|From:||Jason Neyers <email@example.com>|
|To:||Robert H Stevens <firstname.lastname@example.org>|
|Date:||14/01/2009 16:32:10 UTC|
|Subject:||Re: ODG: Duties to the unborn|
1) Aren't you really creating a right to bodily integrity in disguise
then? Isn't it simpler to recognize the right to bodily integrity from
conception with the privilege for the mother?
2) In the world we live in can't foxes be injured in the wild and can't
this effect others? Is there then a right to a "healthy capture"?
Associate Professor of Law &
Cassels Brock LLP Faculty Fellow in Contract Law
Faculty of Law
University of Western Ontario
(519) 661-2111 x. 88435
Robert H Stevens wrote:
>> Dear Rob and all:
>> But if the baseline position is that the child/fetus has no rights of
>> personal integrity until birth then absent the right you posit (of
>> healthy birth) then A would be at liberty to injure the child/fetus.
>> Once the right you posit is said to exist it appears that A now has to
>> restrain his or her actions. In effect, the right you posit is one that
>> forces A to benefit the child/fetus by not factually effecting it even
>> thought the right to personal integrity says otherwise.
> The fact that we cannot rely upon one right (the (standard) Donoghue right
> not to have our bodies negligently injured by other people) doesn't mean
> that we cannot rely upon another right. I am certainly not suggesting a
> positive duty on others that they take steps to ensure the healthy birth
> of the unborn with whom they have no relation. I am not liable for failing
> to give food to hungry pregnant women.
>> What would justify this right of healthy birth? And how would this
>> justify only a right of healthy birth and no other rights to factual
>> positions? I can't really think of another situation where we have
>> rights that secure us a factual position that our other rights say is
>> not protected, absent some sort of assumption of responsibility through
>> contract or otherwise.
> I think it is justified for precisely the same sort of reasons all of our
> rights are justified. So, if humans were invulnerable I would have no duty
> not to injure other people. That is not the world I find myself in. If the
> unborn could not be harmed we wouldn't have to be careful not to injure
>> Think of a case like Pierson v Post and assume that instead of catching
>> the fox, the second hunter merely injured it. Thus when the first hunter
>> captured the fox he sued for this factual injury. Your solution seems
>> akin to saying that although the first hunter's property rights were not
>> injured (since they did not crystallize until capture) the second hunter
>> is liable since there is a right of "healthy capture" that the second
>> hunter infringed. When phrased this way, doesn't it seem that the law is
>> creating a duty on the second hunter to benefit the first (at least in
>> the limited sense that he cannot make the fox factually worse than it
>> would have been had it come into the first hunter's possession untouched)?
> There are many ways in which I can, by my positive action, make you worse
> off than you otherwise would be but commit no wrong. One is by competing
> with you (or grabbing a fox you were chasing first). These are not cases
> of 'failing to confer a benefit'. There is feasance but not misfeasance.
> Catching a fox is certainly not "nonfeasance" (ie not doing). Misfeasance
> and nonfeasance are not, as a matter of English and logic, opposites.
> The right I am suggesting is unusual in one sense: it is only capable of
> being infringed by conduct occurring prior to the right coming into
> existence, but as Neil demonstrated, we don't worry about that.