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RDG
online Restitution Discussion Group Archives |
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Charles,
I'm not sure whether it is remarkable that the members
of this list remember so much of what they once read or heard of, even
briefly, or that it is unremarkable that there is so much that we've seen
that we don't remember we once knew. (I think that sentence makes sense,
but I'll let others parse its twists.)
In any event, something about the current discussion
niggled both because of what we're discussing and something else. I had
no idea what it was. I can't say that I specifically went looking for
some indication why, but I found it regardless. The Canadian Bar Review
had recently put itself completely on line. I decided to browse to see
what was there that I might download for general reading. While there,
I ran a search broad enough to pull up articles dealing with apportionment
and causation. I found what might be what niggled. Or it might not.
If it is, it's Atiyah's 1965 article "Causation, Contributory
Negligence and Volenti Non Fit Injuria" (1965) 43 Can B Rev 609. The article
is a case comment on ICI Ltd v Shatwell [1964] 2 ALL ER 999 and
its predecessor Stapley v Gypsum Mines [1953] AC 663, discussed
under the rubric of four headings: Apportionment of Damages in Cases of
Joint Action; Joint Action and Causation; Volenti Non Fit Injuria as a
Defence to Negligence at Common Law, and Volenti Non Fit Injuria as a
Defence to Breach of Statutory Duty. The first two sections contain comments
on the relevance of non-causative factors to apportionment as between
injured persons and wrongdoers as well as between wrongdoers and the problem
of apportionment between joint wrongdoers. That's the current discussion
niggle. The conclusion contains the something else (for me) niggle - an
early aside on the rebirth of the courts' claims to some sort of inherent
common law power to decline to enforce contractual terms (or contracts)
which aren't illegal on broad grounds of public policy.
On the issue of causation, apportionment and joint actors,
the point he seemed to be making was that the principle behind joint wrongdoing
seems to require the conclusion, in most causes, that the joint actors
are equally at fault when analyzed on a purely causal basis. He at 625
"it seems that the courts are now irrevocably committed to the causal
approach in cases of concerted action and that on similar facts they will
almost certainly feel bound to decide that both parties' actions are,
in part at least, causes of the consequential damage, except, perhaps,
in circumstances (which will surely be rare) in which it can be clearly
demonstrated that the assistance of one of the parties made no difference
to the result. At 621: "But it is submitted that there is in fact ample
authority for the view that two parties who commit a wrong while acting
in concert are each wholly responsible for the consequences." And, at
622 "two persons acting in concert are each legally responsible for all
the consequences of their acts in the same way as they would be if each
of them was (as they were not in that case) the sole cause of the consequences."
He later, at p. 623, mentions the proposition that, in cases of concerted
action the wrongdoers are each authorising the other to do what he does.
The point on causation that I think Atiyah is making
- which I suspect I am parroting either from this article or elsewhere
- though, for the life of me, I don't think I've seen or thought of this
article since sometime between 1975 and 1980 latest - is that, for liability
to P, there's there is no need for a causal connection between the acts
of T2 and the loss, so long as T1s acts are causative, since T1s acts
are deemed to be T2s.
Atiyah also recognized that permitting the use of non-causative
factors could skew the result away from what might be the case if the
considerations are limited to the causative; however, he was more concerned
with analytical, logical anomalies that arise where one has to decide
whether, in cases where two or one or more of the wrongdoers are injured,
the percentages that determine the amount of the wrongdoer's contributory
fault (to determine their damages recovery from those at fault) have to
be the same as the percentages that determine their contribution liability
to one another. That is, if A is 20% at fault for his own injuries, does
it follow that he is also 20% at fault for B's and that B's corresponding
percentages are 80%; or that where there is B C D etc., that the total
of B C and D's etc is 80%. Recent decisions [certainly Barisic v Devenport
[1978] 2 NSWLR 111 (NSWCA); the trial decision in Renaissance v Frazer
(2001), 197 DLR (4th) 335, [2001] OJ No. 866 (QL) (Ont SCJ) - that part
of the judgment was affirmed in the Ont CA which varied only the apportionment
as between R and F as tortfeasors towards M - see, (2004), 242 D.L.R.
(4th) 229, 2004 CanLII 21044 (ON CA); even Fitzgerald v Lane
which was applied in Renaissance) indicate that the contributory
fault apportionments aren't determinative of the contribution apportionment,
and have to be done separately, because there are different factors involved.
That seems correct, to me.
As I read the article, Atiyah seems to think that, conceptually
and logically, the A v B and C etc percentages have to be the same as
the B v A and C percentages if the apportionments are entirely based on
causal factors. He seems to be saying that this would be particularly
so if the wrongdoers were joint actors and the causative conduct was primarily
only one persons'. He is probably right if we're measuring by causative
input only (assuming such measurement were possible). But I believe he
is wrong if the measure is relative blameworthiness. In any event, since
then, we have at least Barisic and Renaissance, and
maybe Fitzgerald, to provide judicial statements that contributory
fault apportionments and contribution apportionments don't have to be
the same. This makes sense, to me, at least because the extent of X's
departure, as the injured person, from the standard that defines the extent
of obligation he has to himself to take reasonable care isn't necessarily
the same as the extent of X's departure from the standard that defines
the extent of his obligation, as wrongdoer, to somebody else: in this
case his co-actor.
In any event, I remain uncertain that your intuition
about what would happen in the trustee / dishonest assistant situation
unless, and until, some judge decides how one gets around the principle
that, so long as the two are joint actors, the trustee's conduct is deemed
to be the assistant's, too. We could dance around the issue by saying
the assistant, in a particular case, didn't have the requisite intent
to be part of the common purpose, so was no more than negligent - that
is, was helping his/her boss but not hoping to get anything out of it
but keeping his/her job - so was merely a negligent concurrent tortfeasor,
but I think that's would be disingenuous dodge except in the case where
the assistant wasn't dishonest.
Paraphrasing what David Wingfield just wrote, it's impossible
to solve this debate in the sense of the correct answer. I think there's
a better answer, though, which is to concede that causative potency adds
nothing to blameworthiness; and that blameworthiness isn't all based on
causation but that an exhaustive formula for determining the content of
blameworthiness isn't practicable. Paraphrasing from a more salacious
area, we may not be able to define blameworthiness in advance, but we
know it when we see it.
Atiyah's article is on the Can Bar Rev site behind the
members only door, so I can not post a link; however, if the Can B Rev
article isn't otherwise readily available to you, and you want it, I'll
email a copy to you.
The unrelated niggle might have been the conclusion to
the piece. At 637, in the context of discussing what the HL meant, in
ICI, by contrary to public policy to allow the employer to contract
out of duties owed to the employee (statutory vs common law), Atiyah wrote:
If, however, their lordships merely meant that an
agreement to waive a statutory duty was contrary to public policy in
the sense that it was unjust for an employer to extract such an agreement
by virtue of his superior bargaining, power, the same reasoning may
well apply where the duty is a common law duty. The significance of
this possibility becoming a reality might be incalculable for it would
be a completely novel exercise of the power, thought by many to be dead,[fn
89] of striking down a provision in an agreement on grounds of public
policy even though the case does not fall into any of the existing well-recognised
heads of public policy. If a provision in an agreement can be declared
contrary to public policy and therefore void on the ground that the
parties are not of equal bargaining power, have we not here a weapon
which many have been searching for in order to combat the growing use
of exemption clauses and the like in standard form contracts? Is it
possible that ICI Ltd. v. Shatwell may one day be cited as
a leading authority in the law of contract as well as tort. [The case referred to at fn 89 is Fender v. St. John-Mildmay,
[1937] A.C. 1, at p.40 per Lord Wright.]
The weapon is, of course, the undefined content and scope
of the doctrine of unconscionability. The comment is historically interesting
to me as I'm struggling with a paper attempting to find some measure of
coherence in the bases upon which Canadian courts (especially Ontario's)
are declining to enforce exclusions in insurance policies - beyond just
the "insurer you can afford to pay, therefore you will pay".
Best regards,
David
----- Original Message ----- Dear David
Of course I agree that causation and
fault are separate concepts. I also agree that in practice it doesn't
often matter whether or not 'causative potency' has any meaning as a
stand-alone reason for making unequal apportionments between wrongdoers
because although the courts frequently invoke it as a relevant factor
in their calculations they almost invariably say in the same breath
that they are also taking into account the parties' 'blameworthiness'.
Once that's tipped into the mixture any qualms they may have on account
of the issues we've been discussing can easily be ignored. Driving carelessly
at 60 mph towards a pedestrian crossing is a more blameworthy thing
to do than driving carelessly towards the crossing at 20 mph because
the chance of harmful consequences is greater and so too is the probable
seriousness of these consequences - so who cares about this tricky causation
stuff? I guess your main point is that considerations of fault creep
in even on the rare occasions when the courts say that they're only
looking at causation, and I can't really argue with that either: BICC
Ltd v Cumbrian Industrials Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1621 seems like
a good example. But still, one reason why I chose my dishonest trustee/dishonest
assistant example is that here both D1 and D2 are as bad as bad can
be: deliberately doing things which they know will harm others in the
conscious knowledge that the world would frown on their behaviour. If
we were apportioning liability between them solely on the basis of fault
we would apportion equally. Yet my intuition tells me that an unequal
apportionment would be appropriate, even if the trustee has now lost
all the money so that no question of retained gains arises to tip the
balance against him.
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