I hesitate to pollute the airways with economic analysis, but is at least arguable that the law accords a remedy allowing rescission for innocent misrepresentation because the representor is more able (cheapest cost avoider) to guard against actively causing mistakes affecting both parties, compared to the information costs facing the representee. Trustworthy commercial information is therefore cheapened and costs of protecting oneself against the other side's errors are lessened. Also we call misrepresentations 'innocent' when negligence or deceit cannot readily be proven - but there may still be some wrongdoing lurking in the misrepresentor's behaviour, at least to the degree that the benefit of the contract is rightly denied to the representor. The duty to disclose accurate information in close relationships can readily be fitted into these models.

Steve Smith's important new Clarendon Series book on 'Contract Theory' (OUP, 2004) has just been published, for which many congratulations to the author.

Joshua Getzler