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I think Steve Hedley is quite right when he says that describing something as "unjust enrichment" does not enhance our understanding of why a particular response is given. But wasn't Jonathon saying that the response was to be given not because of "unjust enrichment" but because (rightly or wrongly) once the judgment is set aside an action could be brought for illegitimate pressure. Surely it is vital to understand why it is that a particular action can be compelled. I don't read Jonathon's comments as appealing to "unjust enrichment" as a panacea in itself.

For me, the example given by Mr Hedley can be used to illustrate this. Historically , to get released because a conviction was wrongful a prisoner had to show that he or she was being "falsely imprisoned". It was not enough that conviction was 'unconstitutional'. The prisoner did this by bringing a writ of habeas corpus. This was effectively an order to show cause why the person was imprisoned. If cause could not be shown, release was directed. The writ operated not as a review of the correctness of any decision to imprison (judicial or otherwise) but to direct any imprisonment which was found to be unlawful. This is the mechanism and reason why an overturned conviction can lead to release. It can be compelled by legal process. Indeed, historically, it was by no means obvious that an unlawful conviction should lead to release. In the 16th century there was much debate about the scope of this writ.

For me, though, the action to set aside the judgment is an action for fraud. It is a new proceeding. It is not like an appeal from conviction. The "personal obligation" which arises to repay money obtained under the judgment when that action is made out is a restitutionary obligation arising as a result of the fraud, which "infects the whole body of the judgment": Jonesco v Beard [1930] AC.