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(1) I concede that I was wrong to classify gifts and payments other than for "valuable consideration" as the same thing. As often, it comes from careless use of a word with too many meanings, "consideration".

(2) I agree that donative intent is an essential feature of a gift. But is the intention to make a gift any different from the intention to transfer property without receiving anything (whether or not the something can be classified as "valuable consideration") in return?

(3) Legal language and spoken language are frequently out of step. The law adopts logical classifications, we use loose concepts. This is why it is legally possible to analyse gambling as making "gifts" to a casino, whereas we have trouble analysing it as such as a matter of everyday speech because it is not akin to giving Christmas presents (even if legally the same thing appears to happen).

-----Original Message-----
From: Robert Stevens
Sent: 15 December 2000 18:11
Subject: Re: Re: [RDG:] Cass (Trustee in Bankruptcy) v. Karpnale?

I would have thought that one of the essential features of a gift was donative intent. Certainly the Insolvency Act (s339, s 238) assumes that gifts and payments other than for valuable consideration are not synonymous. If this is incorrect as a matter of law it would be a shame as the law would be strangely out of step with every day language.

R