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The issue, surely, is not about an 'explanation' at all.
The transfer in Allcard v Skinner, for example, can be 'explained'
as one where the novice was acting under the influence of the Mother Superior.
Similarly, the 'explanation' of Chase Manhattan is that the second
transfer was made by mistake. Indeed, if these 'explanations' were removed,
the ground of claim would simply disappear. What Duncan seems to be looking
for is a justification for the transfers, not an explanation.
WJS
----- Original Message ----- Dear all,
I imagine that if there were a natural
obligation, at least how I define them, that the answer would be no
the transaction does not call for an explanation if there is one. I
say this because if natural obligations arise because we see the agreement
to do act X as being worthy of some recognition, despite being unenforceable,
it is inconsistent to say that there can be a natural obligation where
there is undue influence, or undue influence where there is a natural
obligation. Where there is undue influence the law states that there
is a need to protect the claimant, which negatives the possibility of
a natural obligation. <== Previous message Back to index Next message ==> |
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