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In answer to David Cheifetz's suggestion, that the courts
should recognize a common law contribution right for the benefit of meritorious
claimants who fall through gaps in the statutory scheme: I agree! However
this would still leave us with a mish-mash of overlapping common law and
statutory recovery regimes and for this reason I think that a still better
idea would be statutory reform, as I argue in Chap 4 of my book, esp at
4.64-4.69. My objection to Moore-Bick J's analysis in Niru
is not that I oppose the courts working to fill in the gaps of the statutory
scheme by recognizing a direct common law contribution right, but that
in one breath M-B refuses to do this, and then in the next he recognizes
a common law subrogation right which amounts to exactly the same thing,
except in a more complicated way. Subrogation entails fictionally reviving
someone else's rights and giving them to the claimant instead of just
giving the claimant a right of his own. Why should C be entitled to this
complicated subrogation remedy? Because D has been unjustly enriched at
his expense. Why not give him a direct right then? A job for Occam's razor,
indeed.
Charles
Colleagues:
The twists & turns, the past few years,
in England's contribution jurisprudence as judges struggle with the
scope of the 1978 Civil Liability (Contribution) Act have made for interesting
reading. And probably larger fees for solicitors and barristers.
Charles Mitchell, in his last message,
mentions the seeming incongruity of allowing what amounts to a common
law claim for contribution where the statutory claim must fail because
the statute does not apply. I agree with the view that the ultimate
rationale for contribution is in UE; however, I don't see the incongruity
where the significant reason why the contribution claim failed is merely
that the categorisation of the concurrent wrongdoers' liability to the
injured person puts the situation outside of the limited ambit of the
contribution legislation. Any other approach, I feel, is another reminder
of Maitland's now almost 1 century old reminder that while the forms
of action have been abolished they still rule from their graves.
The logical and better solution, I
feel - Occam's Razor - is to create an analogous common law contribution
right among concurrent wrongdoers applicable to cases where the legislation
does not apply, but generally tracking the sensible portions of the
jurisprudence on the statutory right.
I recommend Weinrib, Contribution in
a Contractual Setting (1976) 54 Can Bar Rev 338 for an excellent and
succinct explanation of why this is the better approach.
That is what is occurring in Ontario.
Although the jurisprudence is still in its infancy, Ontario judges have
been able to avoid dodges like equitable subrogation to allow contribution
between multiple concurrent wrongdoers whose wrongs have caused the
same DAMAGES to the injured person, in cases where the Ontario contribution
statute - which is limited to claims for contribution between concurrent
tortfeasors - does not apply, by creating an analogous common law contribution
right. And then importing the principles from the statutory contribution
right into the common law right. The rationale is, of course, that the
common law is creation of the judges, there is no statutory impediment,
and that the legislation may be looked at as indication of how the common
law should develop.
As to the statutory right, while the
Ontario legislation is limited to claims for contribution between tortfeasors,
Ontario judges, fortunately, been able to duck - actually, I think it's
generally overlooked - the distinction between DAMAGE and DAMAGES, which
seems to bedevil the English jurisprudence, because the Ontario statute,
unlike England's form (current and past), provides that contribution
applies where the DAMAGES have been caused by the fault or negligence
of two or more tortfeasors.
David Cheifetz <== Previous message Back to index Next message ==> |
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