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RDG
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The facts
of Durani are pretty similar to a case decided a fortnight ago in the English
CA, Collings v Lee, 19/10/00.
Lee was a fraudster who offered to help Mrs Collings
sell her house; he fraudulently misrepresented to her that he had sold
the house to a 3rd party for £250,000, and without paying her anything
got her to execute a transfer of the property to himself under a different
name; he was thus able to become registered as the proprietor of the property
at the Land Registry; he then executed a legal charge in favour of Halifax
plc to secure a loan of around £125,000; Halifax did not inspect the property
or discover Mrs Collings in actual occupation.
When the facts came to light, Mrs C sought rectification
of the Register against Lee and Halifax, and at first instance His Honour
Judge Boggis QC, sitting as a judge in Ch D, held that her right to set
aside the transfer to Lee for fraud was an interest which amounted to
an overriding interest under LRA 1925, s 70(1)(g) when coupled with actual
occupation. He therefore ordered rectification and Halifax appealed.
In the CA, the parties were all set to discuss the thorny
question whether a mere equity, such as a right to avoid a transfer of
registered land which is voidable for fraudulent misrep, does or does
not fall with s 70(1)(g). But in the course of argument, Mummery LJ then
pointed out that this was not the case before the court.
It was true that in Lonrho v Fayed (No 2) Millett J had
held that 'a contract obtained by fraudulent misrep is voidable not void,
even in equity' and that until the representee elects to avoid it 'the
representor is not a constructive trustee of the property transferred
pursuant to the contract'. However, in Nourse LJ's words:
'The rationale of the principle [stated by Millett J],
as it applies to a transfer of property, is that, even where the transfer
is obtained by fraudulent misrepresentation, the transferor nevertheless
intends that the whole legal and beneficial ownership in the property
shall pass to the transferee. But that was not this case. [Mrs C] did
not intend to transfer the property to [Lee] and ... did not intend to
transfer it for no consideration. [Lee] acquired the property without
[her] knowledge and consent and in breach of his fiduciary duty to her.'
Under these circumstances, Lee can never have taken clear
title, as an equitable beneficial interest in the property arose in Mrs
C's favour at the moment of the transfer, whether under an 'implied, resulting
or constructive trust' being 'a matter of no importance' (ouch).
Authorities for this analysis: Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange
(1986) 160 CLR 371, 389-90 (Brennan J); Agip v Jackson [1990] Ch 265,
290 (Millett J), approved in Heinl v Jyske Bank [1999] Lloyd's Rep Bank
511 (CA); Twinsectra
v Yardley [1999] Lloyd's Rep Bank 438, 461 (Potter LJ).
Conclusion: appeal dismissed and the judge's order for
rectification affirmed, although not for the reasons he thought.
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