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RDG
online Restitution Discussion Group Archives |
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----- Original Message ----- Dear Andrew:
How is explaining common mistake or
frustration as a rule of law better than saying that the whole
tenor of the agreement objectively interpreted is consistent with the
implication that these obligations were not to bind in certain circumstances
(a natural law position). More importantly, the rule of law route is
a cop-out since it does not explain why there should be such a rule
of law. If the best that the CA can come up with is that a rule exists
because the judges said so or for some unnamed criteria of policy or
fairness, then the English common law understanding of this area is
quite impoverished. =====================================
describing the excuse for mistake or overreaching as
a rule of law is a statement that on certain factual circumstances, an
otherwise okay contract will not be enforced: for prediction purposes
it is unnecessary to consider why non-enforcement follows from mistake
or over-reaching
however, if one wishes to explain why the law-giver
gave the rule for mistake/overreaching, a possible explanation is implied
mutual intent and the higher rule that contract enforcement is to serve
intention. but only if the law-maker has some empirical foundation for
a particular implied intent [implausible as a mutual intent in the overreaching
case] is that intent an explanation: if the lawmaker implies the intent
not because he believes it to be true, but because he wishes it were true
[a natural law position?] or wishes that he could think of another contract
excuse, the intent thus imputed is not an explanation but the beginning
of another inquiry???
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