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RDG
online Restitution Discussion Group Archives |
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At [25] we find this:
In attempting to formulate coherent principles that
would explain and rationalise past decisions to accommodate the relatively
recent recognition of a general law of restitution, there is no doubt
that the learned commentators have greatly contributed to, and will
quite properly continue to influence, its development. However, as the
reasons of Epstein J. indicate, their views have not been uniform despite
the enviable degree of confidence with which they have sometimes been
asserted. [14] The case for certifying the proceeding was very
strongly, and comprehensibly, contested by counsel for the defendants
on the basis of the evidence and the authorities. They left no stone
unturned and, in my opinion, turned over quite a few that were extraneous
to the case presented on behalf of the plaintiffs. Overall there is a good review of different road maps
of restitution but because this is only a certification application, the
judge does not need to pick one, only deciding that it is arguable that
a claim in negligence might lead to a gain-based remedy, and [38] that
"it is not plain and obvious that a claim based on waiver of tort
must satisfy the three-part test for unjust enrichment". While he
concludes that it is arguable that unjust enrichment can be established
without showing any deprivation, he decides that in a case where the only
facts pleaded involve negligence, there is no room for a separate claim
in unjust enrichment. Unfortunately these class actions rarely go trial in
Canada -- they tend to settle after certification -- so we may never get
actual decisions on the points that he decided were arguable.
Neil, what did you find objectionable in the judgment?
Is it that you agreed with the BCSC in Reid,
that there can be no gain-based claim for negligence?
That may well be right, but Reid seems much
less thorough than this judgment; Gerow J simply assumed there that all
gain-based claims are claims in unjust enrichment (which in my view is
inconsistent with Soulos
v Korkontzilas). In the earlier discussion on the RDG of Cullity
J's other judgments, some people read him as saying that waiver of tort
is an independent cause of action; I don't think this new judgment is
open to that criticism. He is not deciding whether waiver of tort is (a)
a gain-based claim for a wrong or (b) part of unjust enrichment, but I
don't think he can be read as saying that it is neither one.
I do think that in [64] Cullity J. may have misunderstood
Peter Birks' position.
Lionel
Justice Cullity of the Ontario Superior Court is at
it again, this time in Heward
v. Eli Lilly & Co., which was released the day before yesterday
(not yet posted to www.canlii.org,
but presumably in a day or two). There the judge makes his most expansive
comments to date on waiver of tort, expressing disagreement with the
recent decision in Reid
v. Ford Motor from British Columbia in finding that a remedy
depends on the three-part test for unjust enrichment from Pettkus
v. Becker. In related news, the Supreme Court of Canada is considering
an application for leave to appeal the
refusal of the Ont. CA to hear the appeal in Serhan v. Johnson &
Johnson, the decision that made waiver of tort a live issue
in Ontario — and for which we also have Justice Cullity to thank.
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