQdXB0Ty1SdFhDbTFTS2ZESjU4TFlqRF9hb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyTm5hUzFpYVc0dlRHRjNRMmwwWlQ5amFYUTlKVEk0TVRrMk15VXlPU1V5TUVGREpUSXdOelU0>
> where time was held to run before the plaintiff discovered that he had
> contracted compensable pneumoconiosis) and have led to modification of the
> bar in personal injury cases: see Pt
> III<redir.aspx?REF=GYM4GwXVxiQrv3tRpemvhERUUTMEq8TNIHeCb-9S58ch1NePbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9VXRqVUk3M3FndHU5cjB2MnJLd0RoMFhJaEFsZFpNcllFS0p1cGN6UlZhellqRF9hb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk5cGJtUmxlQzVvZEcxc0kzQXo.>
> Div.3 of the Limitation
> Act<redir.aspx?REF=7-jEGf6gPUpDdWxHdHiuTSsrJaxrDJqodG4jmc9UTysh1NePbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9UWo5Q0w4ZDc3dnZWSjZueG5zZmxzUmluMkxISkIxem8wYmE4eHp1Nm9pVFlqRF9hb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk4Lg..>.
> Wilson J. in Kamloops v. Nielsen (1984) 2 SCR
> 2<redir.aspx?REF=e7w7Uki6UlN1fGP1xM5TT5JsgCLtj-DvVMd7R5rFHtIh1NePbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9ZmFnWlVJbm93TEdZZlNLZGVwbFVKMGVnMHNyZGRpNGRGSmg1QnoyUzZXUFlqRF9hb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmMyTmpMbXhsZUhWdExuVnRiMjUwY21WaGJDNWpZUzlsYmk4eE9UZzBMekU1T0RSelkzSXlMVEl2TVRrNE5ITmpjakl0TWk1b2RHMXM.>;
> (1984) 10 DLR (4th)
> 641<redir.aspx?REF=e7w7Uki6UlN1fGP1xM5TT5JsgCLtj-DvVMd7R5rFHtIh1NePbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9ZmFnWlVJbm93TEdZZlNLZGVwbFVKMGVnMHNyZGRpNGRGSmg1QnoyUzZXUFlqRF9hb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmMyTmpMbXhsZUhWdExuVnRiMjUwY21WaGJDNWpZUzlsYmk4eE9UZzBMekU1T0RSelkzSXlMVEl2TVRrNE5ITmpjakl0TWk1b2RHMXM.>
> observed that "perhaps the most serious concern is the injustice of a law
> which statute-bars a claim before the plaintiff is even aware of its
> existence": p 40; p 685. It would not be surprising if the application of
> s.14(1)(b)<redir.aspx?REF=KBrdvYmDzPMfpIp_w6K1DAItWXEYD6RpGOYaogeJAv0h1NePbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9SkdQNnkzV0lFMS1ZaDlpaVNHZG82bTFfdWxMbW5TQWUwMHBxWW4tM3lJallqRF9hb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk5ek1UUXVhSFJ0YkEuLg..>
> of the Limitation
> Act<redir.aspx?REF=tZak4maylMVdfBIl9SRmVpfHzq4Azd05sCvDa6CTq61_NdqPbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9UWo5Q0w4ZDc3dnZWSjZueG5zZmxzUmluMkxISkIxem8wYmE4eHp1Nm9pVFlqRF9hb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk4Lg..>
> to cases of economic loss sometimes worked an injustice. The Act may be
> pleaded by a defendant whether its operation will serve the ends of justice
> or not. This was not a case in which the plaintiff's claim depended on a
> contest between the contradictory recollections of opposing witnesses whose
> memories were likely to be dimmed by the passage of time; nor was it a case
> where a disputed claim had been allowed to lie dormant while the limitation
> period ran. It was a case in which the whole of the material evidence as to
> breach of duty came from the solicitors themselves and from their own
> documents. Yet, if the argument founded on the Limitation
> Act<redir.aspx?REF=tZak4maylMVdfBIl9SRmVpfHzq4Azd05sCvDa6CTq61_NdqPbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9UWo5Q0w4ZDc3dnZWSjZueG5zZmxzUmluMkxISkIxem8wYmE4eHp1Nm9pVFlqRF9hb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk4Lg..>
> is right, the solicitors' breach of duty, persisted in throughout all or
> most of the limitation period, has successfully produced an exemption from
> their liability to compensate an executor for loss which their breach of
> duty caused. It is not an attractive argument. If the argument be right,
> there is an incentive for a solicitor whose breach of a duty imposed by law
> causes damage to an executor to conceal it from the executor until six years
> have passed, even though further damage may accrue from day to day so long
> as the concealment continues. The argument does not sit easily with the
> public perception, sedulously cultivated by professional societies, that the
> professional standards of solicitors assure substantial protection in the
> administration of the estates of deceased clients. The argument is no more
> attractive if it is advanced at the insistence of professional insurers. The
> terms of a policy which is apt to qualify the protection expected by the
> public are a matter of private contract or perhaps of negotiation by
> professional societies.
> 24. Whether the raising of the Limitation
> Act<redir.aspx?REF=tZak4maylMVdfBIl9SRmVpfHzq4Azd05sCvDa6CTq61_NdqPbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9UWo5Q0w4ZDc3dnZWSjZueG5zZmxzUmluMkxISkIxem8wYmE4eHp1Nm9pVFlqRF9hb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk4Lg..>
> in a case like the present is regarded as appropriate or not, the issue
> raises questions which depend on the answer to a technical question: when
> does a cause of action in tort for breach of a duty to disclose first
> accrue? The majority of the Court of Appeal held that such a cause of action
> first accrues when damage occurs irrespective of the claimant's knowledge
> (per Kirby P.) or as soon as the wrongful act has caused some damage beyond
> what can be regarded as negligible (per Glass J.A.). There is no doubt that
> most causes of action for negligence first accrue when the plaintiff first
> suffers damage caused by the defendant's breach of duty. The ordinary rule
> is restated in Cartledge v. E. Jopling & Sons Ltd. in terms reproduced by
> Glass J.A. in the Court of Appeal. Difficulties in applying the rule have
> been encountered in England in cases where damage has occurred on land or
> defects have occurred in the construction of buildings, but there is no
> reason to doubt the applicability of the orthodox view: see the discussion
> in Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman, at pp 489-494. There are some
> observations in State of South Australia v. Johnson (1982) 42 ALR
> 161<redir.aspx?REF=hy06NCFzh3gPfcNzR1FzFM-QLGF8ll4vfqmkM3plHnN_NdqPbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9Z21fOGRuRGpLY09URjVuYkxaVkZRT3VmLTJqSUtmYnpFb2I5WjAzVFFZellqRF9hb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyTm5hUzFpYVc0dlRHRjNRMmwwWlQ5amFYUTlKVEk0TVRrNE1pVXlPU1V5TURReUpUSXdRVXhTSlRJd01UWXg.>
> which suggest that time runs from discovery of damage rather than from the
> occurrence of damage, but those observations are to be accounted for by the
> conventional basis on which the parties chose to fight the case - a basis
> which precludes the judgment in that case from being treated as a rejection
> of established legal principle. This case, however, is not an ordinary case
> in which a plaintiff seeks damages for negligence. For reasons earlier
> stated damage is not temporally the last element of the cause of action to
> occur. Unlike the ordinary case, the last element to occur in a case of the
> present kind is the nominated executor's assumption of the office of
> executor. Until that occurs, the cause of action is not complete. For the
> purposes of
> s.14(1)(b)<redir.aspx?REF=4J4WiH3ixUwlNkaDNmH4pV7HEsPmvt8awVG7GR9poXt_NdqPbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9ek9yZE9rZFp0ZlZwY3dkVkJCdWV5M1VkZl95RGNPZnpmN3VuQmZBTER0WTM3a0hhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk5ek1UUXVhSFJ0YkEuLg..>
> of the Limitation
> Act<redir.aspx?REF=05TZWJsSJFvNboxuSyAINU4ukURwPwDuqd3_p1uTS0l_NdqPbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9Vm9rcGpkTEVwTHdfeU1SeFZlby1ZMDJfbGlQUTJsSUJSWU5NWUtBUV9hRTM3a0hhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk4Lg..>,
> "time runs from the accruer of the cause of action, but a cause of action
> does not accrue unless there be some one who can institute the action":
> Meyappa Chetty v. Supramanian Chetty, at p 610; and see Thomson v.
> Clanmorris (Lord) (1900) 1 Ch
> 718<redir.aspx?REF=Z7iWIoAvJLm1ncJx-pYvZtKmIVIATOdZ9JYtRCSXRdt_NdqPbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9d05ER2FtQ2FqY3czWDF6WUtBX0Y2WmdXWDRaSE9TdUt4c2o2X2RuS2loZzM3a0hhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyTm5hUzFpYVc0dlRHRjNRMmwwWlQ5amFYUTlKVEk0TVRrd01DVXlPU1V5TURFbE1qQkRhQ1V5TURjeE9BLi4.>,
> at pp 728- 729. Until the nominated executor assumes the office of executor,
> the cause of action does not accrue and time does not begin to run. If a
> cause of action is itself an asset which devolves on the executor or arises
> from an infringement of the proprietary or possessory rights of an executor
> in respect of the estate, the executor's ignorance of his title would not
> prevent the time from running: cf. Knox v. Gye (1872) LR 5 HL
> 656.<redir.aspx?REF=_ptnWTsv73wju41XV2nxS71LF7KQx1iGVc-DsdmXStd_NdqPbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9ZUVFRzhzMEZ4bW5ia1lHZ0s3MURjSF9BbjYyZGR4ZDd1WUR1MGhDS29nZzM3a0hhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyTm5hUzFpYVc0dlRHRjNRMmwwWlQ5amFYUTlKVEk0TVRnM01pVXlPU1V5TUV4U0pUSXdOU1V5TUVoTUpUSXdOalUy>
> But where no action can be brought by the nominated executor until he
> assumes office, time runs only from that event. Time commenced to run in
> this case only from Mr Hawkins' assumption of the office in March 1981. The
> action was commenced within six years thereafter. The defence based on the
> Limitation
> Act<redir.aspx?REF=05TZWJsSJFvNboxuSyAINU4ukURwPwDuqd3_p1uTS0l_NdqPbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9Vm9rcGpkTEVwTHdfeU1SeFZlby1ZMDJfbGlQUTJsSUJSWU5NWUtBUV9hRTM3a0hhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk4Lg..>
> fails.
> Deane J
>
> 38. There remains for consideration the firm's defence based on
> s.14(1)<redir.aspx?REF=_VpIooDrjtSczBOPOBVHSQRKTgyQ53p1NMQ44q0mj4vdltyPbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9ek9yZE9rZFp0ZlZwY3dkVkJCdWV5M1VkZl95RGNPZnpmN3VuQmZBTER0WTM3a0hhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk5ek1UUXVhSFJ0YkEuLg..>
> of the Limitation
> Act<redir.aspx?REF=cHQUHozfkBVLYg0227Z7g_QUCLK3znSraC95_Xgk8nzdltyPbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9Vm9rcGpkTEVwTHdfeU1SeFZlby1ZMDJfbGlQUTJsSUJSWU5NWUtBUV9hRTM3a0hhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk4Lg..>.
> That section provides, for present purposes, that an action on a cause of
> action founded on contract or tort is "not maintainable if brought after the
> expiration of a limitation period of six years running from the date on
> which the cause of action first accrues to the plaintiff or to a person
> through whom he claims".
> 39. A cause of action in negligence is complete when the damage caused by
> the breach of duty is sustained. It is at that time that, in the ordinary
> case, the cause of action "first accrues" for the purposes of a provision
> such
> ass.14(1)<redir.aspx?REF=_VpIooDrjtSczBOPOBVHSQRKTgyQ53p1NMQ44q0mj4vdltyPbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9ek9yZE9rZFp0ZlZwY3dkVkJCdWV5M1VkZl95RGNPZnpmN3VuQmZBTER0WTM3a0hhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk5ek1UUXVhSFJ0YkEuLg..>
> of the Limitation
> Act<redir.aspx?REF=cHQUHozfkBVLYg0227Z7g_QUCLK3znSraC95_Xgk8nzdltyPbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9Vm9rcGpkTEVwTHdfeU1SeFZlby1ZMDJfbGlQUTJsSUJSWU5NWUtBUV9hRTM3a0hhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk4Lg..>.
> It was submitted, on behalf of the plaintiff, that this Court should qualify
> that settled position by a general proposition that, at least in the case of
> a claim in negligence for damages for economic loss, time does not commence
> to run for the purposes of a provision such as
> s.14(1)<redir.aspx?REF=_VpIooDrjtSczBOPOBVHSQRKTgyQ53p1NMQ44q0mj4vdltyPbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9ek9yZE9rZFp0ZlZwY3dkVkJCdWV5M1VkZl95RGNPZnpmN3VuQmZBTER0WTM3a0hhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk5ek1UUXVhSFJ0YkEuLg..>
> until the stage is reached when the plaintiff discovers, or could on
> reasonable inquiry have discovered, that the damage has been sustained. In
> support of that proposition, particular reliance was placed upon the
> decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Kamloops v. Nielson (1984) 10
> DLR (4th)
> 641<redir.aspx?REF=JvBhmtvBuU7NHe-A91W9ad2Yp8wE97002uSReZekjnLdltyPbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9X2lLS19HeVFfT1NUc1M0VjFxNTZHWnVqYXYzSGtRc1BzUTc5SGh6ZkVSaVdUMFRhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmMyTmpMbXhsZUhWdExuVnRiMjUwY21WaGJDNWpZUzlsYmk4eE9UZzBMekU1T0RSelkzSXlMVEl2TVRrNE5ITmpjakl0TWk1b2RHMXM.>
> (esp. at pp 681ff.); (1984) 2 SCR
> 2<redir.aspx?REF=JvBhmtvBuU7NHe-A91W9ad2Yp8wE97002uSReZekjnLdltyPbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9X2lLS19HeVFfT1NUc1M0VjFxNTZHWnVqYXYzSGtRc1BzUTc5SGh6ZkVSaVdUMFRhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmMyTmpMbXhsZUhWdExuVnRiMjUwY21WaGJDNWpZUzlsYmk4eE9UZzBMekU1T0RSelkzSXlMVEl2TVRrNE5ITmpjakl0TWk1b2RHMXM.>
> (esp. at pp 35ff.) and a passage in the judgment of this Court in South
> Australia v. Johnson (1982) 42 ALR
> 161<redir.aspx?REF=VQ3X-v0ZGQnMdKhP4Rjo_j3fmnjQ-o3T7T01dGFlqTLdltyPbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9ZG9IblZYbHc3X0VNS0JvdkJEQlFnY3hHME1TMHVENFFDa2pNOENCMVJ4S1dUMFRhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyTm5hUzFpYVc0dlRHRjNRMmwwWlQ5amFYUTlKVEk0TVRrNE1pVXlPU1V5TURReUpUSXdRVXhTSlRJd01UWXg.>,
> at p 169. I do not think that those cases, upon proper analysis, support the
> broad proposition for which the plaintiff contends. Such support is,
> however, to be found in the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in
> Central Trust Co. v. Rafuse, at pp 535-536.
> …..
> 41. It can be assumed for the purposes of the present case that economic
> loss caused by the negligent failure to inform Mr. Hawkins of the existence
> and contents of the testatrix's will was first sustained, in the sense that
> rent was not earned, within twelve months of her death. In the light of the
> subsequent grant of probate which retrospectively vested all of the
> testatrix's real and personal estate in Mr. Hawkins as from her death, the
> damage which was then sustained by the estate can now be seen to have been
> sustained by Mr. Hawkins as the testatrix's executor. The question for the
> purposes of
> s.14(1)<redir.aspx?REF=92n81TDNrElteadpaXX2wYkBLYy52QZmwoDfB8XtX9vdltyPbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9aldXcnhLQ1ZUNGZBTERqWU5wMFBaaVhCVFp3WnBiSlc1MFJsZWdRczNlQ1dUMFRhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk5ek1UUXVhSFJ0YkEuLg..>
> of the Limitation
> Act<redir.aspx?REF=cZTXGhW9bHDSkKtrBmX-mRL6WcimCIO6Mcv793Pxgso7-N6PbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9dFZSSFNNeDg2dE9YVDQzVWN3b203NG9ySHZXVkhtQVlqcXJ6MTBfaXo3R1dUMFRhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk4Lg..>
> is not, however, when damage was sustained. The relevant question is when
> the cause of action first accrued "to the plaintiff or to a person through
> whom he claims". In the circumstances of the present case, that question
> gives rise to a miscellany of problems to which reference was made in
> argument or in judgments in the courts below. The cause of action obviously
> did not accrue to the testatrix for she was dead when the damage was
> sustained. It may be arguable that, viewed contemporaneously, the cause of
> action accrued to the Public Trustee at the time when damage was first
> sustained. The limited interest of the Public Trustee under s.61 of the
> Wills, Probate and Administration
> Act<redir.aspx?REF=D6OAkWXjD14WJ9WqA9poT5iI4fV_V2ElNLHw32fYiyo7-N6PbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9RUVkLTY2RHhmbnp5Yi1pc0JkYndYUE9ONFg2QmNmdnkxRHVsOEpkdlFaS1dUMFRhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDNCaFlXRXhPRGs0TWpVNUx3Li4.>
> assumed an ephemeral quality, however, after the grant of probate to Mr.
> Hawkins and it is difficult to see how it could realistically be said that
> the Public Trustee was, for the purposes of
> s.14(1)<redir.aspx?REF=FfDZZCRPSoAO7eWFikGhYDB5N_GXb6VzUPkvla61PBA7-N6PbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9aldXcnhLQ1ZUNGZBTERqWU5wMFBaaVhCVFp3WnBiSlc1MFJsZWdRczNlQ1dUMFRhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk5ek1UUXVhSFJ0YkEuLg..>
> of the Limitation
> Act<redir.aspx?REF=cZTXGhW9bHDSkKtrBmX-mRL6WcimCIO6Mcv793Pxgso7-N6PbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9dFZSSFNNeDg2dE9YVDQzVWN3b203NG9ySHZXVkhtQVlqcXJ6MTBfaXo3R1dUMFRhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk4Lg..>,
> the person to whom the right of action had originally accrued (cf. the
> reference to the first of a class of owners in Pirelli, at p 18) or a
> "person through whom" the plaintiff in the present case claims. Nor is it
> easy to see how, in the context of
> s.61<redir.aspx?REF=jwKZySnp5UEoDZf3WSvdzSzgA2FWwB6L0TTvzOK9vVw7-N6PbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9WFJhZ3Btbl9xV2ZMN3BwQ1FBcGVpSmdqX3NUWG1FU3NVdzI4dkNZaVhXeVdUMFRhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk5ek5qRXVhSFJ0YkEuLg..>and
> viewed objectively, it can realistically be said that the cause of action
> accrued to Mr. Hawkins as executor some six years before he decided to apply
> for, let alone obtained, a grant of probate of the testatrix's will.
> Finally, it is arguable that, in the circumstances of the present case, the
> duty of care owed by the firm was a continuing one, that the breach of that
> duty continued up until the firm finally took some positive step to locate
> Mr. Hawkins and inform him of the existence and contents of the will and
> that damages (which would include the loss of a right of action by the
> operation of the Limitation
> Act<redir.aspx?REF=WG4V29azaihtrUT7JWlzZ0lkn-M-tVIM7cwVT6X41kM7-N6PbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9OXU0UzY2c2xBX292RnZ4VWlvM3FFQWRRV05ydTEwbmxNNTl3RWhkUG5FNzFzRWJhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk4Lg..>)
> continued to accrue in varying forms right up until the time when the Stamp
> Duties Office imposed a fine for late lodgment of the death duty return and
> when Mr. Hawkins incurred any additional legal costs involved in seeking
> probate of a copy will as distinct from the original document. In these
> circumstances, there is something to be said for the view that a distinct
> cause of action accrued each time new damage was incurred by reason of the
> continuing breach of duty. It is, however, unnecessary to pursue these
> problems involved in the firm's defence based on the Limitation
> Act<redir.aspx?REF=WG4V29azaihtrUT7JWlzZ0lkn-M-tVIM7cwVT6X41kM7-N6PbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9OXU0UzY2c2xBX292RnZ4VWlvM3FFQWRRV05ydTEwbmxNNTl3RWhkUG5FNzFzRWJhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk4Lg..>.
> There is a more general answer to that defence. Its basis is to be found in
> the circumstance that, in the present case, the negligent failure of the
> firm to inform Mr. Hawkins of the existence and contents of the testatrix's
> last will not only caused the damage which was sustained by him in the
> capacity of executor of the testatrix's estate but also effectively
> concealed from him, for so long as he remained unaware of the contents of
> the will, the existence of the cause of action in negligence against the
> firm.
> 42. It is inevitable that a Statute of Limitations will, on occasion, lead
> to injustice in the special circumstances of particular cases. Such
> injustice, when it occurs, is an unavoidable cost of the benefits involved
> in ensuring that plaintiffs act promptly and that defendants are not
> subjected to the litigation of stale claims. The present case falls,
> however, in an anomalous category where the applicability of a limitation
> provision such as
> s.14(1)<redir.aspx?REF=ifIUyOGqOygPtnjKhsBdbnKOHuZKxXHqZYeBjpdyFfc7-N6PbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9a0xsTGdoSFZ3NlppZ3Z4WkhDcHc3ZEotZVpMUlJJU3lpcFpfOFpmZnNJNzFzRWJhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk5ek1UUXVhSFJ0YkEuLg..>
> would invariably involve prima facie hardship and injustice and where any
> compensating public benefit, apart from protecting the courts from being
> required to determine issues of distant fact, is absent. If a wrongful
> action or breach of duty by one person not only causes unlawful injury to
> another but, while its effect remains, effectively precludes that other from
> bringing proceedings to recover the damage to which he is entitled, that
> other person is doubly injured. There can be no acceptable or even sensible
> justification of a law which provides that to sustain the second injury will
> preclude recovery of damages for the first. It would, for example, be a
> travesty of justice and common sense if the law provided that a cause of
> action lay for damages for false imprisonment but then went on to provide
> that that cause of action would be lost if the false imprisonment continued
> for six years after the cause of action first accrued. Likewise, it would be
> a travesty of justice and common sense if the law imposed a duty upon a
> solicitor to take positive steps to inform a third person of the contents of
> a document of which the solicitor was alone aware and then provided that any
> cause of action against the solicitor for damage caused by a negligent
> failure to perform that duty would be lost if the negligence continued for
> six years. It is arguable that the notion of unconscionable reliance upon
> the provisions of a Statute of Limitations which provides the foundation of
> the long-established equitable jurisdiction to grant relief in a case of
> concealment of a cause of action until after the limitation period has
> expired (cf.
> s.55(1)<redir.aspx?REF=_cU2dEUx-aQb4GbB7NNFEdhpIZ1Yi_GDs2Wy-857Hh07-N6PbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9MGM1YWczeklIREZvZS1HbU1aeU1uakFuN1lsd2kyTWQ1elI4Nmx5SFVkWDFzRWJhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk5ek5UVXVhSFJ0YkEuLg..>
> of the Limitation
> Act<redir.aspx?REF=WG4V29azaihtrUT7JWlzZ0lkn-M-tVIM7cwVT6X41kM7-N6PbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9OXU0UzY2c2xBX292RnZ4VWlvM3FFQWRRV05ydTEwbmxNNTl3RWhkUG5FNzFzRWJhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk4Lg..>)
> should, by analogy, be extended to cover cases such as these where the
> wrongful act at the one time inflicts the injury and, while its effect
> remains, precludes the bringing of an action for damages. It seems to me,
> however, that the preferable approach is to recognize that it could not have
> been the legislative intent that the effect of provisions such as
> s.14(1)<redir.aspx?REF=xCREdQARtnK2V0q-QdYpPYkOHRgr2W9TKdDLR9cwMdiZWeGPbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9a0xsTGdoSFZ3NlppZ3Z4WkhDcHc3ZEotZVpMUlJJU3lpcFpfOFpmZnNJNzFzRWJhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk5ek1UUXVhSFJ0YkEuLg..>
> of the Limitation
> Act<redir.aspx?REF=62Y0_HkdK8dFJe2RDmqKxkOu_h32qN0FTjvb8Hff6eyZWeGPbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9OXU0UzY2c2xBX292RnZ4VWlvM3FFQWRRV05ydTEwbmxNNTl3RWhkUG5FNzFzRWJhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk4Lg..>
> should be that a cause of action for a wrongful act should be barred by
> lapse of time during a period in which the wrongful act itself effectively
> precluded the bringing of proceedings. On that approach, the reference in
> s.14(1) of the Act to the cause of action first accruing should be construed
> as excluding any period during which the wrongful act itself effectively
> precluded the institution of proceedings.
> 43. In the present case, the negligent failure of the firm to notify Mr.
> Hawkins of the existence or contents of the testatrix's will effectively
> precluded the institution of the present proceedings against the firm until
> he was finally informed of his appointment as executor. The present
> proceedings were instituted within six years of that time. That being so the
> firm's defence based upon the Limitation
> Act<redir.aspx?REF=62Y0_HkdK8dFJe2RDmqKxkOu_h32qN0FTjvb8Hff6eyZWeGPbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9OXU0UzY2c2xBX292RnZ4VWlvM3FFQWRRV05ydTEwbmxNNTl3RWhkUG5FNzFzRWJhb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDJ4aE1UazJPVEV6TXk4Lg..>
> fails.
> Gaudron J
> 25. Until the assets came under the actual control of Mr Hawkins they had
> sustained damage by deterioration and had been subject to waste, including
> that the real estate had not been put to income-producing use. But that was
> not the loss sustained by Mr Hawkins. The property was not then vested in
> him, notwithstanding that by s.44 of the Wills, Probate and Administration
> Act<redir.aspx?REF=DFftlsYZlJaBTDMlCc6A7ioDcyMDWXhJEkbXj1qzhLeZWeGPbkjTCAFodHRwczovL3dlYm1haWwuc3lkbmV5LmVkdS5hdS9vd2EvcmVkaXIuYXNweD9SRUY9NVBfbmpEdmlhNGxHUGdnT1M1b1FnLTFpVk85OFBTOGdscUxPeG1DeGNkNVVFa25hb2tmVENBRm9kSFJ3T2k4dmQzZDNMbUYxYzNSc2FXa3VaV1IxTG1GMUwyRjFMMnhsWjJsekwyNXpkeTlqYjI1emIyeGZZV04wTDNCaFlXRXhPRGs0TWpVNUx3Li4.>
> the grant of probate effected a vesting with retrospective effect. Nor had
> he suffered a loss of income. Indeed it may have been that had the real
> estate been under his control it would have been used for his personal
> occupation rather than for the production of income. What he suffered was a
> loss in the value of the assets referable to their not having been properly
> managed in the period prior to coming under his control. That loss was
> suffered by the executor only when the assets came under his actual control.
> At the earliest, that occurred when he was informed of the existence of the
> will in March 1981. Action was commenced within six years of that date.
> ________________________________
> From: Joe Campbell [j.campbell@sydney.edu.au]
> Sent: Tuesday, March 08, 2016 10:32 AM
> To: Neil Foster; Gerard Sadlier; Jason Neyers
> Cc: obligations@uwo.ca
> Subject: RE: Limitation Period for Negligently Caused Financial Loss
>
> Other authority is in Leda Pty Ltd v Weerden [2007] NSWCA 174 at [70]-[71],
> which reiterates Segal v Fleming [2002] NSWCA 262 at [20]-[27], and
> expressed the view that the analysis is consistent with the judgment of the
> majority of the High Court in the then-recent decision in Commonwealth v.
> Cornwell.
>
> Negligently caused financial loss is an area where there is possible scope
> for an extension of the limitation period by virtue of fraudulent
> concealment, especially when fraudulent concealment can arise from the way
> in which the tort was committed: Bulli Coal Mining Co v Osborne [1899] AEC
> 351; Beaman v ARTS Ltd [1949] 1 KB 550; Levy v Watt [2014] VSCA 60.
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Joe Campbell
>
> From: Neil Foster [mailto:neil.foster@newcastle.edu.au]
> Sent: Tuesday, 8 March 2016 9:05 AM
> To: Gerard Sadlier; Jason Neyers
> Cc: obligations@uwo.ca
> Subject: Re: Limitation Period for Negligently Caused Financial Loss
>
> Dear Ger;
> There is a brief summary of some of the authorities in the 7th edition of
> Luntz & Hambly et al Torts Cases and Commentary (LN Butterworths, 2013)
> paras 5.2.8-5.29. Herewith:
>
>
> 5.2.8 Th ere are many cases of apparent property damage that are better
> analysed as cases of pure
>
> economic loss. Time would then start to run from the suff ering of the
> economic loss, which would
>
> usually be on discovery of the defect: see the analysis of the Australian
> cases in Cyril Smith & Associates
>
> Pty Ltd v Owners-Strata Plan No 64970 [2011] NSWCA 181; BC201104963 at
> [8]–[24]. But, as the
>
> decision in this case shows, even when the defect is known and time has
> started to run, the plaintiff
>
> may be unaware of who is responsible for the defect. In general, even in
> economic loss cases, the High
>
> Court has ‘rejected the proposition that … time does not run until the
> plaintiff discovers, or could
>
> on reasonable inquiry have discovered, that damage has been sustained’:
> Commonwealth v Cornwell,
>
> see 5.2.9, at [6], citing Hawkins v Clayton, see 16.2.19.
>
>
>
> 5.2.9 In Wardley Australia Ltd v State of Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR
> 514, Mason CJ, Dawson,
>
> Gaudron and McHugh JJ said:
>
> Economic loss may take a variety of forms and, as Gaudron J noted in Hawkins
> v Clayton (1988)
>
> 164 CLR 539 at 600–1, the answer to the question when a cause of action for
> negligence causing
>
> economic loss accrues may require consideration of the precise interest
> infringed by the negligent
>
> act or omission. Th e kind of economic loss which is sustained and the time
> when it is fi rst sustained
>
> depend upon the nature of the interest infringed and, perhaps, the nature of
> the interference to
>
> which it is subjected: see Cane, Tort Law and Economic Interests, 1991, pp
> 16–17. With economic
>
> loss, as with other forms of damage, there has to be some actual damage. …
> Prospective loss is not
>
> enough (at 527).
>
>
>
> See also Commonwealth v Cornwell (2007) 229 CLR 519 (employer gave
> plaintiff negligent advice
>
> concerning his eligibility to join superannuation fund; majority held loss
> crystallised only on his
>
> retirement; decision criticised by C W Pincus QC, (2007) 81 ALJ 735 at
> 738); Law Society v Sephton
>
> & Co (a fi rm) [2006] 2 AC 543 (HL) (no damage from negligent certifi
> cation of solicitor’s accounts
>
> by auditor until claim made on Law Society).
>
> Regards
> Neil
>
>
> Associate Professor Neil Foster
> Newcastle Law School
> Acting Assistant Dean, Teaching and Learning
> Faculty of Business and Law
>
> O: MC177, McMullin Building
> T: +61 2 4921 7430
> E: neil.foster@newcastle.edu.au<UrlBlockedError.aspx>
> W: http://www.newcastle.edu.au/profile/neil-foster<UrlBlockedError.aspx>
> My publications: http://works.bepress.com/neil_foster<UrlBlockedError.aspx>/
> , http://ssrn.com/author=504828<UrlBlockedError.aspx>
> Blog: https://lawandreligionaustralia.wordpress.com<UrlBlockedError.aspx>
>
> The University of Newcastle (UON)
> University Drive
> Callaghan NSW 2308
> Australia
>
> CRICOS Provider 00109J
> [The University of Newcastle]<UrlBlockedError.aspx>
>
>
> [width=]
>
>
>
> From: Gerard Sadlier <gerard.sadlier@gmail.com<UrlBlockedError.aspx>>
> Date: Tuesday, 8 March 2016 at 3:35 AM
> To: "jneyers@uwo.ca<UrlBlockedError.aspx>"
> <jneyers@uwo.ca<UrlBlockedError.aspx>>
> Cc: "obligations@uwo.ca<UrlBlockedError.aspx>"
> <obligations@uwo.ca<UrlBlockedError.aspx>>
> Subject: Limitation Period for Negligently Caused Financial Loss
>
> Dear all,
>
> I'd be really grateful for any references to the leading works
> regarding the Australian and/or Canadian law on this issue, especially if
> they
> happened to be available online?
>
> Many thanks
>
> Ger
>
>