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RDG
online Restitution Discussion Group Archives |
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It is difficult to see how the Beatson/Friedmann line
can be sustained in the light of the decision of the House of Lords in
United Australia v Barclay's Bank [1941] AC 1. Moreover, if the
claim in such cases is not parasitic, then what is it based on? How else,
for example, are we to explain the order that the defendant give up his
gain in a case such as A-G v Guardian Newspapers (profits made
in breach of confidence)?
Bill Swadling ----- Original Message ----- For the benefit of a former and cherished
teacher of mine (Swan that is), I feel compelled to point out that it
would be sporting for Russ to concede that not everyone shares the Birksian
line which he has advanced concerning the nature of waiver of tort.
Thus, for example, Beatson speaks for many (including myself) when he
writes: "...the restitutionary claim given by way of 'waiver of
tort' is not parasitic and does not depend on the existence of a tort"
see p.242 of "The Use and Abuse ...". Dan Friedmann is another
who has written in the same vein in his articles on the subject (e.g.
in the Jones symposium).
With respect to those who hold differing
views, it seems obvious to me, for the reasons advanced by Jack and
Dan and others, that waiver of tort, like breach of fiduciary obligation,
is a cause of action, and is not helpfully viewed as merely parasitic
on the existence of another cause of action in tort or, in the case
of fiduciary obligation, in "equity". Back (unhappily) to
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