From:                                         Christine Beuermann <Christine.Beuermann@newcastle.ac.uk>

Sent:                                           Monday 15 June 2026 10:27

To:                                               Robert Stevens; Steve Hedley; obligations

Subject:                                     Re: Privy Council on Vicarious Liability

 

In your example Rob, what if Bastian goes to the victim's house and says he is there on official business (even though he is not) and she has to let him in the house?

 

Full disclaimer, I have not yet read the case.

 

Cheers

 

Christine

 

 


From: Robert Stevens <robert.stevens@law.ox.ac.uk>
Sent: 15 June 2026 10:20
To: Steve Hedley <S.Hedley@ucc.ie>; obligations <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: RE: Privy Council on Vicarious Liability

 

External sender. Take care when opening links or attachments. Do not provide your login details.

Tricky to construct (on my view) because we'd have to posit facts where the detention itself is never wrongful. Detaining someone with the purpose of raping them is wrongful (ie the detention would no longer be being done for a proper purpose, and so would fall outside the statutory authorisation).

 

So, say the victim is lawfully detained. Because of the detention Bastian discovers where she lives, enabling him to commit rape after release. No claim against the employer in my view.

 

What the result would be on the posited 'close connection' test I do not know.

 

I agree, of course, that my preferred Salmond test approach is not the current law in England. I think the change was a mistake.

 

From: Steve Hedley <S.Hedley@ucc.ie>
Sent: 15 June 2026 10:07
To: obligations <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: RE: Privy Council on Vicarious Liability

 

 

But the Privy Council's reasoning doesn't seem to depend on the unlawfulness of the detention. Suppose the facts are slightly different: that there was initially reasonable suspicion of Mrs Bethel (which was only dispelled after enquiries that couldn't have been made quickly); Bastian's motives were initially lawful, and it was only later that he decided to rape her.  Different result?

 

 

From: Robert Stevens <robert.stevens@law.ox.ac.uk>
Sent: Monday 15 June 2026 09:45
To: James Lee <james.lee@kcl.ac.uk>; obligations <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: RE: Privy Council on Vicarious Liability

 

The initial detention was an unauthorised form of what the officer was authorised to do.

 

That initial wrong enabled the subsequent rape.

 

So, the employer is liable for both.

 

We re inching back to the correct position.

R

 

From: James Lee <james.lee@kcl.ac.uk>
Sent: 15 June 2026 09:39
To: obligations <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: Privy Council on Vicarious Liability

 

Dear Colleagues,

 

Last week's Privy Council decision in Bethel v Attorney General of The Bahamas will be of interest to members as the latest development on the close connection test in vicarious liability - https://jcpc.uk/uploads/jcpc_2024_0085_judgment_a133457ee0.pdf. (It was accepted that the law in The Bahamas is the same as English law on this point).

 

The case concerned the false imprisonment, assault and battery of the late claimant. She was a Jamaican national detained by police during an immigration raid, but she was in possession of a spousal permit as the wife of a Bahamian. She was interviewed and held at a detention centre and then transferred into the custody of an immigration officer, Bastian, in order to verify her address. He took her in his car with one of his female friends on a variety of errands and then ultimately to his home, where he detained her. She had repeatedly asked if she could go home to her children and she was told 'not yet'. Bastian continued to detain her and raped her twice. He then returned her home the following day.

 

There were two questions for the Board, first whether Mrs Bethel had been falsely imprisoned, and second whether the defendants (various government departments, but it was held nothing turned on which was to be liable) were vicariously liable for Bastian's wrongdoing. This required examination of the facts in the light of the reasoning of the Supreme Court in BXB v Barry Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses.

 

In a joint opinion by Lord Burrows (who gave the judgment in BXB) and Lady Justice Yip, the Board found that the close connection test was 'clearly satisfied' here (at [40]).

 

This was because Bastian was purportedly exercising his lawful authority for the whole period while he detained her; she was under his control; he owed her a duty of care while detaining her. The Court revisits phrases from previous cases in noting that there was a 'seamless sequence of events' from his initial taking over her custody until he returned her home, and that 'Mr Bastian never took off his "metaphorical uniform" as an immigration officer'.

 

Of most interest is perhaps the consideration at [47]-[48] where the Board distinguishes the outcome in BXB, where the close connection test was not satisfied, and draws parallels instead with recent cases on vicarious liability for the sexual abuse of children.

 

Kind regards,

James

 

--

James Lee

Professor of English Law and Vice-Dean (People & Culture)

The Dickson Poon School of Law

Somerset House East Wing

King's College London

Strand

London WC2R 2LS

 

E-mail: james.lee@kcl.ac.uk 

 

Forthcoming Articles: 'Scottish Storytelling and Law Reform' Edinburgh Law Review

 

With Man Yip, 'Wheeling and Dealing: Fiduciaries and the Commercial Context After Hopcraft' Journal of Business Law

 

Watch my Inaugural Lecture, 'Pure Imagination: Stories, Institutions and Law Reform' https://youtu.be/cSZR4Wycuzg