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RDG
online Restitution Discussion Group Archives |
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I did not
think obviousness was a non-serious issue, though it has indeed been trivialized
in order to be dismissed. My point was not that SH was as bad as the Nazis
but that every argument in the form 'It is obvious that ...' is anti-rational,
in that it evades the giving of reasons and conceals errors. It is obvious
that an apple which detaches itself from a tree will fall to the ground.
But if we had stopped there we would never have found out why. I dispute
the assertion that rationality in law is different from rationality in the
natural sciences but, leaving that large question on one side, I take it
that SH cannot mean that law differs from physics in not needing to discover
reasons.
In Chandler v Webster the view was taken that money payable under a valid
contract could not be recovered even if the contract was later frustrated
and the payer got nothing for his payment. In Fibrosa a different view
prevailed. The difference requires to be explained, and it can only be
explained through a discussion of the reasons why restitution is given.
What advance can we make if one protagonist says that Chandler was obviously
right and the other says that it was obviously wrong, and both insist
that obviousness is an argument behind which it is not necessary to go?
If someone were to maintain money paid under a judgment which was valid
at the time of the payment should not be recoverable even if the judgment
was later reversed, we would likewise have to meet his argument with an
analysis of the reasons why restitution is ordered.
I confess that I would hardly know what law was, or how to mark a law
examination, if 'It is obvious that ...' were thought to be a good argument.
Presumably a student's 'It is obvious ...' would have the same validity
as a judge's.
Peter B H Birks, QC, DCL, FBA <== Previous message Back to index Next message ==> |
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