I agree with Lionel.  The real culprits are the Australians, who in their academic literature seem to put quotes in italics and then either indent or use quotation marks or both.  The reader already knows from the presence of quotation marks or indentation that they are reading a quote.  They don’t need it shoved down their throat.

Bill 

 

 

I entirely agree with Matthew. I feel obliged, however, to register my discontent with the practice of setting quotations in italic text. “Quotations should be set within inverted commas, either single or double,” said the very pedantic Smith. He went on:

 

Of course, inverted commas are often called “quotation marks”; and it goes without saying that longer quotations—more text than will fit on a single line—should be set in indented text, without inverted commas. Italics, however, while they are suitable for emphasis or for non-English words, should not be used for quotations.

 

LDS

 

 

 

Dear all,

 

Those with an interest in equitable remedies may be interested by the English Court of Appeal’s decision today in UniCredit v RusChemAlliance [2025] EWCA Civ 99.

 

Last year, the CA granted a final anti-suit last injunction restraining defendant from pursuing proceedings in Russia based on an English law governed (albeit French-seated) arbitration clause: [2024] EWCA Civ 64. This was upheld by the UKSC: [2024] UKSC 30. The Russian court then says “nice try, but if you don’t get that anti-suit discharged you’ll forfeit £250m of your assets in Russia”. Claimant decides to surrender and asks CA to discharge the anti-suit.

 

A question arises from court: do we have the power to do this?

 

The CA for some reason thinks this raises an issue of what is now called the “finality principle”: see [19]. So it asks “The question, then, is whether there is power under CPR Part 3.1(7) to revoke or amend the CA’s Order in this case at the behest of UniCredit, with the agreement of RCA. It seems to me that such power must exist, both on the authorities I have cited and because of the unusual nature of the grant of a final anti-suit injunction.”

 

The Master of the Rolls ultimately reasons:

 

Secondly, this is private litigation between commercial parties. It would be very strange if a party that had obtained an injunction, even a final one, could never return to the court to ask that, in the changed circumstances that followed the grant of the injunction, it wanted it discharged. Take the example of the court granting a final injunction in favour of one landowner against another using adjoining land in a particular way. It would be surprising, in that situation, if the claimant landowner could not return to court to ask for the injunction to be discharged because, say, either planning permission had been granted permitting the use that had been injuncted, or the landowners had simply reached a commercial agreement varying their rights (see two first instance decisions suggesting this may be the case in different situations: Re Cabot Financial (UK) Ltd [2021] EWHC 789 (Ch), at [2]-[7], and Madison CF UK v. Various [2018] EWHC 2786 (Ch) at [29]-[51]).

 

The Court therefore discharges the anti-suit elements of the order: [44]-[55].

 

I agree with the MR’s reasoning from principle, but is this point really that unclear? And is this not (a rare example of) a genuine “inherent jurisdiction” issue? I had understood the court of equity can always dissolve any final (perpetual) equitable remedy enforcing private rights at the behest of the party obtaining it (subject, I suppose to abuse of process or duress/fraud concerns – see [29] of the MR’s judgment). So for example in, the well-known decision in  Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367, 394 (Lord Wilberforce):

 

“Fifthly, if the order for specific performance is not complied with by the purchaser, the vendor may either apply to the court for enforcement of the order, or may apply to the court to dissolve the order and ask the court to put an end to the contract. This proposition is as stated in Austins of East Ham Ltd. v. Macey [1941] Ch. 338 (and see Singh (Sudagar) v. Nazeer [1979] Ch. 474 , 480, per Megarry V.-C.) and is in my opinion undoubted law, both on principle and authority.”

 

Lord Wilberforce does not say “but of course, once the SP order is made, then we must consider finality”. I cannot see how it would be different for an injunction specifically enforcing a private right (in this case, a contractual right that the defendant arbitrate a dispute), but I would be interested to know if anyone has a different view?

 

Is this not simply an aspect of the nature of equitable remedies. Because specific relief is prospective in effect, it is entirely different to a determination of the kind whether event X has happened in the past, or whether a past breach must be compensated by a fixed amount of money. Once these things is determined then there must be finality (and of course a claimant can always agree to cancel a judgment debt by contract). But the future is uncertain, and circumstances may change such that it is no longer sensible or just for the court to continue holding the defendant over a barrel, requiring they do or do not do something. I can’t think the Chancery would have bound its hands with such inflexibility as by adopting a “finality principle” in this regard. Is the Court of Appeal simply being misled by the change in name from “perpetual” to “final”?

 

 

Matthew Hoyle Barrister www.oeclaw.co.uk Switchboard: +44 (0)20 7583 2000         One Essex Court, London Temple London EC4Y 9AR United Kingdom Tel +44 (0)20 7583 2000 clerks@oeclaw.co.uk One Essex Court, Singapore #04-14 Maxwell Chambers Suites 28 Maxwell Road Singapore 069120 Tel +65 6634 1363 singapore@oeclaw.sg           Information in this message is confidential and is likely to be subject to legal professional privilege. If you have received this message in error, please notify me immediately and do not disclose, copy, distribute or retain either the whole or any part of the message or any attachments. If you are not the intended recipient, please telephone (020) 7583 2000 immediately. Regulated by the Bar Standards Board.

 

 

 

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