From: Jason W Neyers <jneyers@uwo.ca>
To: obligations@uwo.ca
ENRICHMENT@LISTS.MCGILL.CA
Date: 27/07/2016 19:59:56 UTC
Subject: RE: Misrepresentation and Rescission in the UK Supreme Court

Dear Colleagues:

 

My gut reaction (of which I am happy to be disabused) is that the case is wrongly decided and that the decision in the CA is to be preferred.*   As was admitted by the insurer, they did not really believe the statements made by the defendant as to the seriousness of his medical condition but they could not really disprove them at the time of the settlement.  What they really were afraid of was that a sympathetic trial judge might believe the defendant.  So what they relied on was not the truth of the statements but merely the fact that they were made. In this sense and this sense only were the statements a cause of the insurer entering into the settlement. 

 

I am also a little concerned by the summary of the tort given by Lord Toulson at [58] where he seems to be saying that one has to intend the representee to act to his or her detriment in order for the tort be actionable.  He also uses this line of thinking to prove why damage is a necessary element of the tort (at [62]).  But isn’t it trite law that the representor does not have to intend to cause loss: see Bradford v Borders where the court says: ‘If however fraud be established, it is immaterial that there was no intention to cheat or injure the person to whom the false statement was made. ( Derry v. Peek (1889) 14 A.C. 337 at p. 374; Peek v. Gurney L.R. 6 H.L. 377 at p. 409.)’?

 

It seems to me that a better way of dealing with this set of facts is by using the unlawful means tort: the defendant lied to doctors and other professionals involved when they prepared their reports and that this was done with the intention of causing loss to the insurer.

 

*Here is how the CA decision is summarized:

 

“Briggs LJ’s … held that for a misstatement to be the basis for a claim to rescind a contract, the claimant must have given some credit to its truth and have been induced into making the contract by a perception that it was true rather than false. He said that when judges and text-book writers used the  word  “influenced”  …  they  did  so  in  order  to accommodate  cases  where  belief  in  the  truth  of  the  statement  was  a  contributory rather than the [primary] cause of the representee’s entry into the contract.”

 

“Underhill LJ’s … starting  point  was  that  when  a  person  enters  into  a  contract  to  settle  a dispute he knowingly takes the risk of making a payment for a claim which may be ill-founded, and he pays a sum commensurate with his assessment of that risk. But he said that the risk which a settlor must be taken to have accepted will depend on the circumstances of the case. A settlor will not normally be taken to have accepted  the risk that the claimant’s case is not just ill-founded but dishonest. However, if it is sufficiently apparent that the settlor intended  to  settle  notwithstanding the possibility that the claim was fraudulent, he will be held to the settlement. The fact that  the  insurers  had  pleaded  that  the  claim  was  exaggerated  for  financial  gain proved their awareness of the possibility of fraud, but they chose to settle the claim with that awareness, and it was contrary to the public interest in the settlement of disputes for them to be allowed to set aside the settlement.

 

Sincerely,

 

esig-law

Jason Neyers
Professor of Law
Faculty of Law
Western University
Law Building Rm 26
e. jneyers@uwo.ca
t. 519.661.2111 (x88435)

 

From: Lee, James [mailto:james.lee@kcl.ac.uk]
Sent: July-27-16 8:40 AM
To: obligations@uwo.ca; ENRICHMENT@LISTS.MCGILL.CA
Subject: Misrepresentation and Rescission in the UK Supreme Court

 

Dear Colleagues,

 

Further to ODG/RDG e-mails today about other decisions of interest, the UK Supreme Court has also given judgment in Hayward v Zurich Insurance [2016] UKSC 48 https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2015-0099-judgment.pdf. This case concerts ingredients of the tort of deceit and the circumstances in which rescission can be granted for misrepresentation, in particular inducement and causation where the representee may not believe the representation. It was in the context of a personal injury claim which was settled, but it was later discovered that the claimant had dishonestly exaggerated his symptoms for financial gain. The court allows the appeal and the settlement could be set aside. Lord Clarke holds that it "is sufficient for the misrepresentation to be an inducing cause and that it is not necessary for it to be the sole cause" (at [33]), (adopting the language of "material cause"), and also refers approvingly to the article in last year's LQR by Hon KR Handley on "Causation in Misrepresentation", and concludes (at [40]):

"As explained above, the questions whether Zurich was induced to enter into the settlement agreement and whether doing so caused it loss are questions of fact, which were correctly decided in its favour by the judge. I accept the submission that the fact that the representee (Zurich) does not wholly credit the fraudster (Mr Hayward) and carries out its own investigations does not preclude it from having been induced by those representations. Qualified belief or disbelief does not rule out inducement, particularly where those investigations were never going to find out the evidence that subsequently came to light. That depended only on the fact that Mr and Mrs Cox subsequently came forward. Only then did Zurich find out the true position. As Mr Hayward knew, Zurich was settling on a false basis."

Lord Clarke leaves open whether a representee who knows that a representation is untrue can ever succeed. Lord Toulson issues a concurring judgment.

Best wishes,

James

--

James Lee

Senior Lecturer in Private Law

Acting Director of UG Admissions and Scholarships

The Dickson Poon School of Law
King's College London
Strand
London WC2R 2LS



E-mail: james.lee@kcl.ac.uk



Profile: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/law/people/academic/j-lee.aspx