Dear colleagues,
An interesting decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal rendered a couple of weeks ago: Moore v. Sweet, 2017 ONCA 182 (CanLII), <
http://canlii.ca/t/h08vf>. Mr. Moore separated and later divorced from Mrs. Moore. While
they were married, he insured his life for $250,000 with Mrs. Moore designated as beneficiary. When they separated, it was agreed that Mrs. Moore would continue to pay the premiums (some $500/year) and would continue to be the named beneficiary. Mr. Moore
however changed the beneficiary designation to his new spouse, Ms. Sweet. (He made this designation irrevocable, which the first designation had not been; Canadian law allows such a designation which can then only be revoked with the consent of the named beneficiary.)
Later still, the Moores reached a separation agreement in relation to family property, which did not mention the insurance policy, and which did not include a general release.
When Mr. Moore died in 2013 the question was who should get the proceeds. The trial judge held that Mrs. Moore should, partly on the basis of a finding that the Moores' agreement constituted an equitable assignment of Mr. Moore's rights under the policy, and
partly on unjust enrichment reasoning. The ONCA unanimously rejected the reasoning based on equitable assignment.
By a majority of 2-1, the Court also rejected the unjust enrichment claim, implying (but not deciding) that there is no open-ended 'good conscience' category of constructive trust under
Soulos v. Korkontzilas. They held that the second and irrevocable beneficiary designation was a 'juristic reason' for Ms. Sweet's entitlement to the proceeds. Mrs. Moore was entitled to recover the premiums that she had paid since the separation until
the death.
In dissent, Lauwers J.A. would have imposed a constructive trust for unjust enrichment over the proceeds, in favour of Mrs. Moore. He concluded:
"[276] But I would go further and add that, to the extent that they fit awkwardly under the rubric of unjust enrichment, the disappointed beneficiary cases are perhaps better understood as a genus of cases in which a constructive
trust can be imposed via the third route in Soulos – circumstances where the availability of a trust has previously been recognized – and the fourth route – where good conscience otherwise demands it, quite independent of unjust enrichment."
Lionel