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RDG
online Restitution Discussion Group Archives |
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Paul Michalik wrote:
From what I remember of undergrad conflicts
in 1992, the rule from Penn's case
- that an English court adjudicating in matters of
equity, operates on the conscience of the defendant ( ex hypothesi present
in the jurisdiction) and not so "directly" on the title to the foreign
land outside the J as to infringe any principles of comity-
would allow a claim lie that in Polly
Peck to proceed, in spite of the title to foreign land principle
from Mocambique. I remember that rule too, although it never really made
that much sense to me since we know that there are equitable proprietary
rights even if they are historically sourced in conscience. See Webb
v. Webb, [1991] 1 WLR 1410 (ChD), [1994] 3 WLR 901 (ECJ), noted 8
TLI 99.
But this case did not rely on that rule, which I don't
think would apply as the claim to the land in Cyprus was not in any way
based in equity. Rather Rattee J relied on s 30(1) of the Civil Jurisdiction
and Judgments Act, providing that jurisdiction is proper in a tort claim
relating to immovable property outside the UK unless the proceedings are
principally concerned with a question of the title or the right to possession
of that property.
I would have thought that these proceedings were principally
so concerned. This is apparently the first case to interpret s 30(1).
Lionel <== Previous message Back to index Next message ==> |
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