I have great difficulty with this. It suggests (indeed, Steyn actually asserts) that only *technical* reasons prevent us from classifying Blake as a fiduciary. So he suggests that while a pedant or nit-picker might deny that Blake was a fiduciary, any rational person would see that he should be treated like one.

But how can this be so? While Blake was employed by the British secret services, he was clearly a fiduciary. However, equally clearly, that fiduciary relationship was terminated when it was discovered that he was working for the Soviets. The British government reposed no confidence in him after that time. (Indeed, it is hard to think of anyone in whom the British government reposed *less* confidence.) By the time he made the profit, then, he had long ceased to be a fiduciary - and not on a technical ground, but a plain factual ground.

A possible argument is that fiduciaries such as Blake owe "life-long" duties, which survive termination of the fiduciary relationship. A related argument is that information obtained by fiduciaries is still protected after termination. But these arguments were thoroughly shredded at first instance and on appeal - and were not raised again on further appeal to the house of lords. If Steyn had answers to the objections raised by the lower courts, he didn't mention them. A vague statement that Blake's position was "similar" to that of a fiduciary really doesn't cut the mustard.

In what respect, therefore, was Blake in a "very similar position to a fiduciary"? I am mystified. Steyn's remark does not seem to me to survive analysis.

Steve Hedley

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