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Thank you for the correction and the support. Regarding the former, I should be grateful for further help. Since I have systematically studied neither Roman nor Scots Law and frankly admit that I am out of my depth, I trust that my floundering will be viewed with pity, rather than contempt.

In Shilliday v. Smith 1998 S.C. 725 the Lord President (Rodger) at 729 quoted from Stair's Institutions I vii 7:

"The duty of restitution extendeth to those things, quae cadunt in non causam, which coming warrantably to our hands, and without any paction of restitution, yet if the cause cease by which they become ours, there superveneth the obligation of restitution of them. Whence are the condictions in law, sine causa, and causa data causa non secuta, which have this natural ground, and of which there are innumerable instances, as all things that become in the possession of either party in contemplation of marriage, the marriage, which is the cause, failing to be accomplished, the interest of either party ceaseth, and either must restore."

At 730 his Lordship continued:

"The passage concerns two situations. The first (described by Stair as sine causa) is where property comes into someone's hands on a particular basis which ceases to exist. The second (described as 'causa data causa non secuta' ) is where property comes into the person's hands on the basis of some future event which fails to materialise. In either case the property must be restored. The important thing to notice is that in both cases the duty to restore is said to be based not on agreement (paction), but on a natural ground, ie, it is a duty imposed by law. This is a useful reminder that, even if in Cantiere San Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding & Engineering Co. 1923 S.L.T. 624 the House of Lords included certain situations relating to the non-performance of a contract under the heading of the condictio causa data, the basis of liability to reverse unjust enrichment is not contractual but rests on this separate duty imposed by law."

My first difficulty is that, whereas I understand you to say the condictio causa data applies where the purpose which fails is outwith contract, my understanding of both Viscount Stair and Lord President Rodger is simply that, whether or not the purpose which fails is within, the liability which warrants repetition is outwith, contract. I believe there is support for my interpretation of these authorities in all the speeches in Cantiere San Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding & Engineering Co., not least per Lord Dunedin at 630(2):

"It follows ... that if there is anything well settled in the law of Scotland it is that one of the forms of the action of repetition is condictio causa data causa non secuta. I forbear to criticise the Latinity, as the meaning is plain enough. But it is equally plain that this doctrine is applied to contracts, as well as to prestations which have their origin in donation and not in contract."

Thus, save as appears in the next paragraph, I cannot see where I have previously contradicted any of the above quotations.

I admit that I was not previously aware of Shilliday v. Smith. I readily concede that, in the second sentence of my quotation from 1998 S.C. at 730, Lord President Rodger supports your correction. However, my next problem is in discovering the foundation of his Lordship's definition of "sine causa". The example given by Viscount Stair is not of a basis ceasing to exist: there never was a marriage. Yet, apparently, this is an example of sine causa. For, according to Buckland & Mcnair Roman Law and Common Law (2nd edn by Lawson, Cambridge 1952) p.224 (citing D.12.7.5):

"If I pay you money to constitute a wife's dos in a forthcoming marriage and the marriage does not take place, I can recover the money (condictio sine causa)."

I can find no mention of this condiction in Erskine's Principles (21st edn by Rankine, Edinburgh 1911) nor in Gloag & Henderson's Introduction (whether the 4th edn by Gibb & Walker, Edinburgh 1946, or the 9th edn by Wilkinson & Wilson, Edinburgh 1987). I can find no help in The Laws of Scotland - Stair Memorial Encyclopedia. In vol. 15 (Edinburgh, 1996) ¶15 thereof, we are told no more than:

"[t]he condictio sine causa can be treated as subsumed in the condictio indebiti ...";

 and you and I are agreed that the condictio indebiti is irrelevant. Its irrelevance seems to be confirmed by the extracts quoted ibid. ¶16 from Lord President Hope's opinion in Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Lothian Regional Council 1995 S.C. 151 at 155H and 165E.

Until your correction, I thought I had two grounds for relying on causa data causa non secuta. First, in Cantiere San Rocco v. Clyde Shipbuilding & Engineering Co., at 632(2), Lord Shaw of Dunfermline said:

"It is ... admitted ... that consideration has entirely failed. Therefore this ... would be a typical case of restitution under the Roman Law and one for the application of the maxim causa data causa non secuta.

On my analysis, if Lord Archer's judgment against "The Daily Star" were to be set aside, there would be a failure of the consideration for the paper's payment to him. Secondly, Lewis & Short A Latin Dictionary (Oxford, 1897) gives "attend" as one meaning of "sequor". If the cause attributed to the payment was the entry of judgment then, after the setting aside of the judgment, cause will not have attended the payment any further; and restitution ought to follow. My third embarrassment is my inability to perceive that these grounds are sand, not rock.