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Having spent elsewhere
my days as a practising solicitor, I am not acquainted with the relevant
English legislation. However, my impression is that Sanders v. Isaacs is
in a line of cases, which includes Smith v. Sleap (1844) 12 M. & W. 585
and Wakefield v. Newbon (1844) 6 Q.B. 276, and that in Sanders the taxing
master was to be asked to assess the quantum meruit. This happened in Smith
v. Sleap. The assessment could otherwise have been made by the court, as
happened in Wakefield v. Newbon. If my impression is correct then, as in
both the earlier cases, the solicitors in Sanders v. Isaacs would in an
action for money had and received be found liable to repay so much (if any)
of the money paid under protest as exceeded the assessment.
The reason for paying under protest is to exclude any finding (such as
that in North Ocean Shipping Co. Ltd v. Hyundai Construction Co. Ltd.
[1979] Q.B. 705) that the payment is made pursuant to a compromise of
the dispute or otherwise by consent; for recovery is possible in these
circumstances only if the money has been paid under compulsion. The compulsion
lies in the duty to mitigate one's damages. In other words, as I was taught
as an articled clerk and never found to be questioned in practice, the
Court would entertain no claim for substantial damages for the conversion
of the documents by a plaintiff in Sanders' position, simply because payment
under protest would have led to their immediate release. A close analogy
is the decision of McCardie, J., in Payzu Ltd v. Saunders [1919] 2 K.B.
581. Of course, if (but only if) it had always been clear that there was
no risk of suffering substantial loss through delay in obtaining the documents,
Sanders should arguably have sued for their conversion in the ordinary
way.
On its facts, so far as my memory of them has been refreshed by the headnote,
I believe that the previous paragraph contains a ground, alternative to
that given by the House of Lords, for its decision in Woolwich Building
Society v. I.R.C. [1993] A.C. 70.
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From: Hector MacQueen One of my Masters students has raised a question about
English law which as a humble Scot I find myself unable to answer. It
is a quite interesting practical sort of restitution question. If anyone
can suggest an answer, I'd be pleased to hear it.
Hector MacQueen
------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Dear Prof. MacQueen,
I have a question concerning my dissertation "Payments
under Protest - A case for Restitution?".
While searching for cases which show that protest could
be a significant factor in allowing restitution I came across the case
of Sanders v. Isaacs [1971] 1 All ER 755. The case deals with the question
of when the client's application for taxation of a solicitor's bill
should be allowed if the bill has already been paid. (now s.70 of Solicitors
Act 1974). Express reservation of the right of taxation is seen there
as a highly important factor in establishing the required "special circumstances".
What I am not clear about is, what exactly happens
after taxation? If the taxation established that the bill was to high,
can the client automatically claim restitution of the money or does
he have to show that there was some unjust factor according to general
restitutionary principles?
I have looked in Cordery's Law relating to Solicitors
and Halsbury's Law of England but could not find any reference to what
happens after the taxation of the bill. I would be very grateful if
you had any suggestions on this, maybe were I could find more information?
Thanks a lot for your help.
Babette
Hector MacQueen Editor Edinburgh Law Review
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