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RDG
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At least the majority took an intellectually
honest and defensible route to that solution. I find this difficult to accept. Whatever one thought of Lord Woolf's dicta
in the Court of Appeal he at least attempted to set down some rules as to
when a claim to the gain made would be permitted. After the decision of
the House of Lords we are given very little with which to predict the outcome
of future cases. All we are told is:
"No fixed rules can be prescribed. The court will have
regard to all the circumstances, including the subject matter of the contract,
the purpose of the contractual provision which has been breached, the
circumstances in which the breach occurred, the consequences of the breach
and the circumstances in which relief is being sought. A useful general
guide, although not exhaustive, is whether the plaintiff had a legitimate
interest in preventing the defendant's profit making activity and, hence,
in depriving him of profit."
Why cannot rules be prescribed? What is meant by each
of the tantalisingly undefined factors? How much weight is to be given
to each of them? How do we spot a legitimate interest when we see one?
Are saved expenses recoverable or only profits?
When the explanation for the result is the need to do
"practical justice" this appears to be code for reaching a result for
which rational explanation cannot be given except that it seems fair.
At least the academics can continue to argue at length about when a claim
for the gain made from a breach of contract ought to be allowed, as the
House of Lords have not told us.
Two other points occur to me. In his discussion of the
case of "skimped performance" Lord Nicholls appears to contemplate allowing
a part refund of the price where the services paid for were inferior to
those contracted for. This appears to me to signal the end of the requirement
that a failure of consideration must be "total". Further it is unclear
to me whether Lord Nicholls considers it to be a pre-requisite of recovery
that the contract is terminated for breach.
The other point is a question of style. Both in Blake
and in Alfred McAlpine v Panatown there is a gratifying willingness to
cite academic work. But this tends to be done by way of vindication: "I
am pleased to note that Professors X, Y and Z agree with me and I found
their articles very helpful." It would surely be better if substantive
arguments for or against a particular result were engaged with (with attribution)
rather than breadth of reading being defensively shown off.
Robert Stevens <== Previous message Back to index Next message ==> |
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