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RDG
online Restitution Discussion Group Archives |
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Peter Birks wrote:
(1) The most important things that I know on this are
(2) Moses v Macferlan shows that there is no need to
reverse the judgment if you can show that the plaintiff committed a
civil wrong in suing, for then the payment under the judgment is merely
the measure of, or included in the measure of, damages, and the judgment
itself stands. PB suppose:
money has been received under a judgment which would not have issued
had some facts been known
the facts may be so serious as totally to defeat the entire substantive
basis for the judgment, or to reduce the substantive measure of recovery
or the unknown facts might constitute procedural errors which leave the
substantive basis and measure of recovery untouched
there will be rules as to whether the discovery of particular sorts of
error defeats the usual conclusiveness of a judgment
there will be rules as to whether a defeating error can be corrected
by setting aside the judgment or by an independent action as with Macferlan
described above
where the error correction is effected by the first step of setting aside
the judgment, there must be rules as to further proceedings:
1] it could be the rule that, whatever the sort of error, moneys received
under the judgment must be repaid, and a proceeding commenced anew toward
the substantive judgment to which the original plaintiff is entitled on
the facts if any
2] it could be the rule that the original plaintiff would not be required,
in the proceeding to set aside the judgment, to yield up everything received
and then commence a new proceeding, but could instead, in the set-aside
proceeding, establish her substantive rights if any as a set-off or reduction
which ever the procedural structure, it is OBVIOUS that after proceedings
are completed in any case in which the judgment is not conclusive, the
judgment holder will have that to which she is substantively entitled
and will not have that to which she is not substantively entitled
obvious rules tend to be given names--and a name for the rule that a
judgment recipient sometimes has to give some of it back--could be called
restitution without shocking too many legal minds, and the ground for
the restitution might be 'unjust enrichment' again without jarring too
many of the profession?
it is however true that the rules as a whole need not
be described as containing an element of 'restitution for unjust enrichment'
but simply as implementing a system whereby plaintiffs get and keep only
that to which they are substantively entitled on the facts of which the
system takes cognizance.
american papers have led me to believe that lord archer has been abolished?? <== Previous message Back to index Next message ==> |
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