-- >From gregery1@indiatimes.com Tue Feb 01 20:24:34 2000 Received: from net01.axime.com ([160.92.120.1] helo=mailhost.axime.com) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12Fjqj-0002f9-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 20:24:33 +0000 Received: from comp6 (98AAD6B8.ipt.aol.com [152.170.214.184]) by mailhost.axime.com (8.9.3/[Atos MultiMedia]) with SMTP id VAA27885; Tue, 1 Feb 2000 21:21:50 +0100 (MET) Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 21:21:50 +0100 (MET) From: gregery1@indiatimes.com Message-Id: <200002012021.VAA27885@mailhost.axime.com> To: reps@hotmail.com Subject: Only 14 Good Reps Needed ...

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>From lionel.smith@law.oxford.ac.uk Thu Feb 03 14:13:10 2000 Received: from oxmail3.ox.ac.uk ([129.67.1.180] helo=oxmail.ox.ac.uk) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12GN0Q-00036e-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 14:13:10 +0000 Received: from sable.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.4]) by oxmail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.10 #1) id 12GMyN-0006j8-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Thu, 3 Feb 2000 14:11:03 +0000 Received: from fellow22.sthughs.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.228.82]) by sable.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 3.13 #1) id 12GMyN-00067E-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Thu, 03 Feb 2000 14:11:03 +0000 Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: lawf0014@sable.ox.ac.uk Message-Id: Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2000 14:09:31 +0000 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk From: Lionel Smith Subject: Dawson on UE Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" William S. Hein & Co. have reprinted John Dawson's 1950 Rosenthal Lectures, "Unjust Enrichment: A Comparative Analysis." ISBN 1-57588-523-9. US$48. You can order it from the Law Book Exchange Lionel >From lionel.smith@law.oxford.ac.uk Fri Feb 04 12:46:17 2000 Received: from oxmail2.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.1] helo=oxmail.ox.ac.uk) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12Gi7t-0003OW-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 12:46:17 +0000 Received: from sable.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.4]) by oxmail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.10 #1) id 12Gi5p-0006mv-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Fri, 4 Feb 2000 12:44:09 +0000 Received: from fellow22.sthughs.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.228.82]) by sable.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 3.13 #1) id 12Gi5p-0004ey-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Fri, 04 Feb 2000 12:44:09 +0000 Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: lawf0014@sable.ox.ac.uk Message-Id: Date: Fri, 4 Feb 2000 12:42:37 +0000 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk From: Lionel Smith Subject: LQR Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="============_-1262454338==_ma============" --============_-1262454338==_ma============ Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" In the Jan 2000 LQR: RJ Smith, Oral Contracts for the Sale of Land: Estoppels and Constructive Trusts (note on Yaxley v Gotts [1999] 3 WLR 1217) CEF Rickett & R Grantham, Resulting Trusts - The True Nature of the Failing Trust Cases (note on Air Jamaica Ltd v Charlton [1999] 1 WLR 1399) A Ward & G McCormack, Subrogation and Bankers' Autonomous Undertakings L --============_-1262454338==_ma============ Content-Type: text/enriched; charset="us-ascii" GenevaIn the Jan 2000 LQR: RJ Smith, Oral Contracts for the Sale of Land: Estoppels and Constructive Trusts (note on Yaxley v Gotts [1999] 3 WLR 1217) CEF Rickett & R Grantham, Resulting Trusts - The True Nature of the Failing Trust Cases (note on Air Jamaica Ltd v Charlton [1999] 1 WLR 1399) A Ward & G McCormack, Subrogation and Bankers' Autonomous Undertakings L --============_-1262454338==_ma============-- >From m.armstrong@lancaster.ac.uk Wed Feb 09 09:05:05 2000 Received: from alliance.lancs.ac.uk ([148.88.17.8]) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12IT3Z-0007Dh-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Wed, 9 Feb 2000 09:05:05 +0000 Received: from exchange-ims.lancs.ac.uk ([148.88.17.22]) by alliance.lancs.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 3.13 #1) id 12IT0i-0006ps-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Wed, 09 Feb 2000 09:02:08 +0000 Received: by exchange-ims.lancs.ac.uk with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <1RAACDXT>; Wed, 9 Feb 2000 09:02:00 -0000 Message-ID: <7823222F821AD311844800204840353A4177A6@exchange2.lancs.ac.uk> From: "Armstrong, Mark" To: "'restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk'" Subject: Query Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 09:01:56 -0000 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Dear All, In Nurdin & Peacock v D B Ramsden [1999] 1 WLR 1249, Neuberger J stated the following at page 1263C-D: "As for the Banque Financiere case, it did not raise the question of whether or not a plaintiff could recover money paid under a mistake of law; it was concerned with the law of subrogation". Neuberger J was responding to Counsel's submission that the decisions of the House of Lords in Westdeutsche and Banque Financiere had overtaken or overruled the decisions in Woolich Equitable Builidng Society v IRC [1993] and Friends' Provident Life Office v Hillier Parker May & Rowden [1997] pre-Kleinwort Benson. There are conflicting opinions as to the nature of the mistake in Banque Financiere. Swaddling [1999] RLR at 210 suggests that arguably it was a mistake of 'law'. On the other hand, Villiers [1999] LMCLQ at 223 suggests that it was a mistake of 'fact'. Any thoughts on (1) the nature of the mistake in Banque Financiere (in my opinion it is a mistake of fact) and (2) Neuberger's comments? Mark Armstrong >From william.swadling@brasenose.oxford.ac.uk Wed Feb 09 10:38:37 2000 Received: from oxmail3.ox.ac.uk ([129.67.1.180] helo=oxmail.ox.ac.uk) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12IUW5-0008KY-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Wed, 9 Feb 2000 10:38:37 +0000 Received: from ermine.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.13]) by oxmail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.10 #1) id 12IUTz-0007Th-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Wed, 9 Feb 2000 10:36:27 +0000 Received: from unregistered1.bnc.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.130.29] helo=Swadling.bnc_nt) by ermine.ox.ac.uk with smtp (Exim 3.13 #1) id 12IUTz-0001z4-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Wed, 09 Feb 2000 10:36:27 +0000 X-Sender: bras0540@ermine.ox.ac.uk X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Light Version 1.5.2 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk From: William Swadling Subject: Banque Financiere Message-Id: Date: Wed, 09 Feb 2000 10:36:27 +0000 The mistake, I seem to recollect, was to think that a third party could be bound by a contract to which it was not privy. I do not see how this could be described as anything other than a mistake of law. W J Swadling. At 09:01 09/02/00 -0000, you wrote: >Dear All, > >In Nurdin & Peacock v D B Ramsden [1999] 1 WLR 1249, Neuberger J stated the >following at page 1263C-D: > > "As for the Banque Financiere case, it did not raise the question of >whether or not a plaintiff could recover money paid under a mistake of >law; it was concerned with the law of subrogation". > >Neuberger J was responding to Counsel's submission that the decisions of the >House of Lords in Westdeutsche and Banque Financiere had overtaken or overruled >the decisions in Woolich Equitable Builidng Society v IRC [1993] and Friends' >Provident Life Office v Hillier Parker May & Rowden [1997] pre-Kleinwort >Benson. > >There are conflicting opinions as to the nature of the mistake in Banque >Financiere. Swaddling [1999] RLR at 210 suggests that arguably it was a >mistake of 'law'. On the other hand, Villiers [1999] LMCLQ at 223 suggests >that it was a mistake of 'fact'. > >Any thoughts on (1) the nature of the mistake in Banque Financiere (in my >opinion it is a mistake of fact) and (2) Neuberger's comments? > >Mark Armstrong > >___________________________________________________________________________ _____ >This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an >international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of unjust >enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe restitution" in the body of a >message to . To unsubscribe, send "unsubscribe >restitution" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, >send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith of >St. Hugh's College, Oxford, U.K., tel. (0)1865 274 966, email >. > > ___________________________________________________________________________ William Swadling, MA, LLM, Fellow and Tutor in Law, Tel: +44 1865 277869 (Direct) Tutor for Admissions Tel: +44 1865 277510 (Secretary) Brasenose College, Tel: +44 1865 277830 (Messages) OXFORD, OX1 4AJ. Fax: +44 1865 277520 ___________________________________________________________________________ >From gerard.mcmeel@bristol.ac.uk Wed Feb 09 12:27:42 2000 Received: from dire.bris.ac.uk ([137.222.10.60]) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12IWDe-0002G6-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Wed, 9 Feb 2000 12:27:42 +0000 Received: from eis.bris.ac.uk by dire.bris.ac.uk with SMTP-PRIV with ESMTP; Wed, 9 Feb 2000 12:25:27 +0000 Received: from law-brno.law.bris.ac.uk (brno.law.bris.ac.uk [137.222.84.104]) by eis.bris.ac.uk (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id MAA13504; Wed, 9 Feb 2000 12:24:50 GMT From: Gerard McMeel Sender: Gerard.McMeel@bristol.ac.uk Reply-To: gerard.mcmeel@bristol.ac.uk To: William Swadling Cc: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: Re: RDG: Banque Financiere In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 12:41:29 +0000 (GMT) Priority: NORMAL X-Mailer: Simeon for Win32 Version 4.1.5 Build (43) X-Authentication: IMSP MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=US-ASCII Or one could say that the mistake was that Mr Herzig had the necessary authority to bind other members of the Omni corporate group. Agency law tends to view the existence and scope of authority as a matter of fact. This would support the mistake of fact view. Gerard McMeel University of Bristol On Wed, 09 Feb 2000 10:36:27 +0000 William Swadling wrote: > The mistake, I seem to recollect, was to think that a third party could be > bound by a contract to which it was not privy. I do not see how this could > be described as anything other than a mistake of law. > > W J Swadling. > > > At 09:01 09/02/00 -0000, you wrote: > >Dear All, > > > >In Nurdin & Peacock v D B Ramsden [1999] 1 WLR 1249, Neuberger J stated the > >following at page 1263C-D: > > > > "As for the Banque Financiere case, it did not raise the question of > >whether or not a plaintiff could recover money paid under a mistake of > >law; it was concerned with the law of subrogation". > > > >Neuberger J was responding to Counsel's submission that the decisions of the > >House of Lords in Westdeutsche and Banque Financiere had overtaken or overruled > >the decisions in Woolich Equitable Builidng Society v IRC [1993] and Friends' > >Provident Life Office v Hillier Parker May & Rowden [1997] pre-Kleinwort > >Benson. > > > >There are conflicting opinions as to the nature of the mistake in Banque > >Financiere. Swaddling [1999] RLR at 210 suggests that arguably it was a > >mistake of 'law'. On the other hand, Villiers [1999] LMCLQ at 223 suggests > >that it was a mistake of 'fact'. > > > >Any thoughts on (1) the nature of the mistake in Banque Financiere (in my > >opinion it is a mistake of fact) and (2) Neuberger's comments? > > > >Mark Armstrong > > > >___________________________________________________________________________ > _____ > >This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an > >international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of unjust > >enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe restitution" in the body of a > >message to . To unsubscribe, send "unsubscribe > >restitution" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, > >send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith of > >St. Hugh's College, Oxford, U.K., tel. (0)1865 274 966, email > >. > > > > > ___________________________________________________________________________ > > William Swadling, MA, LLM, > Fellow and Tutor in Law, Tel: +44 1865 277869 (Direct) > Tutor for Admissions Tel: +44 1865 277510 (Secretary) > Brasenose College, Tel: +44 1865 277830 (Messages) > OXFORD, OX1 4AJ. Fax: +44 1865 277520 > ___________________________________________________________________________ > > > ________________________________________________________________________________ > This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an > international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of unjust > enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe restitution" in the body of a > message to . To unsubscribe, send "unsubscribe > restitution" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, > send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith of > St. Hugh's College, Oxford, U.K., tel. (0)1865 274 966, email > . > ---------------------- Gerard McMeel gerard.mcmeel@bristol.ac.uk >From m.armstrong@lancaster.ac.uk Wed Feb 09 13:03:56 2000 Received: from alliance.lancs.ac.uk ([148.88.17.8]) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12IWmi-00031S-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Wed, 9 Feb 2000 13:03:56 +0000 Received: from exchange-ims.lancs.ac.uk ([148.88.17.22]) by alliance.lancs.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 3.13 #1) id 12IWkb-0002AJ-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Wed, 09 Feb 2000 13:01:45 +0000 Received: by exchange-ims.lancs.ac.uk with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id <1RAACH4N>; Wed, 9 Feb 2000 13:01:49 -0000 Message-ID: <7823222F821AD311844800204840353A4177A9@exchange2.lancs.ac.uk> From: "Armstrong, Mark" To: "'restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk'" Subject: FW: RDG: Banque Financiere Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 13:01:46 -0000 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) I accept William Swaddling's point that a mistake - that a third party cannot be bound by a contract to which it was not privy - is clearly a mistake of law. However, postponement letters are two a penny these days in corporate re-financings and are clearly intended to bind, for example, inter-group subsidiaries (OOL) who are also creditors of one company (Parc) in the group. Without boring anyone with the details, in effect, the objective of such arrangements is to contract-out of the pari passu rules under IA 1986 . Privity, as far as I am aware, has never been raised as an issue in litigation over the validity and effects of priority/subordination agreements (which normally utilise the trust form to avoid the pari passu rules and being caught as a charge for CA 1985 registration purposes). The point in Banque Financiere was not whether a third party cannot be bound by a contract to which it is not privy (it seems to be implicitly accepted in the case that postponement letters do bind) but whether an agent, H, had authority to bind OOL. This supports the mistake being one of fact. William Swaddling's reply raises the issue of whether or not parties can contract-out of the privity doctrine and I certainly don't want to get involved in that debate. > -----Original Message----- > From: Gerard McMeel [SMTP:gerard.mcmeel@bristol.ac.uk] > Sent: 09 February 2000 12:41 > To: William Swadling > Cc: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk > Subject: Re: RDG: Banque Financiere > > Or one could say that the mistake was that Mr Herzig had the necessary > authority to bind other members of the Omni corporate group. Agency law > tends to view the existence and scope of authority as a matter of fact. > This would support the mistake of fact view. > > Gerard McMeel > University of Bristol > > On Wed, 09 Feb 2000 10:36:27 +0000 William Swadling > wrote: > > > The mistake, I seem to recollect, was to think that a third party could be > > bound by a contract to which it was not privy. I do not see how this could > > be described as anything other than a mistake of law. > > > > W J Swadling. > > > > > > At 09:01 09/02/00 -0000, you wrote: > > >Dear All, > > > > > >In Nurdin & Peacock v D B Ramsden [1999] 1 WLR 1249, Neuberger J stated > the > > >following at page 1263C-D: > > > > > > "As for the Banque Financiere case, it did not raise the question of > > >whether or not a plaintiff could recover money paid under a mistake of > > >law; it was concerned with the law of subrogation". > > > > > >Neuberger J was responding to Counsel's submission that the decisions of > the > > >House of Lords in Westdeutsche and Banque Financiere had overtaken or > overruled > > >the decisions in Woolich Equitable Builidng Society v IRC [1993] and > Friends' > > >Provident Life Office v Hillier Parker May & Rowden [1997] pre-Kleinwort > > >Benson. > > > > > >There are conflicting opinions as to the nature of the mistake in Banque > > >Financiere. Swaddling [1999] RLR at 210 suggests that arguably it was a > > >mistake of 'law'. On the other hand, Villiers [1999] LMCLQ at 223 > suggests > > >that it was a mistake of 'fact'. > > > > > >Any thoughts on (1) the nature of the mistake in Banque Financiere (in my > > >opinion it is a mistake of fact) and (2) Neuberger's comments? > > > > > >Mark Armstrong > > > > > > >___________________________________________________________________________ > > _____ > > >This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an > > >international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of > unjust > > >enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe restitution" in the body of a > > >message to . To unsubscribe, send > "unsubscribe > > >restitution" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, > > >send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith > of > > >St. Hugh's College, Oxford, U.K., tel. (0)1865 274 966, email > > >. > > > > > > > > ___________________________________________________________________________ > > > > William Swadling, MA, LLM, > > Fellow and Tutor in Law, Tel: +44 1865 277869 (Direct) > > Tutor for Admissions Tel: +44 1865 277510 (Secretary) > > Brasenose College, Tel: +44 1865 277830 (Messages) > > OXFORD, OX1 4AJ. Fax: +44 1865 277520 > > ___________________________________________________________________________ > > > > > > > _____________________________________________________________________________ > ___ > > This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an > > international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of unjust > > enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe restitution" in the body of a > > message to . To unsubscribe, send "unsubscribe > > restitution" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, > > send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith of > > St. Hugh's College, Oxford, U.K., tel. (0)1865 274 966, email > > . > > > > ---------------------- > Gerard McMeel > gerard.mcmeel@bristol.ac.uk > > > _____________________________________________________________________________ > ___ > This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an > international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of unjust > enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe restitution" in the body of a > message to . To unsubscribe, send "unsubscribe > restitution" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, > send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith of > St. Hugh's College, Oxford, U.K., tel. (0)1865 274 966, email > . >From duncan.sheehan@corpus-christi.oxford.ac.uk Wed Feb 09 14:23:13 2000 Received: from oxmail2.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.1] helo=oxmail.ox.ac.uk) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12IY1R-0003oT-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Wed, 9 Feb 2000 14:23:13 +0000 Received: from sable.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.4]) by oxmail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.10 #1) id 12IXzJ-0006xd-00; Wed, 9 Feb 2000 14:21:01 +0000 Received: from corp0380 (helo=localhost) by sable.ox.ac.uk with local-esmtp (Exim 3.13 #1) id 12IXzJ-0007I0-00; Wed, 09 Feb 2000 14:21:01 +0000 Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 14:21:00 +0000 (GMT) From: Duncan Sheehan To: "Armstrong, Mark" cc: "'restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk'" Subject: Re: RDG: Query In-Reply-To: <7823222F821AD311844800204840353A4177A6@exchange2.lancs.ac.uk> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII I have two points to make. The first is short and quick and hopefully nobody will dissent too much. That is that when I read that Banque Financiere was not concerned with recovery for mistake of law but with subrogation I cringe slightly. I am happy to line up with Bill Swadling and say that it was a mistake of law, but I question how Neuberger J can seemingly contrast subrogation with the question of recovery for mistake of law as opposed to fact. The House of Lords as I recall were absolutely convinced that subrogation in the context of the facts of Banque Financiere was a remedy for unjust enrichment, the causative factor being the mistake, which I characterise as one of law, but ultimately for these purposes it doesn't matter whether you think it was a mistake of fact. The mistake triggers the remedy; it must be irrelevant whether that is direct repayment or (on these facts) subrogation. The second point, which is slightly off on a tangent, is this. Does the question of whether it is a mistake of law or of fact matter, either in this case or generally? I can think of at least one situation off the top of my head where it might matter; however. That is the following. If I buy a desk in a furniture store and forget to pay for seven years and nobody sues me, but then I remember and pay, believing wrongly that the limitation period in contract cases is 10 years instead of the six that is under the Limitation Act 1980 section 5 can I recover? Moses v Macferlan would say that you can't. Even irrespective of that it is trite that you cannot recover for mistake where the money was owed in any case (see Robert Goff J in Barclays v Simms and Lord Hope in Kleinwort Benson), and I think you can base non recovery on that even though it is unenforceable obligation. This of course, as I understand Scots and South African law, and people who know more about that than me can correct me if this is not the case, is analogous to the doctrine that a natural obligation can act as a defence to the condictio indebiti. Does anybody think that it is off the wall to claim that a similar doctrine applies in England? I am coming round to the opinion that it does. Duncan Sheehan On Wed, 9 Feb 2000, Armstrong, Mark wrote: > Dear All, > > In Nurdin & Peacock v D B Ramsden [1999] 1 WLR 1249, Neuberger J stated the > following at page 1263C-D: > > "As for the Banque Financiere case, it did not raise the question of > whether or not a plaintiff could recover money paid under a mistake of > law; it was concerned with the law of subrogation". > > Neuberger J was responding to Counsel's submission that the decisions of the > House of Lords in Westdeutsche and Banque Financiere had overtaken or overruled > the decisions in Woolich Equitable Builidng Society v IRC [1993] and Friends' > Provident Life Office v Hillier Parker May & Rowden [1997] pre-Kleinwort > Benson. > > There are conflicting opinions as to the nature of the mistake in Banque > Financiere. Swaddling [1999] RLR at 210 suggests that arguably it was a > mistake of 'law'. On the other hand, Villiers [1999] LMCLQ at 223 suggests > that it was a mistake of 'fact'. > > Any thoughts on (1) the nature of the mistake in Banque Financiere (in my > opinion it is a mistake of fact) and (2) Neuberger's comments? > > Mark Armstrong > > ________________________________________________________________________________ > This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an > international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of unjust > enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe restitution" in the body of a > message to . To unsubscribe, send "unsubscribe > restitution" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, > send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith of > St. Hugh's College, Oxford, U.K., tel. (0)1865 274 966, email > . > >From lionel.smith@law.oxford.ac.uk Wed Feb 09 16:58:19 2000 Received: from oxmail1.ox.ac.uk ([129.67.1.1] helo=oxmail.ox.ac.uk) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12IaRX-000679-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Wed, 9 Feb 2000 16:58:19 +0000 Received: from sable.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.4]) by oxmail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.10 #1) id 12IaPQ-00017W-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Wed, 9 Feb 2000 16:56:08 +0000 Received: from fellow22.sthughs.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.228.82]) by sable.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 3.13 #1) id 12IaPQ-0003tv-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Wed, 09 Feb 2000 16:56:08 +0000 Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: lawf0014@sable.ox.ac.uk Message-Id: In-Reply-To: <7823222F821AD311844800204840353A4177A9@exchange2.lancs.ac.uk> References: <7823222F821AD311844800204840353A4177A9@exchange2.lancs.ac.uk> Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 16:54:33 +0000 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk From: Lionel Smith Subject: Re: FW: RDG: Banque Financiere Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" >Privity, as far as I am aware, has never been raised as an issue in litigation >over the validity and effects of priority/subordination agreements Euroclean Canada Inc. v. Forest Glade Investments Ltd. (1985)16 D.L.R. (4th) 289 (Ont CA). The point is covered by legislation in most of Canada. LDS >From mskj1@singnet.com.sg Thu Feb 10 05:52:58 2000 Received: from smtp4.singnet.com.sg ([165.21.101.224]) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12ImXB-0000UT-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 05:52:57 +0000 Received: from user (hs13128.singnet.com.sg [165.21.36.138]) by smtp4.singnet.com.sg (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id NAA06067; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 13:49:40 +0800 (SGT) (envelope-from mskj1@singnet.com.sg) Message-ID: <000f01bf738b$991064a0$8a2415a5@user> From: "joseph" To: "Duncan Sheehan" Cc: References: Subject: Re: RDG: Query Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 13:51:16 +0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2615.200 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2615.200 Duncan Sheehan asked on Wednesday, February 09, 2000 10:21 PM (ST) > If I buy a desk in a furniture > store and forget to pay for seven years and nobody sues me, but then I > remember and pay, believing wrongly that the limitation period in contract > cases is 10 years instead of the six that is under the Limitation Act 1980 > section 5 can I recover? At the risk of stating the obvious (and/or going on a tangent of my own) should not the answer to the above question be predicated upon the answer to the following question: When does the limitation period begin to run? In Kleinwort Benson, as the money claimed by the plaintiff-bank was paid to the local authorities before the six year limitation period under section 5 of the 1980 Act, the plaintiff-bank contended that pursuant to section 32(1)(c) of the same Act, the limitation period only began to run from the time the mistake was or could reasonably be discovered. And, of course, that date was the date of judgment in Hazell v Hammersmith LBC. On the other side, the local authorities argued that: (a) the true import of section 32(1)(c) is that it does not touch on mistakes of law; and (b) the proper interpretation of the phrase 'discovered' vis-a-vis mistakes under section 32(1)(c) pointed solely to mistakes of fact and not mistakes of law. As we all know the majority of their Lordhips did not buy the argument of the local authorities. Lord Goff ruled that the equitable rule (i.e., that time should only run from the time at which the mistake was, or could reasonably be, discovered) which underpins all mistakes applied immaterial of whether they were mistakes of fact or mistakes of law. Louis Joseph >From mskj1@singnet.com.sg Thu Feb 10 07:35:42 2000 Received: from helium.singnet.com.sg ([165.21.101.212]) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12Io8b-0000yF-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 07:35:41 +0000 Received: from user (hs1433.singnet.com.sg [165.21.36.253]) by helium.singnet.com.sg (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id PAA13602 for ; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 15:33:25 +0800 (SGT) Message-ID: <004301bf7399$f65947e0$fd2415a5@user> From: "joseph" To: Subject: Fw: RDG: Query Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 15:38:53 +0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2615.200 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2615.200 Dear all I do believe that I did misunderstand Mr Sheehan's question. My apologies. For what it is worth, I accept his answer: it cannot be recovered at least under the rule in Moses v Macferlan. My apologies. Louis Joseph ----- Original Message ----- From: joseph To: Duncan Sheehan Cc: Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 1:51 PM Subject: Re: RDG: Query > Duncan Sheehan asked on Wednesday, February 09, 2000 10:21 PM (ST) > > > If I buy a desk in a furniture > > store and forget to pay for seven years and nobody sues me, but then I > > remember and pay, believing wrongly that the limitation period in contract > > cases is 10 years instead of the six that is under the Limitation Act 1980 > > section 5 can I recover? > > At the risk of stating the obvious (and/or going on a tangent of my own) > should not the answer to the above question be predicated upon the answer to > the following question: When does the limitation period begin to run? In > Kleinwort Benson, as the money claimed by the plaintiff-bank was paid to the > local authorities before the six year limitation period under section 5 of > the 1980 Act, the plaintiff-bank contended that pursuant to section 32(1)(c) > of the same Act, the limitation period only began to run from the time the > mistake was or could reasonably be discovered. And, of course, that date was > the date of judgment in Hazell v Hammersmith LBC. On the other side, the > local authorities argued that: (a) the true import of section 32(1)(c) is > that it does not touch on mistakes of law; and (b) the proper interpretation > of the phrase 'discovered' vis-a-vis mistakes under section 32(1)(c) pointed > solely to mistakes of fact and not mistakes of law. As we all know the > majority of their Lordhips did not buy the argument of the local > authorities. Lord Goff ruled that the equitable rule (i.e., that time should > only run from the time at which the mistake was, or could reasonably be, > discovered) which underpins all mistakes applied immaterial of whether they > were mistakes of fact or mistakes of law. > > Louis Joseph >From mskj1@singnet.com.sg Thu Feb 10 09:08:07 2000 Received: from smtp4.singnet.com.sg ([165.21.101.224]) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12Ipa2-0001KV-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 09:08:07 +0000 Received: from user (hs1415.singnet.com.sg [165.21.36.235]) by smtp4.singnet.com.sg (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id RAA47172 for ; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 17:04:54 +0800 (SGT) (envelope-from mskj1@singnet.com.sg) Message-ID: <001801bf73a6$e02d6520$eb2415a5@user> From: "joseph" To: Subject: Re: RDG: Query Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 17:11:19 +0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2615.200 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2615.200 Dear All In an attempt to redeem myself from my earlier booboo (and I do hope that none of my clients and/or former students are privy to this list) may I say that in my view, as a matter of trite law, (a) the payee (store owner) may retain the payment by showing that the 'enrichment' is not unjust; (b) consideration had been given for the payment; and/or (c) there had been a change of position in reliance on the payment. But I suppose that Mr Sheehan's real question is whether, given that the money was bona fide owed to the payee, restitution must be made on the basis that that obligation became unenforceable - for falling foul of the limitation period - at the date of the payment? Equity would surely intervene to ensure that no restitution need be made under these circumstances. However, whether there exists a doctrine under English law to support that position is, in my view doubtful. This might be a case of, to use Lord Goff's words, there being 'a chronic lack of support'. Louis Joseph ----- Original Message ----- From: joseph To: Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 3:38 PM Subject: Fw: RDG: Query > Dear all > > I do believe that I did misunderstand Mr Sheehan's question. My apologies. > For what it is worth, I accept his answer: it cannot be recovered at least > under the rule in Moses v Macferlan. My apologies. > > Louis Joseph > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: joseph > To: Duncan Sheehan > Cc: > Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 1:51 PM > Subject: Re: RDG: Query > > > > Duncan Sheehan asked on Wednesday, February 09, 2000 10:21 PM (ST) > > > > > If I buy a desk in a furniture > > > store and forget to pay for seven years and nobody sues me, but then I > > > remember and pay, believing wrongly that the limitation period in > contract > > > cases is 10 years instead of the six that is under the Limitation Act > 1980 > > > section 5 can I recover? > > > > At the risk of stating the obvious (and/or going on a tangent of my own) > > should not the answer to the above question be predicated upon the answer > to > > the following question: When does the limitation period begin to run? In > > Kleinwort Benson, as the money claimed by the plaintiff-bank was paid to > the > > local authorities before the six year limitation period under section 5 of > > the 1980 Act, the plaintiff-bank contended that pursuant to section > 32(1)(c) > > of the same Act, the limitation period only began to run from the time the > > mistake was or could reasonably be discovered. And, of course, that date > was > > the date of judgment in Hazell v Hammersmith LBC. On the other side, the > > local authorities argued that: (a) the true import of section 32(1)(c) is > > that it does not touch on mistakes of law; and (b) the proper > interpretation > > of the phrase 'discovered' vis-a-vis mistakes under section 32(1)(c) > pointed > > solely to mistakes of fact and not mistakes of law. As we all know the > > majority of their Lordhips did not buy the argument of the local > > authorities. Lord Goff ruled that the equitable rule (i.e., that time > should > > only run from the time at which the mistake was, or could reasonably be, > > discovered) which underpins all mistakes applied immaterial of whether > they > > were mistakes of fact or mistakes of law. > > > > Louis Joseph > >From lionel.smith@law.oxford.ac.uk Thu Feb 10 09:30:22 2000 Received: from oxmail1.ox.ac.uk ([129.67.1.1] helo=oxmail.ox.ac.uk) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12Ipva-0001Xl-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 09:30:22 +0000 Received: from sable.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.4]) by oxmail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.10 #1) id 12IptT-0003CR-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 09:28:11 +0000 Received: from fellow22.sthughs.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.228.82]) by sable.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 3.13 #1) id 12IptT-0001qX-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 09:28:11 +0000 Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: lawf0014@sable.ox.ac.uk Message-Id: Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 09:26:37 +0000 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk From: Lionel Smith Subject: cases Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="============_-1261947697==_ma============" --============_-1261947697==_ma============ Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" 1. Caledonia North Sea Ltd v London Bridge Engineering Ltd, Inner House, Times, 8 Feb 2000 [Judgment December 17, 1999]: An insurer who had indemnified the insured party by meeting claims for damages had two methods of recovering his expenditure from a contractor who had given the insured an indemnity for such claims. The insurer could raise an action in his own name to enforce his right of relief for the whole sum. Alternatively, he could bring proceedings in the name of the assured against the indemnifier on the basis of the contract of indemnity. 2. Banner Homes Group plc v Luff Developments Ltd , English CA, 28 Jan 00 (New Law Online) Banner and Luff were developers both interested in a development site. In 1995 Luff agreed a purchase price with the vendor and the controllers of Luff and Banner agreed in principle that the site would be bought and developed by a joint venture company to be owned and funded 50:50 by Luff and Banner. The companies instructed their solicitors accordingly and a company, Stowhelm, was acquired off the shelf to be the joint venture vehicle. Luff then had second thoughts about a joint venture with Banner and postponed signing a shareholder agreement relating to Stowhelm until after exchange of contracts for purchase of the site by Stowhelm with moneys provided by Luff. The shareholders' agreement was never signed and Banner took proceedings alleging that there had been a concluded oral agreement for a joint venture, alternatively that the circumstances gave rise to a constructive trust in favour of Banner over half the shares in Stowhelm. Held by the CA, half the shares in Stowhelm were held on constructive trust for Banner. 3. Allied Carpets Group plc v Nethercott, English QBD, 28 Jan 00 (New Law Online) N was the chief executive officer of the claimant company, Allied, and a shareholder. He signed Allied's accounts for the years 1993-1998, representing that the accounts gave a true and fair view. In fact they did not. When Allied discovered accounting irregularities it asked its auditors to investigate and N was dismissed. Allied sought summary judgment on a claim against N for repayment of the dividends paid on his shares in 1996-97 and 1997-98 on the basis that N held them on constructive trust for the company because the payments were ultra vires for failure to comply with the Companies Act 1985 and N knew of the facts giving rise to that state of affairs. Held, there was no arguable defence to the claim for a constructive trust. L --============_-1261947697==_ma============ Content-Type: text/enriched; charset="us-ascii" Geneva1. Caledonia North Sea Ltd v London Bridge Engineering Ltd, Inner House, Times, 8 Feb 2000 [Judgment December 17, 1999]: An insurer who had indemnified the insured party by meeting claims for damages had two methods of recovering his expenditure from a contractor who had given the insured an indemnity for such claims. The insurer could raise an action in his own name to enforce his right of relief for the whole sum. Alternatively, he could bring proceedings in the name of the assured against the indemnifier on the basis of the contract of indemnity. 2. Banner Homes Group plc v Luff Developments Ltd , English CA, 28 Jan 00 (New Law Online) Banner and Luff were developers both interested in a development site. In 1995 Luff agreed a purchase price with the vendor and the controllers of Luff and Banner agreed in principle that the site would be bought and developed by a joint venture company to be owned and funded 50:50 by Luff and Banner. The companies instructed their solicitors accordingly and a company, Stowhelm, was acquired off the shelf to be the joint venture vehicle. Luff then had second thoughts about a joint venture with Banner and postponed signing a shareholder agreement relating to Stowhelm until after exchange of contracts for purchase of the site by Stowhelm with moneys provided by Luff. The shareholders' agreement was never signed and Banner took proceedings alleging that there had been a concluded oral agreement for a joint venture, alternatively that the circumstances gave rise to a constructive trust in favour of Banner over half the shares in Stowhelm. Held by the CA, half the shares in Stowhelm were held on constructive trust for Banner. 3. Allied Carpets Group plc v Nethercott, English QBD, 28 Jan 00 (New Law Online) N was the chief executive officer of the claimant company, Allied, and a shareholder. He signed Allied's accounts for the years 1993-1998, representing that the accounts gave a true and fair view. In fact they did not. When Allied discovered accounting irregularities it asked its auditors to investigate and N was dismissed. Allied sought summary judgment on a claim against N for repayment of the dividends paid on his shares in 1996-97 and 1997-98 on the basis that N held them on constructive trust for the company because the payments were ultra vires for failure to comply with the Companies Act 1985 and N knew of the facts giving rise to that state of affairs. Held, there was no arguable defence to the claim for a constructive trust. L --============_-1261947697==_ma============-- >From scullymatthew@hotmail.com Thu Feb 10 09:50:14 2000 Received: from law-f266.hotmail.com ([209.185.130.182] helo=hotmail.com) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with smtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12IqEo-0001x8-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 09:50:14 +0000 Received: (qmail 12323 invoked by uid 0); 10 Feb 2000 09:47:31 -0000 Message-ID: <20000210094731.12322.qmail@hotmail.com> Received: from 194.81.212.22 by www.hotmail.com with HTTP; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 01:47:31 PST X-Originating-IP: [194.81.212.22] From: "Matthew Scully" To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: Re: RDG: Query Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 09:47:31 GMT Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed > > If I buy a desk in a furniture > > store and forget to pay for seven years and nobody sues me, but then I > > remember and pay, believing wrongly that the limitation period in >contract > > cases is 10 years instead of the six that is under the Limitation Act >1980 > > section 5 can I recover? If recovery was allowed in Nurdin & Peacock v Ramsden, where the mistake was one as to the existence of a right to recover, then it is difficult to see why it should not be allowed in this case. However, in Nurdin, the overpayments had not been due in the first place. In Duncan Sheehan's scenario, the price of the desk was due but the right to sue for the price was extinguished by the expiration of the limitation period. The concept of "natural obligation" (purists will shudder) may be of use here in denying the right to recover the price of the desk which was paid after seven years. As a matter of obligation, the money is always owed even if, as a matter of procedure, it cannot be sued for. Alternatively, if Nurdin can be analysed as a "failure of basis" case (i.e. whether or not there is a mistake is irrelevant, what counts is that the overpayment was not due), then there is room to distinguish this scenario on the grounds that the basis for the payment of the price is the contract for the sale of the desk, which remains even though the vendor's right to sue has been extinguished. Matthew Scully. Oxford Institute of Legal Practice. ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com >From colin.riegels@harneys.com Thu Feb 10 12:26:38 2000 Received: from mail1.caribsurf.com ([205.214.192.207]) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12Isg9-0005DC-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 12:26:38 +0000 Received: from hwrexc1.hwr.org ([205.214.206.58]) by mail1.caribsurf.com (8.9.1/8.9.1) with ESMTP id IAA04855; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 08:23:35 -0400 (GMT-0400) Received: by hwrexc1.hwr.org with Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) id ; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 08:10:57 -0400 Message-ID: From: "Riegels, Colin" To: "'joseph'" Cc: "'restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk'" Subject: RE: RDG: Query Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 08:10:56 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2448.0) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" > At the risk of stating the obvious (and/or going on a tangent > of my own) > should not the answer to the above question be predicated > upon the answer to > the following question: When does the limitation period begin > to run? I think that there is a danger of confusing two different limitation periods here: the limitation period in relation to the initial debt for the purchase of the desk and the limitation period in relation to any claim for resitution of the sums paid. Under English law the limitation period in relation to the debt would have clearly expired, but (as the Limitation Act only bars the remedy and not the right) the debt still subsists and the sums paid would be a valid discharge of it. That the sums were paid in the discharge of a lawful debt should, I would think, be a total bar to restitution as it would be impossible to characterise the enrichment as "unjust". COLIN RIEGELS Barrister >From charles.mitchell@kcl.ac.uk Thu Feb 10 13:31:20 2000 Received: from angelo.kcl.ac.uk ([137.73.66.5]) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12Itgm-0006Zd-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 13:31:20 +0000 Received: from pc102.kcl.ac.uk (pc187.law.kcl.ac.uk [137.73.78.187]) by angelo.kcl.ac.uk with SMTP id NAA26293 for ; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 13:29:08 GMT Message-Id: <3.0.6.32.20000210133323.00795a00@law-mail.kcl.ac.uk> X-Sender: stty2277@law-mail.kcl.ac.uk X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Light Version 3.0.6 (32) Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 13:33:23 +0000 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk From: Charles Mitchell Subject: A Tale of Two Remedies, or the Right Pleading for the Wrong Reason Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Caledonia North Sea Ltd v London Bridge Engineering Ltd, posted by Lionel today, nicely illustrates the ambiguities inherent in the word 'subrogation'. For although you might not guess it from the way in which the courts frequently use the word to describe them both, there are in fact two types of subrogation. Let us call them 'simple subrogation' and 'reviving subrogation' (not because I'm proud of this terminology, but because I've got used to it now, and I can't think of anything better). Simple subrogation is a remedy awarded in certain circumstances to interveners who make payments in respect of other people's obligations, and who don't discharge those obligations by their payments. It entails the courts' agreeing to treat an intervener as though he had stepped into the creditor's shoes and set about enforcing the creditor's still subsisting right of action against the debtor for his own benefit. We know from The Esso Bernicia that simply subrogated actions *must* always be brought in the name of the creditor: if the intervener purports to bring a simply subrogated action in his own name, it will be struck out as wrongly pleaded. Furthermore, if he tries to bring a direct action in UE in his own name against the debtor he won't get anywhere, as the debtor can reply that he hasn't been enriched by the intervener's payment, since he remains liable to the creditor. Reviving subrogation is a remedy awarded to interveners who have made payments in respect of other peoples' obligations and who have succeeded in discharging those obligations by their payments. It entails the court's agreeing to treat an intervener as though the obligation had not been discharged, and as though the intervener had stepped into the creditor's shoes and set about enforcing the creditor's rights for his own benefit. We know from BFC v Parc that the scope of the court's agreement to treat the intervener in this way can vary, as according to circumstances the court may think it appropriate to treat the intervener in this way vis-a-vis one party, but not vis-a-vis another party. It was formerly the case that a surety had only an equitable right to be reimbursed by a principal debtor where the principal had not expressly promised to repay him: see eg Ford v Stobridge (1632) Nels 24; Hungerford v Hungerford (1708) Gilb Eq Rep 67, 69 (per Lord Cowper LC). It would therefore have given him an advantage to acquire the creditor's personal rights at law via reviving subrogation. But sureties have been entitled to reimbursement at common law at least since Morrice v Redwyn (1731) 2 Barn KB 26. And in practice, therefore, interveners nowadays usually only ask for reviving subrogation if it will enable them to acquire the creditor's (extinguished but fictionally revived) secured rights against the debtor: they are not interested in acquiring the creditor's personal rights (there is an exception to this which I won't go into, but see eg Thurstan's case). It follows that in practice an intervener usually only asks for reviving subrogation in the context of an action for money paid or a contribution action brought in his own name against the debtor, as an additional remedy on top of an order for account and payment: see eg Atkin's Court Forms Vol 18 (2nd edn, 1992 issue) p 352 Form 82; Vol 20 (2nd edn, 1993 issue) p 179 Form 13. However, there is no procedural *requirement* that an intervener seeking to acquire rights via reviving subrogation must do so in the context of an action brought in his own name. For the Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1856, s 5, gives interveners who have paid under legal compulsion the optional right 'if need be and upon a proper indemnity, to use the name of the creditor in any action, or other proceeding' to recover from the debtor. For the reason already stated, interveners nowadays practically never use this route to recovery (nor did they by the end of the 19th century if Lord Cockburn CJ is to be believed - see Swire v Redman (1876) 1 QBD 536, at 541). But the optional right to use this route is still there on the statute book. Which brings us to Caledonia North Sea ... Following the Piper Alpha oil-rig disaster, the rig operator's liability insurer paid it in respect of its liability to employees and the families of employees injured or killed. The operator also had the right to recover in respect of this liability from various third parties who had been involved in building the rig, who had given the operator contractual undertakings to indemnify them against such liability. The insurer assumed that its payment did not discharge the insured's right of action against the contractors, and so it assumed that any action it might have against the contractors to recover its payments should be framed as a simply subrogated action in the insured's name. 360 trial days and many lawyers' bills later, however, the contractors pointed out that in fact the insurer's payment had discharged their liability. Lord Caplan agreed, and went on to hold that the insurer should therefore have brought a direct action against the contractors for reimbursement in its own name. He therefore struck out the insurer's action as wrongly pleaded, and (I imagine) the insurer was jolly cross with its lawyers. On appeal, though, whilst Lord Rodger agreed that the contractors' liability had been discharged, he went on to hold - quite correctly - that the insurer had had the optional right to use the insured's name in litigation, acquired via *reviving*, though not by *simple* subrogation (my terminology, not his). The insurer's action had therefore been rightly constituted after all, although not for the reason which it had supposed. There are three footnotes to this saga: 1) The Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1856, s 5 was enacted to bring English law into line with the Scots law concerning the rights of sureties to acquire securities via reviving subrogation. There is therefore an appealing historical neatness about the fact that a Scots lawyer should now be the one to remind us what the section says. 2) Lord Caplan ordered that the costs of the action he struck out should be divided equally between the pursuers and the defenders, since both sides had behaved equally feebly in failing to take the pleading point on Day 1 rather than on Day 360. I have not seen a full transcript of Lord Rodger's judgment yet, and so I don't know whether he has left this costs order in place, or varied it in any way. Can you shift the costs of winning a pleading point for the wrong reason onto your opponent? 3) The law concerning the question whether an intervener's payment to a creditor discharges the debt is in a hopeless mess. It is inconsistent, unpredictable, and it leaves those representing interveners unsure whether or not to plead their actions against debtors as simply subrogated actions in the creditor's name. Something should be done about this. ________________________________________________________________________ Dr Charles Mitchell Lecturer in Law School of Law King's College London Strand LONDON WC2R 2LS tel: 020 7848 2290 fax: 020 7848 2465 >From eusl07@srv0.law.ed.ac.uk Thu Feb 10 15:59:55 2000 Received: from haymarket.ed.ac.uk ([129.215.128.53]) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12Iw0Z-0000Fi-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 15:59:55 +0000 Received: from srv0.law.ed.ac.uk (srv0.law.ed.ac.uk [129.215.244.1]) by haymarket.ed.ac.uk (8.8.7/8.8.7) with ESMTP id PAA08397; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 15:59:54 GMT Message-Id: <200002101559.PAA08397@haymarket.ed.ac.uk> Received: from LAW-SRV0/SpoolDir by srv0.law.ed.ac.uk (Mercury 1.43); 10 Feb 100 15:59:53 +0000 Received: from SpoolDir by LAW-SRV0 (Mercury 1.43); 10 Feb 100 15:59:33 +0000 From: "Hector MacQueen" To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk, Lionel Smith Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 15:59:31 +0000 Subject: Re: RDG: cases Priority: normal In-reply-to: X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.01b) Full judgments in the Piper Alpha subrogation case (550 pages or so) available at the Scottish courts website http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk Click on enter, then Court of Session. Hector MacQueen Hector.MacQueen@ed.ac.uk Professor of Private Law University of Edinburgh Edinburgh EH8 9YL UK Tel (UK)-0131-650-2060/4633 Fax (UK)-0131-662-4902 Editor Edinburgh Law Review >From duncan.sheehan@corpus-christi.oxford.ac.uk Thu Feb 10 18:13:23 2000 Received: from oxmail2.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.1] helo=oxmail.ox.ac.uk) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12Iy5j-0002ZA-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:13:23 +0000 Received: from sable.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.4]) by oxmail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.10 #1) id 12Iy5a-0006rx-00; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:13:14 +0000 Received: from corp0380 (helo=localhost) by sable.ox.ac.uk with local-esmtp (Exim 3.13 #1) id 12Iy5a-0004S1-00; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:13:14 +0000 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:13:14 +0000 (GMT) From: Duncan Sheehan To: joseph cc: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: Re: Fw: RDG: Query In-Reply-To: <004301bf7399$f65947e0$fd2415a5@user> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Just to clear up any further misunderstanding, the limitation period in my question relates not to my mistake, but my breach in not paying. On Thu, 10 Feb 2000, joseph wrote: > Dear all > > I do believe that I did misunderstand Mr Sheehan's question. My apologies. > For what it is worth, I accept his answer: it cannot be recovered at least > under the rule in Moses v Macferlan. My apologies. > > Louis Joseph > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: joseph > To: Duncan Sheehan > Cc: > Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 1:51 PM > Subject: Re: RDG: Query > > > > Duncan Sheehan asked on Wednesday, February 09, 2000 10:21 PM (ST) > > > > > If I buy a desk in a furniture > > > store and forget to pay for seven years and nobody sues me, but then I > > > remember and pay, believing wrongly that the limitation period in > contract > > > cases is 10 years instead of the six that is under the Limitation Act > 1980 > > > section 5 can I recover? > > > > At the risk of stating the obvious (and/or going on a tangent of my own) > > should not the answer to the above question be predicated upon the answer > to > > the following question: When does the limitation period begin to run? In > > Kleinwort Benson, as the money claimed by the plaintiff-bank was paid to > the > > local authorities before the six year limitation period under section 5 of > > the 1980 Act, the plaintiff-bank contended that pursuant to section > 32(1)(c) > > of the same Act, the limitation period only began to run from the time the > > mistake was or could reasonably be discovered. And, of course, that date > was > > the date of judgment in Hazell v Hammersmith LBC. On the other side, the > > local authorities argued that: (a) the true import of section 32(1)(c) is > > that it does not touch on mistakes of law; and (b) the proper > interpretation > > of the phrase 'discovered' vis-a-vis mistakes under section 32(1)(c) > pointed > > solely to mistakes of fact and not mistakes of law. As we all know the > > majority of their Lordhips did not buy the argument of the local > > authorities. Lord Goff ruled that the equitable rule (i.e., that time > should > > only run from the time at which the mistake was, or could reasonably be, > > discovered) which underpins all mistakes applied immaterial of whether > they > > were mistakes of fact or mistakes of law. > > > > Louis Joseph > > > ________________________________________________________________________________ > This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an > international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of unjust > enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe restitution" in the body of a > message to . To unsubscribe, send "unsubscribe > restitution" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, > send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith of > St. Hugh's College, Oxford, U.K., tel. (0)1865 274 966, email > . > >From duncan.sheehan@corpus-christi.oxford.ac.uk Thu Feb 10 18:45:30 2000 Received: from oxmail3.ox.ac.uk ([129.67.1.180] helo=oxmail.ox.ac.uk) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12Iyan-0002pZ-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:45:29 +0000 Received: from sable.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.4]) by oxmail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.10 #1) id 12Iyac-0001yu-00; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:45:18 +0000 Received: from corp0380 (helo=localhost) by sable.ox.ac.uk with local-esmtp (Exim 3.13 #1) id 12Iyab-0001Ag-00; Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:45:17 +0000 Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 18:45:17 +0000 (GMT) From: Duncan Sheehan To: "Riegels, Colin" cc: 'joseph' , "'restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk'" Subject: RE: RDG: Query In-Reply-To: Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII I'm glad that you are all happy to agree with the blindingly obvious, at least I'm not completely stupid. I think what I was groping towards in a way which was obviously about as clear as mud is the question of whether you can extend the concept of things actually due anyway (natural obligations if you like, I apologise tp purists but I think I do) to the Kleinwort Benson-ish situation where there is no policy reason for restitution. In Kleinwort Benson of course there was a protective policy that justified rendering the contracts void (we wish to protect the good citizens of this country from local authorities gambling with our money). I cannot think of a particularly good real example off the top of my head but take a case where the House of Lords overrules a fictitious case, *Smith v Smith. The rule in *Smith v Smith is essentially arbitrary but all contracts entered into on the basis of it are now void. Presumably retrospectively. So we were all mistaken at the time that we entered into our contracts as to the existence of the contract. It was a mistake of law; we recover, or do we? I accept Louis Joseph's point that authority on this is probably scanty. However, my question is this can we say that there is actually no good reason for restitution. Obviously people in the Birks camp would say that KB is wrong on this point and you shouldn't get restitution. I don't myself believe that; I think there is a mistake, which is where my nervous breakdown comes. I still don't want to give restitution. However, I see potential light in the form of Larner v London County Council. There the Court of Appeal said that although the payments were unenforceable, they were given for good reason, whether that is seen as as a result of national policy in times of war or as I remember Graham Virgo suggesting in Principles of the Law of Restitution a moral obligation to keep one's promises (a natural obligation?). I can see a good argument for saying that notwithstanding the overruling of *Smith v Smith that we have an obligation to keep our promises anyway, so no restitution. Thoughts, or this all of this absolutely barmy? Duncan Sheehan On Thu, 10 Feb 2000, Riegels, Colin wrote: > > At the risk of stating the obvious (and/or going on a tangent > > of my own) > > should not the answer to the above question be predicated > > upon the answer to > > the following question: When does the limitation period begin > > to run? > > I think that there is a danger of confusing two different limitation periods > here: the limitation period in relation to the initial debt for the purchase > of the desk and the limitation period in relation to any claim for > resitution of the sums paid. > > Under English law the limitation period in relation to the debt would have > clearly expired, but (as the Limitation Act only bars the remedy and not the > right) the debt still subsists and the sums paid would be a valid discharge > of it. That the sums were paid in the discharge of a lawful debt should, I > would think, be a total bar to restitution as it would be impossible to > characterise the enrichment as "unjust". > > COLIN RIEGELS > Barrister > > > ________________________________________________________________________________ > This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an > international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of unjust > enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe restitution" in the body of a > message to . To unsubscribe, send "unsubscribe > restitution" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, > send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith of > St. Hugh's College, Oxford, U.K., tel. (0)1865 274 966, email > . > >From aaxel@attglobal.net Fri Feb 11 17:43:03 2000 Received: from out2.prserv.net ([32.97.166.32] helo=prserv.net) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12JK5u-0006cr-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 17:43:03 +0000 Received: from aaxelrod.rutgers.edu ([166.72.179.154]) by prserv.net (out2) with SMTP id <2000021117425522902ihai2e>; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 17:42:56 +0000 Message-ID: <38A372C1.7F9E@attglobal.net> Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2000 21:24:01 -0500 From: aaxel@attglobal.net Reply-To: aaxel@attglobal.net X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.02 (Win95; I) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Matthew Scully CC: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: Re: RDG: Query References: <20000210094731.12322.qmail@hotmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Matthew Scully wrote: > > > > If I buy a desk in a furniture store and forget to pay for seven years and nobody sues me, but then I remember and pay, believing wrongly that the limitation period in contract cases is 10 years instead of the six that is under the Limitation Act >1980 section 5 can I recover? > > If recovery was allowed in Nurdin & Peacock v Ramsden, where the mistake was > one as to the existence of a right to recover, then it is difficult to see> why it should not be allowed in this case. However, in Nurdin, the overpayments had not been due in the first place. In Duncan Sheehan's scenario, the price of the desk was due but the right to sue for the price was extinguished by the expiration of the limitation period. The concept of "natural obligation" (purists will shudder) may be of use here in denying the right to recover the price of the desk which was paid after seven years. > As a matter of obligation, the money is always owed even if, as a matter of procedure, it cannot be sued for. > > maybe we can keep the purists, not to mention legal realists [if there is a difference] from shuddering via the following: the statute of limitations is a defense, and its assertion by the debtor precludes any judicial finding that the debt ever existed: it is uninteresting to say that the debt persists, as it cannot be judicially established that it ever was if however the debtor admits the debt after the statutory date, as in the hypothetical. it can be thus established, in which event it is uninteresting to say that it had ever expired >From lionel.smith@law.oxford.ac.uk Fri Feb 11 17:48:42 2000 Received: from oxmail1.ox.ac.uk ([129.67.1.1] helo=oxmail.ox.ac.uk) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12JKBO-0006gG-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 17:48:42 +0000 Received: from sable.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.4]) by oxmail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.10 #1) id 12JKBN-0003GQ-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 17:48:41 +0000 Received: from fellow22.sthughs.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.228.82]) by sable.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 3.13 #1) id 12JKBN-0006Dl-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Fri, 11 Feb 2000 17:48:41 +0000 Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: lawf0014@sable.ox.ac.uk Message-Id: Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 17:47:08 +0000 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk From: Lionel Smith Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" approved: eregion From: aaxel@attglobal.net Subject: Re: RDG: Query Matthew Scully wrote: > > > > If I buy a desk in a furniture store and forget to pay for >seven years and nobody sues me, but then I remember and pay, >believing wrongly that the limitation period in contract cases is 10 >years instead of the six that is under the Limitation Act >1980 >section 5 can I recover? > > If recovery was allowed in Nurdin & Peacock v Ramsden, where the >mistake was > one as to the existence of a right to recover, then it >is difficult to see> why it should not be allowed in this case. >However, in Nurdin, the overpayments had not been due in the first >place. In Duncan Sheehan's scenario, the price of the desk was due >but the right to sue for the price was extinguished by the >expiration of the limitation period. The concept of "natural >obligation" (purists will shudder) may be of use here in denying the >right to recover the price of the desk which was paid after seven >years. > As a matter of obligation, the money is always owed even if, as a >matter of procedure, it cannot be sued for. > > maybe we can keep the purists, not to mention legal realists [if >there is a difference] from shuddering via the following: the statute of limitations is a defense, and its assertion by the debtor precludes any judicial finding that the debt ever existed: it is uninteresting to say that the debt persists, as it cannot be judicially established that it ever was if however the debtor admits the debt after the statutory date, as in the hypothetical. it can be thus established, in which event it is uninteresting to say that it had ever expired >From scullymatthew@hotmail.com Sat Feb 12 21:20:47 2000 Received: from law-f110.hotmail.com ([209.185.131.173] helo=hotmail.com) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with smtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12JjyB-0003GA-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Sat, 12 Feb 2000 21:20:47 +0000 Received: (qmail 6738 invoked by uid 0); 12 Feb 2000 21:20:15 -0000 Message-ID: <20000212212015.6737.qmail@hotmail.com> Received: from 195.92.194.21 by www.hotmail.com with HTTP; Sat, 12 Feb 2000 13:20:15 PST X-Originating-IP: [195.92.194.21] From: "Matthew Scully" To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: Re: RDG: Query Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 21:20:15 GMT Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed >the statute of limitations is a defense, and its assertion by the debtor >precludes any judicial finding that the debt ever existed: it is >uninteresting to say that the debt persists, as it cannot be judicially >established that it ever was This is why we cannot refer to the debt as a legally enforceable obligation. The concept of natural obligation is put forward as a means of allowing discharge of a "debt" which is legally unenforceable (either because of a procedural bar such as the Statute of Limitations or because the "debt" only exists as a moral obligation such as the obligation to provide for retired parents (to borrow an example from French Law)) to be good consideration. The Statute of Limitations does not preclude any judicial finding that the debt ever was. It is much less sophisticated in its operation. It simply precludes recovery. It does not extinguish the indebtedness, it extinguishes the cause of action to enforce the indebtedness. Why else can one simply "affirm" one's indebtedness and thereby waive one's right to rely on the time bar? In what other areas of law can a simple affirmation of indebtedness suffice to create a binding obligation to pay? Matthew Scully. Oxford Institute of Legal Practice. ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com >From aaxel@attglobal.net Sun Feb 13 04:10:59 2000 Received: from out1.prserv.net ([32.97.166.31] helo=prserv.net) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12JqN9-0005qj-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Sun, 13 Feb 2000 04:10:59 +0000 Received: from aaxelrod.rutgers.edu ([166.72.179.230]) by prserv.net (out1) with SMTP id <2000021304105625201qhch9e>; Sun, 13 Feb 2000 04:10:57 +0000 Message-ID: <38A60F8E.3CC1@attglobal.net> Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 20:57:34 -0500 From: aaxel@attglobal.net Reply-To: aaxel@attglobal.net X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.02 (Win95; I) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: restitution Subject: [Fwd: Re: RDG: Query] Content-Type: message/rfc822 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline Message-ID: <38A60DBB.5C8@attglobal.net> Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 20:49:47 -0500 From: aaxel@attglobal.net Reply-To: aaxel@attglobal.net X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.02 (Win95; I) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Matthew Scully Subject: Re: RDG: Query References: <20000212212015.6737.qmail@hotmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Matthew Scully wrote: > AA had said: ; > >the statute of limitations is a defense, and its assertion by the debtor > >precludes any judicial finding that the debt ever existed: it is > >uninteresting to say that the debt persists, as it cannot be judicially > >established that it ever was > MS: > This is why we cannot refer to the debt as a legally enforceable obligation. > The concept of natural obligation is put forward as a means of allowing > discharge of a "debt" which is legally unenforceable (either because of a > procedural bar such as the Statute of Limitations or because the "debt" only > exists as a moral obligation such as the obligation to provide for retired > parents (to borrow an example from French Law)) to be good consideration. > > The Statute of Limitations does not preclude any judicial finding that the > debt ever was. it is much less sophisticated in its operation. It simply > precludes recovery. It does not extinguish the indebtedness, it > extinguishes the cause of action to enforce the indebtedness. Why else can > one simply "affirm" one's indebtedness and thereby waive one's right to rely > on the time bar? AA: i did not make myself clear i expect we will agree that the statute of limitations precludes any finding that the debt existed in the proceeding in which the running of the statute is established. such a finding would defeat one of the higher purposes of the statute, which is to preclude affirmative proofs of an obligation when time has likely eroded such contradictory evidence as the defendant might have adduced. anyway as a matter of procedure, if the running is established, the court simply has no occasion to rule on any aspect of the debt. so i wonder at your first sentence: 'that is why we cannot refer to the debt as a legally enforceable obligation': if the statute is established, we cannot refer to the debt as a 'debt'. MS In what other areas of law can a simple affirmation of > indebtedness suffice to create a binding obligation to pay? > AA: any other time a debt is alleged by a plaintiff, and admitted by the defendant my point was that discussions about the debt continuing, but being unenforceable simply make no contribution to understanding of the results: if the debt is denied and the statute asserted, judgment for defendant: if the statute [tho having run] is not asserted, judgment for plaintiff if there is no other defense. what is added to legal understanding of these results by higher thought about the unenforceability but persistence of time-barred transactions?? > by the way, another formulation which might pop up in american legal thought: it is the sensible legislative intention behind the statute of limitations that it simply offers an option to the defendant to bar proof of the debt, and has no other operation with respect to the early transaction [again a formulation which eschews the higher thought]. _________________________________ i hope you are interested in these considerable differences between us in conceptualization: there are certainly many american lawyers and academics who would describe the matter as you do, but many would talk about it as i have. >From aaxel@attglobal.net Sun Feb 13 04:48:55 2000 Received: from out5.prserv.net ([32.97.166.35] helo=prserv.net) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12Jqxr-00062p-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Sun, 13 Feb 2000 04:48:55 +0000 Received: from aaxelrod.rutgers.edu ([166.72.179.99]) by prserv.net (out5) with SMTP id <200002130448472430096s0je>; Sun, 13 Feb 2000 04:48:48 +0000 Message-ID: <38A63843.23C6@attglobal.net> Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 23:51:15 -0500 From: aaxel@attglobal.net Reply-To: aaxel@attglobal.net X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.02 (Win95; I) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: [Fwd: moral oblig and the statute of limitations] Content-Type: message/rfc822 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline Message-ID: <38A63737.51DA@attglobal.net> Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 23:46:47 -0500 From: aaxel@attglobal.net Reply-To: aaxel@attglobal.net X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.02 (Win95; I) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: restitution Subject: moral oblig and the statute of limitations Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit a will provides: and i hereby leave Blackacre on a trust for my beloved son edgar, his heirs and assigns, but if at the time of my death he shall have any undischarged moral obligations, for the members of the restitution discussion group' it is discovered that edgar was sued ten years ago on a debt alleged to have been incurred forty years ago, and successfully defended with a fifteen year S/L? there is plenty of evidence to support the proof of the original obligation; there is no evidence to back up edgar's assertion that he paid the debt many years ago, in front of witnesses since deceased, and with a check since thrown away. who gets blackacre? >From aaxel@attglobal.net Sun Feb 13 17:45:59 2000 Received: from out4.prserv.net ([32.97.166.34] helo=prserv.net) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12K35r-0002dq-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Sun, 13 Feb 2000 17:45:59 +0000 Received: from aaxelrod.rutgers.edu ([166.72.179.253]) by prserv.net (out4) with SMTP id <2000021317455623902ngsqje>; Sun, 13 Feb 2000 17:45:56 +0000 Message-ID: <38A6EE13.6C36@attglobal.net> Date: Sun, 13 Feb 2000 12:46:59 -0500 From: aaxel@attglobal.net Reply-To: aaxel@attglobal.net X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.02 (Win95; I) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: restitution Subject: moral obligation and the statute of limitations Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit a will provides: '..Blackacre ...on a trust...for my beloved son edgar, his heirs and assigns, but if at the time of my death he shall have any undischarged moral obligations,..for the members of the restitution discussion group' it is discovered that edgar was sued ten years ago on a debt alleged to have been incurred forty years ago, and successfully defended with a fifteen year S/L. there is plenty of evidence to support the proof of the original obligation; there is no evidence to back up edgar's testimony that he paid the debt many years ago, in front of witnesses since deceased, and with a check since thrown away. the payment is denied by the original plaintiff. who gets blackacre? ... >From PaulMichalik@wn.moke.co.nz Sun Feb 13 19:43:22 2000 Received: from thresher.netlink.co.nz ([202.20.93.12]) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12K4vR-0003Yn-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Sun, 13 Feb 2000 19:43:22 +0000 Received: from nz4mor3.wn.moke.co.nz (morrkent.wn.netlink.net.nz [202.37.61.180]) by thresher.netlink.co.nz (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id IAA05563 for ; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 08:43:16 +1300 (NZDT) Received: from nz4mor3.wn.moke.co.nz (202.50.159.252) by nz4mor3.wn.moke.co.nz Monday, February 14, 2000 08:40:10 Message-ID: Received: by NZ4MOR3 with Internet Mail Service (5.5.1960.3) id ; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 08:40:09 +1300 Message-ID: From: Paul Michalik To: "'restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk'" Subject: RE: RDG: Query Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 08:40:08 +1300 Importance: low X-Priority: 5 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.1960.3) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" >the statute of limitations is a defense, and its assertion by the debtor >precludes any judicial finding that the debt ever existed: it is >uninteresting to say that the debt persists, as it cannot be judicially >established that it ever was In my humble view, the continuing existence of the debt is far from "uninteresting". While no action can be taken to enforce the debt, the time-honoured position has it that - IF the debt is paid, (or IF money comes into the hands of the creditor, against which he or she seeks to set off an amount in respect of the debt) the law will accept that. The debt is then discharged, but only then. Expiry of limitations periods prevents enforcement action, but does not discharge the debt. The interest for unjust enrichment scholarship seems to me to be the continuing, but unenforceable nature of the debt, which will prevent an action to recover what might otherwise appear to be an unjust enrichment. The situation on which this thread was originally based might be difficult to assign to one or other of the categories we tend to use in debate, but it is absolutely certain that there is no recovery. The law must be telling us that such an enrichment is not "unjust". The interesting problem, therefore, is; how do we ensure that the analysis of the recovery rights in respect of unjust enrichments does not falsely encourage us to allow recovery here - whether for mistake of law or otherwise. Will "Natural Obligations" be the right label? Paul _______________________________________________________ Paul Michalik work Morrison Kent ph 04 - 495 8927 PO Box 10-035 fax 04 - 495 8937 Wellington mob 021 - 251 6834 home Flat 8, 53 Liardet St ph 04 - 389 8885 Vogeltown Wellington New Zealand -----Original Message----- From: Matthew Scully [mailto:scullymatthew@hotmail.com] Sent: Sunday, 13 February 2000 10:20 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: Re: RDG: Query This is why we cannot refer to the debt as a legally enforceable obligation. The concept of natural obligation is put forward as a means of allowing discharge of a "debt" which is legally unenforceable (either because of a procedural bar such as the Statute of Limitations or because the "debt" only exists as a moral obligation such as the obligation to provide for retired parents (to borrow an example from French Law)) to be good consideration. The Statute of Limitations does not preclude any judicial finding that the debt ever was. It is much less sophisticated in its operation. It simply precludes recovery. It does not extinguish the indebtedness, it extinguishes the cause of action to enforce the indebtedness. Why else can one simply "affirm" one's indebtedness and thereby waive one's right to rely on the time bar? In what other areas of law can a simple affirmation of indebtedness suffice to create a binding obligation to pay? Matthew Scully. Oxford Institute of Legal Practice. ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com >From robertsq@bigpond.com Mon Feb 14 00:58:29 2000 Received: from teapot23.domain2.bigpond.com ([139.134.5.165]) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with smtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12K9qP-0006De-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 00:58:29 +0000 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by teapot23.domain2.bigpond.com (NTMail 3.02.13) with ESMTP id la325427 for ; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 10:56:32 +1000 Received: from EXIP-T-001-p-202-3.tmns.net.au ([139.134.202.3]) by mail2.bigpond.com (Claudes-Top-Fuel-MailRouter V2.7c 3/745927); 14 Feb 2000 10:56:22 Message-ID: <001601bf7687$95781280$03ca868b@robertsq> From: "Robert Squirrell" To: Subject: change of address Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 12:04:35 +1100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0011_01BF76E3.A9590320" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2314.1300 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2314.1300 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0011_01BF76E3.A9590320 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable please note the new address robertsq@bigpond.com which applies from now. = I shall keep the "mira.net" account for a month or so just in case. ------=_NextPart_000_0011_01BF76E3.A9590320 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
please note the new address robertsq@bigpond.com which = applies from=20 now. I shall keep the "mira.net" account for a month or so just in=20 case.
------=_NextPart_000_0011_01BF76E3.A9590320-- >From lionel.smith@law.oxford.ac.uk Mon Feb 14 09:29:58 2000 Received: from oxmail3.ox.ac.uk ([129.67.1.180] helo=oxmail.ox.ac.uk) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12KHpO-0001Xk-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:29:58 +0000 Received: from sable.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.4]) by oxmail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.10 #1) id 12KHpO-0000ya-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:29:58 +0000 Received: from fellow22.sthughs.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.228.82]) by sable.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 3.13 #1) id 12KHpO-0001w0-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:29:58 +0000 Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: lawf0014@sable.ox.ac.uk Message-Id: Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:28:28 +0000 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk From: Lionel Smith Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" approved: eregion From: aaxel@attglobal.net Subject: Re: RDG: Query Matthew Scully wrote: > AA had said: ; > >the statute of limitations is a defense, and its assertion by the debtor > >precludes any judicial finding that the debt ever existed: it is > >uninteresting to say that the debt persists, as it cannot be judicially > >established that it ever was > MS: > This is why we cannot refer to the debt as a legally enforceable obligation. > The concept of natural obligation is put forward as a means of allowing > discharge of a "debt" which is legally unenforceable (either because of a > procedural bar such as the Statute of Limitations or because the "debt" only > exists as a moral obligation such as the obligation to provide for retired > parents (to borrow an example from French Law)) to be good consideration. > > The Statute of Limitations does not preclude any judicial finding that the > debt ever was. it is much less sophisticated in its operation. It simply > precludes recovery. It does not extinguish the indebtedness, it > extinguishes the cause of action to enforce the indebtedness. Why else can > one simply "affirm" one's indebtedness and thereby waive one's right to rely > on the time bar? AA: i did not make myself clear i expect we will agree that the statute of limitations precludes any finding that the debt existed in the proceeding in which the running of the statute is established. such a finding would defeat one of the higher purposes of the statute, which is to preclude affirmative proofs of an obligation when time has likely eroded such contradictory evidence as the defendant might have adduced. anyway as a matter of procedure, if the running is established, the court simply has no occasion to rule on any aspect of the debt. so i wonder at your first sentence: 'that is why we cannot refer to the debt as a legally enforceable obligation': if the statute is established, we cannot refer to the debt as a 'debt'. MS In what other areas of law can a simple affirmation of > indebtedness suffice to create a binding obligation to pay? > AA: any other time a debt is alleged by a plaintiff, and admitted by the defendant my point was that discussions about the debt continuing, but being unenforceable simply make no contribution to understanding of the results: if the debt is denied and the statute asserted, judgment for defendant: if the statute [tho having run] is not asserted, judgment for plaintiff if there is no other defense. what is added to legal understanding of these results by higher thought about the unenforceability but persistence of time-barred transactions?? > by the way, another formulation which might pop up in american legal thought: it is the sensible legislative intention behind the statute of limitations that it simply offers an option to the defendant to bar proof of the debt, and has no other operation with respect to the early transaction [again a formulation which eschews the higher thought]. _________________________________ i hope you are interested in these considerable differences between us in conceptualization: there are certainly many american lawyers and academics who would describe the matter as you do, but many would talk about it as i have. >From lionel.smith@law.oxford.ac.uk Mon Feb 14 09:30:48 2000 Received: from oxmail4.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.33] helo=oxmail.ox.ac.uk) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12KHqC-0001Xz-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:30:48 +0000 Received: from sable.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.4]) by oxmail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.10 #1) id 12KHqB-0000DN-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:30:47 +0000 Received: from fellow22.sthughs.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.228.82]) by sable.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 3.13 #1) id 12KHqB-0000F5-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:30:47 +0000 Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: lawf0014@sable.ox.ac.uk Message-Id: Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2000 09:29:18 +0000 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk From: Lionel Smith Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" approved: eregion From: aaxel@attglobal.net Subject: moral oblig and the statute of limitations a will provides: and i hereby leave Blackacre on a trust for my beloved son edgar, his heirs and assigns, but if at the time of my death he shall have any undischarged moral obligations, for the members of the restitution discussion group' it is discovered that edgar was sued ten years ago on a debt alleged to have been incurred forty years ago, and successfully defended with a fifteen year S/L? there is plenty of evidence to support the proof of the original obligation; there is no evidence to back up edgar's assertion that he paid the debt many years ago, in front of witnesses since deceased, and with a check since thrown away. who gets blackacre? >From lionel.smith@st-hughs.oxford.ac.uk Wed Feb 16 11:22:20 2000 Received: from oxmail3.ox.ac.uk ([129.67.1.180] helo=oxmail.ox.ac.uk) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12L2X9-0000J7-01 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Wed, 16 Feb 2000 11:22:15 +0000 Received: from sable.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.4]) by oxmail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.10 #1) id 12Kmr7-0000Bf-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 18:37:49 +0000 Received: from max45.public.ox.ac.uk ([192.76.27.45]) by sable.ox.ac.uk with smtp (Exim 3.13 #1) id 12Kmr5-0001p8-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 18:37:49 +0000 Subject: Date: Tue, 15 Feb 00 18:39:08 +0000 x-sender: lawf0014@sable.ox.ac.uk x-mailer: Claris Emailer 1.1 From: Lionel Smith To: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Message-Id: approved: eregion From: aaxel@attglobal.net Subject: moral oblig and the statute of limitations a will provides: and i hereby leave Blackacre on a trust for my beloved son edgar, his heirs and assigns, but if at the time of my death he shall have any undischarged moral obligations, for the members of the restitution discussion group' it is discovered that edgar was sued ten years ago on a debt alleged to have been incurred forty years ago, and successfully defended with a fifteen year S/L? there is plenty of evidence to support the proof of the original obligation; there is no evidence to back up edgar's assertion that he paid the debt many years ago, in front of witnesses since deceased, and with a check since thrown away. who gets blackacre? >From lionel.smith@st-hughs.oxford.ac.uk Wed Feb 16 11:22:20 2000 Received: from oxmail3.ox.ac.uk ([129.67.1.180] helo=oxmail.ox.ac.uk) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12L2XA-0000J7-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Wed, 16 Feb 2000 11:22:16 +0000 Received: from sable.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.4]) by oxmail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.10 #1) id 12Kmqz-0000BV-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 18:37:41 +0000 Received: from max45.public.ox.ac.uk ([192.76.27.45]) by sable.ox.ac.uk with smtp (Exim 3.13 #1) id 12Kmqx-0001p8-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Tue, 15 Feb 2000 18:37:40 +0000 Subject: Date: Tue, 15 Feb 00 18:39:00 +0000 x-sender: lawf0014@sable.ox.ac.uk x-mailer: Claris Emailer 1.1 From: Lionel Smith To: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Message-Id: approved: eregion From: aaxel@attglobal.net Subject: [Fwd: Re: RDG: Query] Matthew Scully wrote: > AA had said: ; > >the statute of limitations is a defense, and its assertion by the debtor > >precludes any judicial finding that the debt ever existed: it is > >uninteresting to say that the debt persists, as it cannot be judicially > >established that it ever was > MS: > This is why we cannot refer to the debt as a legally enforceable obligation. > The concept of natural obligation is put forward as a means of allowing > discharge of a "debt" which is legally unenforceable (either because of a > procedural bar such as the Statute of Limitations or because the "debt" only > exists as a moral obligation such as the obligation to provide for retired > parents (to borrow an example from French Law)) to be good consideration. > > The Statute of Limitations does not preclude any judicial finding that the > debt ever was. it is much less sophisticated in its operation. It simply > precludes recovery. It does not extinguish the indebtedness, it > extinguishes the cause of action to enforce the indebtedness. Why else can > one simply "affirm" one's indebtedness and thereby waive one's right to rely > on the time bar? AA: i did not make myself clear i expect we will agree that the statute of limitations precludes any finding that the debt existed in the proceeding in which the running of the statute is established. such a finding would defeat one of the higher purposes of the statute, which is to preclude affirmative proofs of an obligation when time has likely eroded such contradictory evidence as the defendant might have adduced. anyway as a matter of procedure, if the running is established, the court simply has no occasion to rule on any aspect of the debt. so i wonder at your first sentence: 'that is why we cannot refer to the debt as a legally enforceable obligation': if the statute is established, we cannot refer to the debt as a 'debt'. MS In what other areas of law can a simple affirmation of > indebtedness suffice to create a binding obligation to pay? > AA: any other time a debt is alleged by a plaintiff, and admitted by the defendant my point was that discussions about the debt continuing, but being unenforceable simply make no contribution to understanding of the results: if the debt is denied and the statute asserted, judgment for defendant: if the statute [tho having run] is not asserted, judgment for plaintiff if there is no other defense. what is added to legal understanding of these results by higher thought about the unenforceability but persistence of time-barred transactions?? > by the way, another formulation which might pop up in american legal thought: it is the sensible legislative intention behind the statute of limitations that it simply offers an option to the defendant to bar proof of the debt, and has no other operation with respect to the early transaction [again a formulation which eschews the higher thought]. _________________________________ i hope you are interested in these considerable differences between us in conceptualization: there are certainly many american lawyers and academics who would describe the matter as you do, but many would talk about it as i have. >From gerhard.dannemann@law.oxford.ac.uk Thu Feb 17 15:43:25 2000 Received: from oxmail1.ox.ac.uk ([129.67.1.1] helo=oxmail.ox.ac.uk) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12LT5R-0002CE-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Thu, 17 Feb 2000 15:43:25 +0000 Received: from ermine.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.13]) by oxmail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.10 #1) id 12LT5S-0001lk-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Thu, 17 Feb 2000 15:43:26 +0000 Received: from max35.public.ox.ac.uk ([192.76.27.35] helo=law.ox.ac.uk) by ermine.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 3.13 #1) id 12LT5R-0005mm-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Thu, 17 Feb 2000 15:43:25 +0000 Message-ID: <38AC1672.6ED0ED5F@law.ox.ac.uk> Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2000 16:40:34 +0100 From: Gerhard Dannemann X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.51 [en] (Win95; I) X-Accept-Language: de MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "Maillist, Restitution" Subject: Never underestimate the power of restitution Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Maillist Members may be interested to learn that the current severe political crisis in Germany involving the German Christian Democratic Union is closely linked to restitution law. Yesterday, the conservative party leader and whip, Wolfgang Sch=E4uble, announced that he will not stand again in forthcoming elections to both positions within one day after the president of the German parliament had announced that he subjects the CDU to a 41 Million DM restitutionary claim for public funds received during 1999 in violation of the CDU's duty to submit full financial accounts under =A7 24 Parteiengesetz (Policical Parties Act) on the ground that its branch organisation in Hesse had hidden away some DM 17 Million in accounts in Liechtenstein. An English translation of the Political Parties Act is published in the German Law Archive at: http://iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/ParteienG.htm While the restitution claim for DM 41 Million paid out in 1999 follows from the statute itself (=A7 20 subs. 3, =A7 23 subs. 4), and while this claim will not bankrupt the party, its future is, to a large degree, in the hands of the general law of restitution. For it is primarily this law which will have to decide whether and to which extent the CDU is obliged to return a few hundred more millions of DM on the ground that this party has presented similarly false accounts since the early 1980ies - claims which, if allowed in full, would in all likelihood bankrupt this party. Constitutional law aspects will have a role to play in this (notably the principle of proportionality, which I think off the cuff has not previously been applied to restitution claims), but it is nevertheless remarkable what restitution law can do to a country and to one of its two main political parties. Gerhard Dannemann -- = Dr. Gerhard Dannemann Erich Brost University Lecturer in German Civil and Commercial Law University of Oxford http://iuscomp.org >From jonathon.moore@law.oxford.ac.uk Fri Feb 18 14:51:57 2000 Received: from oxmail3.ox.ac.uk ([129.67.1.180] helo=oxmail.ox.ac.uk) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12LolB-0005Yb-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Fri, 18 Feb 2000 14:51:57 +0000 Received: from heraldgate1.oucs.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.49] helo=frontend1.herald.ox.ac.uk ident=exim) by oxmail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.10 #1) id 12LolB-000792-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Fri, 18 Feb 2000 14:51:57 +0000 Received: from max168.public.ox.ac.uk ([192.76.27.168] helo=oemcomputer) by frontend1.herald.ox.ac.uk with smtp (Exim 2.02 #1) id 12LolB-0007lt-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Fri, 18 Feb 2000 14:51:57 +0000 Message-ID: <000801bf7a1f$a74a4320$a81b4cc0@oemcomputer> Reply-To: "Jonathon P. Moore" From: "Jonathon P. Moore" To: Subject: "Knowing Receipt" in Bank of America v Arnell Date: Fri, 18 Feb 2000 14:51:33 -0000 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0005_01BF7A1F.A6148240" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2919.6600 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0005_01BF7A1F.A6148240 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Members of the list have already been referred to the recently-reported = decision of Aikens J in Bank of America v Arnell [1999] Lloyd's Reports = Banking 399. I have only just obtained access to that report, and have = therefore held off commenting until now. Aikens J discussed the state of mind necessary to invoke liability for = "knowing receipt". At para 15, page 406, he held: "The latest consideration of the point by the Court of Appeal is in = Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley & Ors (Potter LJ; Sir Iain Glidewell and Sir = David Hirst: 28 April 1999). I think that it is clear from the judgment = of Potter LJ in that case (see particularly at paras 105-108) that the = fundamental question that the court has to ask now is: was the recipient = acting *honestly* when he received the funds." Potter LJ's jugdment is, in many ways, excellent. But one thing his = Lordship did not do was to decide that dishonesty was a necessary = element of the "knowing receipt" cause of action. It is true that the paragraphs referred to by Aikens J contain a = detailed discussion of dishonesty, and that those paragraphs come under = the heading " 'Knowing' Receipt or Assistance" (before para 101). But = it is abundantly clear that Potter LJ was discussing dishonesty only in = relation to dishonest assistance under Royal Brunei v Tan. Thus, at = para 107, Potter LJ says: "That being so, and because the judge found that Mr Leach did close = his eyes to the effect of the Sims' Undertaking, it seems to me that the = findings made by the judge and the evidence to which we have been = referred put this court in a position to proceed to effect the exercise = which the judge declined to perform, namely to consider whether or not = Mr Leach's state of mind was such as to establish accessory liability on = the basis stated in Royal Brunei Airlines." It is also clear that, in relation to "knowing receipt", the most one = can say about Twinsectra is that Potter LJ was content to assume that = *notice* was required. Thus, at para 114: " In relation to the receipt-based claim, it is plain that Mr Leach = received the trust property for his own benefit with notice of the = trust, took subject to it and is liable personally to account for it to = Twinsectra." The one failing of Potter LJ's judgment in Twinsectra (understandable in = light of the facts) was that it passed up the opportunity to consider = Lord Nicholls' extra-judicial view that "knowing receipt" (or at least = one version of it) is actually a strict liability claim in unjust = enrichment. =20 But it would be a huge mistake for judges to go to the other extreme by = wrongly assuming that Potter LJ required dishonesty as an element of the = cause of action. Jonathon Moore ------=_NextPart_000_0005_01BF7A1F.A6148240 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Members of the list have already been = referred to=20 the recently-reported decision of Aikens J in Bank of America v Arnell = [1999]=20 Lloyd's Reports Banking 399.  I have only just obtained access to = that=20 report, and have therefore held off commenting until now.
 
Aikens J discussed the state of mind = necessary to=20 invoke liability for "knowing receipt".  At para 15, page 406, he=20 held:
"The latest consideration of the = point by the=20 Court of Appeal is in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley & Ors (Potter LJ; = Sir Iain=20 Glidewell and Sir David Hirst: 28 April 1999).  I think that it = is clear=20 from the judgment of Potter LJ in that case (see particularly at paras = 105-108) that the fundamental question that the court has to ask now = is: was=20 the recipient acting *honestly* when he received the=20 funds."
Potter LJ's jugdment is, in many ways,=20 excellent.  But one thing his Lordship did not do was to decide = that=20 dishonesty was a necessary element of the "knowing receipt" cause of=20 action.
 
It is true that the paragraphs referred = to by=20 Aikens J contain a detailed discussion of dishonesty, and that those = paragraphs=20 come under the heading " 'Knowing' Receipt or Assistance" (before para=20 101).  But it is abundantly clear that Potter LJ was discussing = dishonesty=20 only in relation to dishonest assistance under Royal Brunei v Tan.  = Thus,=20 at para 107, Potter LJ says:
"That being so, and because the = judge found=20 that Mr Leach did close his eyes to the effect of the Sims’ = Undertaking, it=20 seems to me that the findings made by the judge and the evidence to = which we=20 have been referred put this court in a position to proceed to effect = the=20 exercise which the judge declined to perform, namely to consider = whether or=20 not Mr Leach’s state of mind was such as to establish accessory = liability on=20 the basis stated in Royal Brunei=20 Airlines."
It is also clear that, in relation to = "knowing=20 receipt", the most one can say about Twinsectra is that Potter LJ was = content to=20 assume that *notice* was required.  Thus, at para 114:
" In relation to the receipt-based = claim, it is=20 plain that Mr Leach received the trust property for his own benefit = with=20 notice of the trust, took subject to it and is liable personally to = account=20 for it to Twinsectra."
The one failing of Potter LJ's judgment = in=20 Twinsectra (understandable in light of the facts) was that it passed up = the=20 opportunity to consider Lord Nicholls' extra-judicial view that "knowing = receipt" (or at least one version of it) is actually a strict liability = claim in=20 unjust enrichment. 
 
But it would be a huge mistake for = judges to go to=20 the other extreme by wrongly assuming that Potter LJ required dishonesty = as an=20 element of the cause of action.
 
 
Jonathon Moore
 
------=_NextPart_000_0005_01BF7A1F.A6148240-- >From lionel.smith@law.oxford.ac.uk Fri Feb 18 15:14:31 2000 Received: from oxmail3.ox.ac.uk ([129.67.1.180] helo=oxmail.ox.ac.uk) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12Lp70-00064L-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Fri, 18 Feb 2000 15:14:30 +0000 Received: from sable.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.4]) by oxmail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.10 #1) id 12Lp71-0007kl-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Fri, 18 Feb 2000 15:14:31 +0000 Received: from fellow22.sthughs.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.228.82]) by sable.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 3.13 #1) id 12Lp70-0007J1-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Fri, 18 Feb 2000 15:14:30 +0000 Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: lawf0014@sable.ox.ac.uk Message-Id: Date: Fri, 18 Feb 2000 15:12:04 +0000 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk From: Lionel Smith Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="============_-1261235770==_ma============" --============_-1261235770==_ma============ Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" approved: eregion From: "Jonathon P. Moore" Subject: "Knowing Receipt" in Bank of America v Arnell Members of the list have already been referred to the recently-reported decision of Aikens J in Bank of America v Arnell [1999] Lloyd's Reports Banking 399. I have only just obtained access to that report, and have therefore held off commenting until now. Aikens J discussed the state of mind necessary to invoke liability for "knowing receipt". At para 15, page 406, he held: "The latest consideration of the point by the Court of Appeal is in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley & Ors (Potter LJ; Sir Iain Glidewell and Sir David Hirst: 28 April 1999). I think that it is clear from the judgment of Potter LJ in that case (see particularly at paras 105-108) that the fundamental question that the court has to ask now is: was the recipient acting *honestly* when he received the funds." Potter LJ's jugdment is, in many ways, excellent. But one thing his Lordship did not do was to decide that dishonesty was a necessary element of the "knowing receipt" cause of action. It is true that the paragraphs referred to by Aikens J contain a detailed discussion of dishonesty, and that those paragraphs come under the heading " 'Knowing' Receipt or Assistance" (before para 101). But it is abundantly clear that Potter LJ was discussing dishonesty only in relation to dishonest assistance under Royal Brunei v Tan. Thus, at para 107, Potter LJ says: "That being so, and because the judge found that Mr Leach did close his eyes to the effect of the Sims' Undertaking, it seems to me that the findings made by the judge and the evidence to which we have been referred put this court in a position to proceed to effect the exercise which the judge declined to perform, namely to consider whether or not Mr Leach's state of mind was such as to establish accessory liability on the basis stated in Royal Brunei Airlines." It is also clear that, in relation to "knowing receipt", the most one can say about Twinsectra is that Potter LJ was content to assume that *notice* was required. Thus, at para 114: " In relation to the receipt-based claim, it is plain that Mr Leach received the trust property for his own benefit with notice of the trust, took subject to it and is liable personally to account for it to Twinsectra." The one failing of Potter LJ's judgment in Twinsectra (understandable in light of the facts) was that it passed up the opportunity to consider Lord Nicholls' extra-judicial view that "knowing receipt" (or at least one version of it) is actually a strict liability claim in unjust enrichment. But it would be a huge mistake for judges to go to the other extreme by wrongly assuming that Potter LJ required dishonesty as an element of the cause of action. Jonathon Moore --============_-1261235770==_ma============ Content-Type: text/enriched; charset="us-ascii" approved: eregion PalatinoFrom: "Jonathon P. Moore" < Subject: "Knowing Receipt" in Bank of America v Arnell Members of the list have already been referred to the recently-reported decision of Aikens J in Bank of America v Arnell [1999] Lloyd's Reports Banking 399. I have only just obtained access to that report, and have therefore held off commenting until now. Aikens J discussed the state of mind necessary to invoke liability for "knowing receipt". At para 15, page 406, he held: "The latest consideration of the point by the Court of Appeal is in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley & Ors (Potter LJ; Sir Iain Glidewell and Sir David Hirst: 28 April 1999). I think that it is clear from the judgment of Potter LJ in that case (see particularly at paras 105-108) that the fundamental question that the court has to ask now is: was the recipient acting *honestly* when he received the funds." Potter LJ's jugdment is, in many ways, excellent. But one thing his Lordship did not do was to decide that dishonesty was a necessary element of the "knowing receipt" cause of action. It is true that the paragraphs referred to by Aikens J contain a detailed discussion of dishonesty, and that those paragraphs come under the heading " 'Knowing' Receipt or Assistance" (before para 101). But it is abundantly clear that Potter LJ was discussing dishonesty only in relation to dishonest assistance under Royal Brunei v Tan. Thus, at para 107, Potter LJ says: "That being so, and because the judge found that Mr Leach did close his eyes to the effect of the Sims' Undertaking, it seems to me that the findings made by the judge and the evidence to which we have been referred put this court in a position to proceed to effect the exercise which the judge declined to perform, namely to consider whether or not Mr Leach's state of mind was such as to establish accessory liability on the basis stated in Royal Brunei Airlines." It is also clear that, in relation to "knowing receipt", the most one can say about Twinsectra is that Potter LJ was content to assume that *notice* was required. Thus, at para 114: " In relation to the receipt-based claim, it is plain that Mr Leach received the trust property for his own benefit with notice of the trust, took subject to it and is liable personally to account for it to Twinsectra." The one failing of Potter LJ's judgment in Twinsectra (understandable in light of the facts) was that it passed up the opportunity to consider Lord Nicholls' extra-judicial view that "knowing receipt" (or at least one version of it) is actually a strict liability claim in unjust enrichment. But it would be a huge mistake for judges to go to the other extreme by wrongly assuming that Potter LJ required dishonesty as an element of the cause of action. Jonathon Moore --============_-1261235770==_ma============-- >From mskj1@singnet.com.sg Fri Feb 18 22:37:12 2000 Received: from smtp1.singnet.com.sg ([165.21.7.81] helo=iron.singnet.com.sg) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12Lw1P-0001fy-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Fri, 18 Feb 2000 22:37:12 +0000 Received: from user (hs14148.singnet.com.sg [165.21.37.112]) by iron.singnet.com.sg (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id GAA04431 for ; Sat, 19 Feb 2000 06:37:05 +0800 (SGT) Message-ID: <003b01bf7a61$95f15220$702515a5@user> From: "joseph" To: References: Subject: Re: Honest Receipt? Date: Sat, 19 Feb 2000 06:41:42 +0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0038_01BF7AA4.62701100" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2615.200 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2615.200 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0038_01BF7AA4.62701100 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I am slightly confused. Is 'knowing receipt' different from 'honest = receipt'? For, if we are taking of the same thing (but perhaps two = different sides of it) wasn't the defence of 'honest receipt' (unless it = is not the same as 'knowing receipt') comprehensively rejected by the = House of Lords in Klienwort Benson? As I understand it, the seeds of = this defence was suggested by Brennan J in David Securities Pty Ltd v = Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 109 ALR 57, when he said (at p = 92): 'It is a defence for a claim for restitution of money paid or = property transferred under a mistake of law that the defendant honestly = believed, when he learnt of the payment or transfer, that he was = entitled to receive and retain the money or the property.' As to the availability of this defence, remember that Lord Goff said in = Kleinwort Benson (at [1997] 3 WLR 1095, 1124) that it suffers from a = chronic lack of support, as it is generally regarded as being wider than = is necessary to meet the perceived mischief. He concluded (at p 1125): '... it would be most unwise for the common law, having recognised the = right to recover money paid under a mistake of law on the ground of = unjust enrichment, immediately to proceed to the recognition of so wide = a defence as which would exclude the right of recovery in a very large = proportion of cases. The proper course is surely to identify particular = sets of circumstances which, as a matter of principle or policy, may = lead to the conclusion that recovery should not be allowed: and in so = doing to draw on the experience of the past, looking in particular from = the analogous case of money paid under mistake of fact.' Lord Lloyd (at p 1136), Lord Hoffman (at p 1136-7) and Lord Hope (at p = 1151) concurred with Lord Goff on this point. Louis Joseph ----- Original Message -----=20 From: Lionel Smith=20 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk=20 Sent: Friday, February 18, 2000 11:12 PM approved: eregion From: "Jonathon P. Moore" Subject: "Knowing Receipt" in Bank of America v Arnell Members of the list have already been referred to the = recently-reported decision of Aikens J in Bank of America v Arnell [1999] Lloyd's = Reports Banking 399. I have only just obtained access to that report, and have therefore held off commenting until now. Aikens J discussed the state of mind necessary to invoke liability for = "knowing receipt". At para 15, page 406, he held: "The latest consideration of the point by the Court of Appeal is in=20 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley & Ors (Potter LJ; Sir Iain Glidewell and Sir=20 David Hirst: 28 April 1999). I think that it is clear from the = judgment=20 of Potter LJ in that case (see particularly at paras 105-108) that the fundamental question that the court has to ask now is: was the = recipient=20 acting *honestly* when he received the funds." Potter LJ's jugdment is, in many ways, excellent. But one thing his=20 Lordship did not do was to decide that dishonesty was a necessary=20 element of the "knowing receipt" cause of action. It is true that the paragraphs referred to by Aikens J contain a=20 detailed discussion of dishonesty, and that those paragraphs come = under the heading " 'Knowing' Receipt or Assistance" (before para 101). But it is abundantly clear that Potter LJ was discussing dishonesty only = in relation to dishonest assistance under Royal Brunei v Tan. Thus, at=20 para 107, Potter LJ says: "That being so, and because the judge found that Mr Leach did close=20 his eyes to the effect of the Sims' Undertaking, it seems to me that = the=20 findings made by the judge and the evidence to which we have been=20 referred put this court in a position to proceed to effect the = exercise which the judge declined to perform, namely to consider whether or not Mr Leach's state of mind was such as to establish accessory liability = on=20 the basis stated in Royal Brunei Airlines." It is also clear that, in relation to "knowing receipt", the most one=20 can say about Twinsectra is that Potter LJ was content to assume that=20 *notice* was required. Thus, at para 114: " In relation to the receipt-based claim, it is plain that Mr Leach=20 received the trust property for his own benefit with notice of the=20 trust, took subject to it and is liable personally to account for it = to Twinsectra." The one failing of Potter LJ's judgment in Twinsectra (understandable = in=20 light of the facts) was that it passed up the opportunity to consider=20 Lord Nicholls' extra-judicial view that "knowing receipt" (or at least one version of it) is actually a strict liability claim in unjust=20 enrichment. But it would be a huge mistake for judges to go to the other extreme = by wrongly assuming that Potter LJ required dishonesty as an element of = the=20 cause of action. Jonathon Moore=20 ------=_NextPart_000_0038_01BF7AA4.62701100 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I am slightly confused. Is 'knowing receipt' different from 'honest = receipt'? For, if we are taking of the same thing (but perhaps two = different=20 sides of it) wasn't the defence of 'honest receipt' (unless it is = not the=20 same as 'knowing receipt') comprehensively rejected by the House of = Lords in=20 Klienwort Benson? As I understand it, the seeds of this defence = was=20 suggested by Brennan J in David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth = Bank of=20 Australia (1992) 109 ALR 57, when he said (at p 92): 'It is a = defence for a=20 claim for restitution of money paid or property transferred under a = mistake of=20 law that the defendant honestly believed, when he learnt of the payment = or=20 transfer, that he was entitled to receive and retain the money or the=20 property.'
 
As to the availability of this defence, remember that Lord Goff = said in=20 Kleinwort Benson (at [1997] 3 WLR 1095, 1124) that it = suffers from=20 a chronic lack of support, as it is generally regarded as being wider = than is=20 necessary to meet the perceived mischief. He concluded (at p = 1125):
'... it would be most unwise for the common law, having = recognised the=20 right to recover money paid under a mistake of law on the ground of = unjust=20 enrichment, immediately to proceed to the recognition of so wide a = defence as=20 which would exclude the right of recovery in a very large proportion = of cases.=20 The proper course is surely to identify  particular sets of = circumstances=20 which, as a matter of principle or policy, may lead to the conclusion = that=20 recovery should not be allowed: and in so doing  to draw on the=20 experience of the past, looking in particular from the analogous case = of money=20 paid under  mistake of fact.'
Lord Lloyd (at p 1136), Lord Hoffman (at p 1136-7) and Lord Hope = (at p=20 1151) concurred with Lord Goff on this point.
 
Louis Joseph
 
----- Original Message -----
From:=20 Lionel Smith
To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk =
Sent: Friday, February 18, 2000 = 11:12=20 PM

approved:=20 eregion
From: "Jonathon P. = Moore"=20 <jonathon.moore@law.oxford= .ac.uk>
Subject:=20 "Knowing Receipt" in Bank of America v Arnell

Members of the = list have=20 already been referred to the recently-reported
decision of Aikens J = in Bank=20 of America v Arnell [1999] Lloyd's Reports
Banking 399. I have only = just=20 obtained access to that report, and have
therefore held off = commenting=20 until now.

Aikens J discussed the state of mind necessary to = invoke=20 liability for "knowing receipt". At para 15, page 406, he = held:

"The=20 latest consideration of the point by the Court of Appeal is in =
Twinsectra=20 Ltd v Yardley & Ors (Potter LJ; Sir Iain Glidewell and Sir =
David=20 Hirst: 28 April 1999). I think that it is clear from the judgment =
of=20 Potter LJ in that case (see particularly at paras 105-108) that=20 the
fundamental question that the court has to ask now is: was the=20 recipient
acting *honestly* when he received the = funds."

Potter=20 LJ's jugdment is, in many ways, excellent. But one thing his =
Lordship did=20 not do was to decide that dishonesty was a necessary
element of = the=20 "knowing receipt" cause of action.

It is true that the = paragraphs=20 referred to by Aikens J contain a
detailed discussion of = dishonesty, and=20 that those paragraphs come under
the heading " 'Knowing' Receipt or = Assistance" (before para 101). But
it is abundantly clear that = Potter LJ=20 was discussing dishonesty only in
relation to dishonest assistance = under=20 Royal Brunei v Tan. Thus, at
para 107, Potter LJ = says:

"That being=20 so, and because the judge found that Mr Leach did close
his eyes = to the=20 effect of the Sims' Undertaking, it seems to me that the
findings = made by=20 the judge and the evidence to which we have been
referred put this = court=20 in a position to proceed to effect the exercise
which the judge = declined to=20 perform, namely to consider whether or not
Mr Leach's state of mind = was=20 such as to establish accessory liability on
the basis stated in = Royal=20 Brunei Airlines."

It is also clear that, in relation to = "knowing=20 receipt", the most one
can say about Twinsectra is that Potter LJ = was=20 content to assume that
*notice* was required. Thus, at para = 114:

"=20 In relation to the receipt-based claim, it is plain that Mr Leach =
received=20 the trust property for his own benefit with notice of the
trust, = took=20 subject to it and is liable personally to account for it=20 to
Twinsectra."

The one failing of Potter LJ's judgment in=20 Twinsectra (understandable in
light of the facts) was that it = passed up=20 the opportunity to consider
Lord Nicholls' extra-judicial view = that=20 "knowing receipt" (or at least
one version of it) is actually a = strict=20 liability claim in unjust
enrichment.

But it would be a = huge=20 mistake for judges to go to the other extreme by
wrongly assuming = that=20 Potter LJ required dishonesty as an element of the
cause of=20 action.


Jonathon Moore=20 ------=_NextPart_000_0038_01BF7AA4.62701100-- >From mskj1@singnet.com.sg Sat Feb 19 09:03:30 2000 Received: from smtp3.singnet.com.sg ([165.21.7.83] helo=zinc.singnet.com.sg) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12M5nV-0003Kx-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Sat, 19 Feb 2000 09:03:30 +0000 Received: from user (hs1431.singnet.com.sg [165.21.36.251]) by zinc.singnet.com.sg (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id RAA29734; Sat, 19 Feb 2000 17:03:13 +0800 (SGT) Message-ID: <000a01bf7ab9$0fd021a0$fb2415a5@user> From: "joseph" To: "Jonathon P. Moore" , References: <001c01bf7a65$c9e9ede0$fd2415a5@user> <001b01bf7ab5$7cdeaae0$aa1b4cc0@oemcomputer> Subject: Re: Re: Honest Receipt? Date: Sat, 19 Feb 2000 17:09:13 +0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0007_01BF7AFC.0B855D20" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2615.200 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2615.200 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0007_01BF7AFC.0B855D20 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Yup, I think I have got it. One ("knowing receipt") is a cause of action = - i.e., the plaintiff says: "you have to give the money back because = when you received it, you knew you had no right to it"; and the other = ("honest receipt") is a plea by the defendant who says: "look, when I = received the money I thought 'honestly' that I was entitled to it". Am I = right? Gracias amigo! Louis Joseph ----- Original Message -----=20 From: Jonathon P. Moore=20 To: joseph=20 Sent: Saturday, February 19, 2000 4:44 PM Subject: Re: Re: Honest Receipt? I don't understand your question. 'Knowing receipt' is a claim, though poorly named. 'Honest receipt' = is a suggested defence, which has been rejected by the courts. ----- Original Message -----=20 From: joseph=20 To: Jonathon Moore=20 Sent: Friday, February 18, 2000 11:13 PM Subject: Fw: Re: Honest Receipt? ----- Original Message -----=20 From: joseph=20 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk=20 Sent: Saturday, February 19, 2000 6:41 AM Subject: RDG: Re: Honest Receipt? I am slightly confused. Is 'knowing receipt' different from 'honest = receipt'? For, if we are taking of the same thing (but perhaps two = different sides of it) wasn't the defence of 'honest receipt' (unless it = is not the same as 'knowing receipt') comprehensively rejected by the = House of Lords in Klienwort Benson? As I understand it, the seeds of = this defence was suggested by Brennan J in David Securities Pty Ltd v = Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 109 ALR 57, when he said (at p = 92): 'It is a defence for a claim for restitution of money paid or = property transferred under a mistake of law that the defendant honestly = believed, when he learnt of the payment or transfer, that he was = entitled to receive and retain the money or the property.' As to the availability of this defence, remember that Lord Goff said = in Kleinwort Benson (at [1997] 3 WLR 1095, 1124) that it suffers from a = chronic lack of support, as it is generally regarded as being wider than = is necessary to meet the perceived mischief. He concluded (at p 1125): '... it would be most unwise for the common law, having recognised = the right to recover money paid under a mistake of law on the ground of = unjust enrichment, immediately to proceed to the recognition of so wide = a defence as which would exclude the right of recovery in a very large = proportion of cases. The proper course is surely to identify particular = sets of circumstances which, as a matter of principle or policy, may = lead to the conclusion that recovery should not be allowed: and in so = doing to draw on the experience of the past, looking in particular from = the analogous case of money paid under mistake of fact.' Lord Lloyd (at p 1136), Lord Hoffman (at p 1136-7) and Lord Hope (at = p 1151) concurred with Lord Goff on this point. Louis Joseph ----- Original Message -----=20 From: Lionel Smith=20 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk=20 Sent: Friday, February 18, 2000 11:12 PM approved: eregion From: "Jonathon P. Moore" Subject: "Knowing Receipt" in Bank of America v Arnell Members of the list have already been referred to the = recently-reported decision of Aikens J in Bank of America v Arnell [1999] Lloyd's = Reports Banking 399. I have only just obtained access to that report, and = have therefore held off commenting until now. Aikens J discussed the state of mind necessary to invoke liability = for "knowing receipt". At para 15, page 406, he held: "The latest consideration of the point by the Court of Appeal is = in=20 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley & Ors (Potter LJ; Sir Iain Glidewell and = Sir=20 David Hirst: 28 April 1999). I think that it is clear from the = judgment=20 of Potter LJ in that case (see particularly at paras 105-108) that = the fundamental question that the court has to ask now is: was the = recipient=20 acting *honestly* when he received the funds." Potter LJ's jugdment is, in many ways, excellent. But one thing = his=20 Lordship did not do was to decide that dishonesty was a necessary=20 element of the "knowing receipt" cause of action. It is true that the paragraphs referred to by Aikens J contain a=20 detailed discussion of dishonesty, and that those paragraphs come = under the heading " 'Knowing' Receipt or Assistance" (before para 101). = But it is abundantly clear that Potter LJ was discussing dishonesty = only in relation to dishonest assistance under Royal Brunei v Tan. Thus, = at=20 para 107, Potter LJ says: "That being so, and because the judge found that Mr Leach did = close=20 his eyes to the effect of the Sims' Undertaking, it seems to me = that the=20 findings made by the judge and the evidence to which we have been=20 referred put this court in a position to proceed to effect the = exercise which the judge declined to perform, namely to consider whether or = not Mr Leach's state of mind was such as to establish accessory = liability on=20 the basis stated in Royal Brunei Airlines." It is also clear that, in relation to "knowing receipt", the most = one=20 can say about Twinsectra is that Potter LJ was content to assume = that=20 *notice* was required. Thus, at para 114: " In relation to the receipt-based claim, it is plain that Mr = Leach=20 received the trust property for his own benefit with notice of the = trust, took subject to it and is liable personally to account for = it to Twinsectra." The one failing of Potter LJ's judgment in Twinsectra = (understandable in=20 light of the facts) was that it passed up the opportunity to = consider=20 Lord Nicholls' extra-judicial view that "knowing receipt" (or at = least one version of it) is actually a strict liability claim in unjust=20 enrichment. But it would be a huge mistake for judges to go to the other = extreme by wrongly assuming that Potter LJ required dishonesty as an element = of the=20 cause of action. Jonathon Moore=20 ------=_NextPart_000_0007_01BF7AFC.0B855D20 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Yup, I think I have got it. One ("knowing receipt") is a cause of = action -=20 i.e., the plaintiff says: "you have to give the money back because = when you=20 received it, you knew you had no right to it"; and the other = ("honest=20 receipt") is a plea by the defendant who says: "look, when I received = the money=20 I thought 'honestly' that I was entitled to it". Am I right? = Gracias=20 amigo!
 
Louis Joseph
----- Original Message -----
From:=20 Jonathon P. Moore
To: joseph
Sent: Saturday, February 19, = 2000 4:44=20 PM
Subject: Re: Re: Honest = Receipt?

I don't understand your = question.
 
'Knowing receipt' is a claim, though = poorly=20 named.  'Honest receipt' is a suggested defence, which has been = rejected=20 by the courts.
----- Original Message -----
From:=20 joseph=20
To: Jonathon Moore
Sent: Friday, February 18, = 2000 11:13=20 PM
Subject: Fw: Re: Honest = Receipt?

 
----- Original Message -----=20
From: = joseph=20
Sent: Saturday, February 19, 2000 6:41 AM
Subject: RDG: Re: Honest Receipt?

I am slightly confused. Is 'knowing receipt' different from = 'honest=20 receipt'? For, if we are taking of the same thing (but perhaps two = different=20 sides of it) wasn't the defence of 'honest receipt' (unless it = is not=20 the same as 'knowing receipt') comprehensively rejected by the House = of=20 Lords in Klienwort Benson? As I understand it, the seeds of = this=20 defence was suggested by Brennan J in David Securities Pty Ltd v = Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 109 ALR 57, when he said = (at p=20 92): 'It is a defence for a claim for restitution of money paid or = property=20 transferred under a mistake of law that the defendant honestly = believed,=20 when he learnt of the payment or transfer, that he was entitled to = receive=20 and retain the money or the property.'
 
As to the availability of this defence, remember that Lord Goff = said in=20 Kleinwort Benson (at [1997] 3 WLR 1095, 1124) that it = suffers=20 from a chronic lack of support, as it is generally regarded as being = wider=20 than is necessary to meet the perceived mischief. He concluded (at p = 1125):
'... it would be most unwise for the common law, having = recognised=20 the right to recover money paid under a mistake of law on the = ground of=20 unjust enrichment, immediately to proceed to the recognition of so = wide a=20 defence as which would exclude the right of recovery in a very = large=20 proportion of cases. The proper course is surely to identify  = particular sets of circumstances which, as a matter of principle = or=20 policy, may lead to the conclusion that recovery should not be = allowed:=20 and in so doing  to draw on the experience of the past, = looking in=20 particular from the analogous case of money paid under  = mistake of=20 fact.'
Lord Lloyd (at p 1136), Lord Hoffman (at p 1136-7) and Lord = Hope (at p=20 1151) concurred with Lord Goff on this point.
 
Louis Joseph
 
----- Original Message ----- =
From:=20 Lionel Smith
To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk=20
Sent: Friday, February 18, = 2000 11:12=20 PM

approved: eregion
From: "Jonathon P.=20 Moore" <jonathon.moore@law.oxford= .ac.uk>
Subject:=20 "Knowing Receipt" in Bank of America v Arnell

Members of = the list=20 have already been referred to the recently-reported
decision of = Aikens=20 J in Bank of America v Arnell [1999] Lloyd's Reports
Banking = 399. I=20 have only just obtained access to that report, and = have
therefore held=20 off commenting until now.

Aikens J discussed the state of = mind=20 necessary to invoke liability for "knowing receipt". At para 15, = page 406,=20 he held:

"The latest consideration of the point by the = Court of=20 Appeal is in
Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley & Ors (Potter LJ; = Sir Iain=20 Glidewell and Sir
David Hirst: 28 April 1999). I think that it = is=20 clear from the judgment
of Potter LJ in that case (see = particularly at=20 paras 105-108) that the
fundamental question that the court has = to ask=20 now is: was the recipient
acting *honestly* when he received = the=20 funds."

Potter LJ's jugdment is, in many ways, excellent. = But one=20 thing his
Lordship did not do was to decide that dishonesty = was a=20 necessary
element of the "knowing receipt" cause of = action.

It=20 is true that the paragraphs referred to by Aikens J contain a =
detailed=20 discussion of dishonesty, and that those paragraphs come = under
the=20 heading " 'Knowing' Receipt or Assistance" (before para 101). = But
it is=20 abundantly clear that Potter LJ was discussing dishonesty only=20 in
relation to dishonest assistance under Royal Brunei v Tan. = Thus, at=20
para 107, Potter LJ says:

"That being so, and because = the judge=20 found that Mr Leach did close
his eyes to the effect of the = Sims'=20 Undertaking, it seems to me that the
findings made by the = judge and=20 the evidence to which we have been
referred put this court in = a=20 position to proceed to effect the exercise
which the judge = declined to=20 perform, namely to consider whether or not
Mr Leach's state of = mind was=20 such as to establish accessory liability on
the basis stated = in Royal=20 Brunei Airlines."

It is also clear that, in relation to = "knowing=20 receipt", the most one
can say about Twinsectra is that Potter = LJ was=20 content to assume that
*notice* was required. Thus, at para=20 114:

" In relation to the receipt-based claim, it is plain = that Mr=20 Leach
received the trust property for his own benefit with = notice of=20 the
trust, took subject to it and is liable personally to = account for=20 it to
Twinsectra."

The one failing of Potter LJ's = judgment in=20 Twinsectra (understandable in
light of the facts) was that it = passed=20 up the opportunity to consider
Lord Nicholls' extra-judicial = view that=20 "knowing receipt" (or at least
one version of it) is actually a = strict=20 liability claim in unjust
enrichment.

But it would be a = huge=20 mistake for judges to go to the other extreme by
wrongly = assuming that=20 Potter LJ required dishonesty as an element of the
cause of=20 action.


Jonathon Moore=20 = ------=_NextPart_000_0007_01BF7AFC.0B855D20-- >From mskj1@singnet.com.sg Sat Feb 19 11:52:00 2000 Received: from smtp2.singnet.com.sg ([165.21.7.82] helo=copper.singnet.com.sg) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12M8QZ-0003rN-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Sat, 19 Feb 2000 11:51:59 +0000 Received: from user (hs19103.singnet.com.sg [165.21.34.113]) by copper.singnet.com.sg (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id TAA24413 for ; Sat, 19 Feb 2000 19:51:50 +0800 (SGT) Message-ID: <000c01bf7ad0$9eeece60$712215a5@user> From: "joseph" To: Subject: Fw: Re: Re: Honest Receipt? Date: Sat, 19 Feb 2000 19:57:53 +0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0009_01BF7B13.9B9FCF00" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2615.200 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2615.200 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0009_01BF7B13.9B9FCF00 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On the assumption that Jonathon is not on the maillist, I forward his = response to all (& sundry?).=20 :) cheeers! ----- Original Message -----=20 From: Jonathon P. Moore=20 To: joseph=20 Sent: Saturday, February 19, 2000 5:44 PM Subject: Re: Re: Re: Honest Receipt? Basically, yes. But 'honest receipt' is not part of English law. = 'Knowing receipt' is, in the view of many, best explained by Lord = Nicholls in:=20 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, 'Knowing Receipt: The Need for a New = Landmark' in WR Cornish et al (eds) Restitution Past, Present and Future = (1998) 231 ----- Original Message -----=20 From: joseph=20 To: Jonathon P. Moore ; restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk=20 Sent: Saturday, February 19, 2000 9:09 AM Subject: RDG: Re: Re: Honest Receipt? Yup, I think I have got it. One ("knowing receipt") is a cause of = action - i.e., the plaintiff says: "you have to give the money back = because when you received it, you knew you had no right to it"; and the = other ("honest receipt") is a plea by the defendant who says: "look, = when I received the money I thought 'honestly' that I was entitled to = it". Am I right? Gracias amigo! Louis Joseph ----- Original Message -----=20 From: Jonathon P. Moore=20 To: joseph=20 Sent: Saturday, February 19, 2000 4:44 PM Subject: Re: Re: Honest Receipt? I don't understand your question. 'Knowing receipt' is a claim, though poorly named. 'Honest receipt' = is a suggested defence, which has been rejected by the courts. ----- Original Message -----=20 From: joseph=20 To: Jonathon Moore=20 Sent: Friday, February 18, 2000 11:13 PM Subject: Fw: Re: Honest Receipt? ----- Original Message -----=20 From: joseph=20 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk=20 Sent: Saturday, February 19, 2000 6:41 AM Subject: RDG: Re: Honest Receipt? I am slightly confused. Is 'knowing receipt' different from = 'honest receipt'? For, if we are taking of the same thing (but perhaps = two different sides of it) wasn't the defence of 'honest receipt' = (unless it is not the same as 'knowing receipt') comprehensively = rejected by the House of Lords in Klienwort Benson? As I understand it, = the seeds of this defence was suggested by Brennan J in David Securities = Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 109 ALR 57, when he said = (at p 92): 'It is a defence for a claim for restitution of money paid or = property transferred under a mistake of law that the defendant honestly = believed, when he learnt of the payment or transfer, that he was = entitled to receive and retain the money or the property.' As to the availability of this defence, remember that Lord Goff = said in Kleinwort Benson (at [1997] 3 WLR 1095, 1124) that it suffers = from a chronic lack of support, as it is generally regarded as being = wider than is necessary to meet the perceived mischief. He concluded (at = p 1125): '... it would be most unwise for the common law, having = recognised the right to recover money paid under a mistake of law on the = ground of unjust enrichment, immediately to proceed to the recognition = of so wide a defence as which would exclude the right of recovery in a = very large proportion of cases. The proper course is surely to identify = particular sets of circumstances which, as a matter of principle or = policy, may lead to the conclusion that recovery should not be allowed: = and in so doing to draw on the experience of the past, looking in = particular from the analogous case of money paid under mistake of = fact.' Lord Lloyd (at p 1136), Lord Hoffman (at p 1136-7) and Lord Hope = (at p 1151) concurred with Lord Goff on this point. Louis Joseph ----- Original Message -----=20 From: Lionel Smith=20 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk=20 Sent: Friday, February 18, 2000 11:12 PM approved: eregion From: "Jonathon P. Moore" Subject: "Knowing Receipt" in Bank of America v Arnell Members of the list have already been referred to the = recently-reported decision of Aikens J in Bank of America v Arnell [1999] Lloyd's = Reports Banking 399. I have only just obtained access to that report, = and have therefore held off commenting until now. Aikens J discussed the state of mind necessary to invoke = liability for "knowing receipt". At para 15, page 406, he held: "The latest consideration of the point by the Court of Appeal is = in=20 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley & Ors (Potter LJ; Sir Iain Glidewell = and Sir=20 David Hirst: 28 April 1999). I think that it is clear from the = judgment=20 of Potter LJ in that case (see particularly at paras 105-108) = that the fundamental question that the court has to ask now is: was the = recipient=20 acting *honestly* when he received the funds." Potter LJ's jugdment is, in many ways, excellent. But one thing = his=20 Lordship did not do was to decide that dishonesty was a = necessary=20 element of the "knowing receipt" cause of action. It is true that the paragraphs referred to by Aikens J contain a = detailed discussion of dishonesty, and that those paragraphs = come under the heading " 'Knowing' Receipt or Assistance" (before para = 101). But it is abundantly clear that Potter LJ was discussing dishonesty = only in relation to dishonest assistance under Royal Brunei v Tan. Thus, = at=20 para 107, Potter LJ says: "That being so, and because the judge found that Mr Leach did = close=20 his eyes to the effect of the Sims' Undertaking, it seems to me = that the=20 findings made by the judge and the evidence to which we have = been=20 referred put this court in a position to proceed to effect the = exercise which the judge declined to perform, namely to consider whether = or not Mr Leach's state of mind was such as to establish accessory = liability on=20 the basis stated in Royal Brunei Airlines." It is also clear that, in relation to "knowing receipt", the = most one=20 can say about Twinsectra is that Potter LJ was content to assume = that=20 *notice* was required. Thus, at para 114: " In relation to the receipt-based claim, it is plain that Mr = Leach=20 received the trust property for his own benefit with notice of = the=20 trust, took subject to it and is liable personally to account = for it to Twinsectra." The one failing of Potter LJ's judgment in Twinsectra = (understandable in=20 light of the facts) was that it passed up the opportunity to = consider=20 Lord Nicholls' extra-judicial view that "knowing receipt" (or at = least one version of it) is actually a strict liability claim in = unjust=20 enrichment. But it would be a huge mistake for judges to go to the other = extreme by wrongly assuming that Potter LJ required dishonesty as an = element of the=20 cause of action. Jonathon Moore=20 ------=_NextPart_000_0009_01BF7B13.9B9FCF00 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On the assumption that Jonathon is not on the maillist, I forward = his=20 response to all (& sundry?).
 
:) cheeers!
 
----- Original Message -----=20
From: Jonathon P. Moore
To: joseph
Sent: Saturday, February 19, 2000 5:44 PM
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Honest Receipt?

Basically, yes.  But 'honest = receipt' is not=20 part of English law.  'Knowing receipt' is, in the view of = many, best=20 explained by Lord Nicholls in:=20

Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, ‘Knowing Receipt: The Need for a = New Landmark’=20 in WR Cornish et al (eds) Restitution Past, Present and Future = (1998)=20 231

----- Original Message -----
From:=20 joseph=20
To: Jonathon P. Moore ; restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk =
Sent: Saturday, February 19, = 2000 9:09=20 AM
Subject: RDG: Re: Re: Honest=20 Receipt?

Yup, I think I have got it. One ("knowing receipt") is a cause of = action=20 - i.e., the plaintiff says: "you have to give the money back = because when=20 you received it, you knew you had no right to it"; and = the other=20 ("honest receipt") is a plea by the defendant who says: "look, when I = received=20 the money I thought 'honestly' that I was entitled to it". Am I = right?=20 Gracias amigo!
 
Louis Joseph
----- Original Message -----
From:=20 Jonathon P. Moore
To: joseph=20
Sent: Saturday, February 19, = 2000 4:44=20 PM
Subject: Re: Re: Honest = Receipt?

I don't understand your = question.
 
'Knowing receipt' is a claim, = though poorly=20 named.  'Honest receipt' is a suggested defence, which has been = rejected by the courts.
----- Original Message ----- =
From:=20 joseph
To: Jonathon Moore
Sent: Friday, February 18, = 2000 11:13=20 PM
Subject: Fw: Re: Honest=20 Receipt?

 
----- Original Message -----=20
From: = joseph=20
Sent: Saturday, February 19, 2000 6:41 AM
Subject: RDG: Re: Honest Receipt?

I am slightly confused. Is 'knowing receipt' different from = 'honest=20 receipt'? For, if we are taking of the same thing (but perhaps two = different sides of it) wasn't the defence of 'honest receipt' = (unless=20 it is not the same as 'knowing receipt') comprehensively rejected = by the=20 House of Lords in Klienwort Benson? As I understand it, = the seeds=20 of this defence was suggested by Brennan J in David Securities = Pty Ltd=20 v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 109 ALR 57, when he = said (at=20 p 92): 'It is a defence for a claim for restitution of money paid = or=20 property transferred under a mistake of law that the defendant = honestly=20 believed, when he learnt of the payment or transfer, that he was = entitled=20 to receive and retain the money or the property.'
 
As to the availability of this defence, remember that Lord = Goff said=20 in Kleinwort Benson (at [1997] 3 WLR 1095, 1124) = that it=20 suffers from a chronic lack of support, as it is generally = regarded as=20 being wider than is necessary to meet the perceived mischief. He = concluded=20 (at p 1125):
'... it would be most unwise for the common law, having = recognised=20 the right to recover money paid under a mistake of law on the = ground of=20 unjust enrichment, immediately to proceed to the recognition of = so wide=20 a defence as which would exclude the right of recovery in a very = large=20 proportion of cases. The proper course is surely to = identify =20 particular sets of circumstances which, as a matter of principle = or=20 policy, may lead to the conclusion that recovery should not be = allowed:=20 and in so doing  to draw on the experience of the past, = looking in=20 particular from the analogous case of money paid under  = mistake of=20 fact.'
Lord Lloyd (at p 1136), Lord Hoffman (at p 1136-7) and Lord = Hope (at=20 p 1151) concurred with Lord Goff on this point.
 
Louis Joseph
 
----- Original Message ----- =
From:=20 Lionel Smith
To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk=20
Sent: Friday, February = 18, 2000=20 11:12 PM

approved: eregion
From: "Jonathon P.=20 Moore" <jonathon.moore@law.oxford= .ac.uk>
Subject:=20 "Knowing Receipt" in Bank of America v Arnell

Members of = the list=20 have already been referred to the recently-reported
decision = of=20 Aikens J in Bank of America v Arnell [1999] Lloyd's = Reports
Banking=20 399. I have only just obtained access to that report, and=20 have
therefore held off commenting until now.

Aikens J = discussed the state of mind necessary to invoke liability for = "knowing=20 receipt". At para 15, page 406, he held:

"The latest=20 consideration of the point by the Court of Appeal is in =
Twinsectra=20 Ltd v Yardley & Ors (Potter LJ; Sir Iain Glidewell and Sir =
David=20 Hirst: 28 April 1999). I think that it is clear from the = judgment
of=20 Potter LJ in that case (see particularly at paras 105-108) that=20 the
fundamental question that the court has to ask now is: = was the=20 recipient
acting *honestly* when he received the=20 funds."

Potter LJ's jugdment is, in many ways, excellent. = But one=20 thing his
Lordship did not do was to decide that dishonesty = was a=20 necessary
element of the "knowing receipt" cause of=20 action.

It is true that the paragraphs referred to by = Aikens J=20 contain a
detailed discussion of dishonesty, and that those=20 paragraphs come under
the heading " 'Knowing' Receipt or = Assistance"=20 (before para 101). But
it is abundantly clear that Potter LJ = was=20 discussing dishonesty only in
relation to dishonest = assistance under=20 Royal Brunei v Tan. Thus, at
para 107, Potter LJ = says:

"That=20 being so, and because the judge found that Mr Leach did close =
his=20 eyes to the effect of the Sims' Undertaking, it seems to me that = the=20
findings made by the judge and the evidence to which we have = been=20
referred put this court in a position to proceed to effect = the=20 exercise
which the judge declined to perform, namely to = consider=20 whether or not
Mr Leach's state of mind was such as to = establish=20 accessory liability on
the basis stated in Royal Brunei=20 Airlines."

It is also clear that, in relation to "knowing = receipt", the most one
can say about Twinsectra is that = Potter LJ=20 was content to assume that
*notice* was required. Thus, at = para=20 114:

" In relation to the receipt-based claim, it is = plain that=20 Mr Leach
received the trust property for his own benefit = with notice=20 of the
trust, took subject to it and is liable personally to = account=20 for it to
Twinsectra."

The one failing of Potter LJ's = judgment=20 in Twinsectra (understandable in
light of the facts) was = that it=20 passed up the opportunity to consider
Lord Nicholls' = extra-judicial=20 view that "knowing receipt" (or at least
one version of it) = is=20 actually a strict liability claim in unjust =
enrichment.

But=20 it would be a huge mistake for judges to go to the other extreme = by
wrongly assuming that Potter LJ required dishonesty as an = element=20 of the
cause of action.


Jonathon Moore = ------=_NextPart_000_0009_01BF7B13.9B9FCF00-- >From a.hudson@qmw.ac.uk Sat Feb 19 12:09:30 2000 Received: from zeta.qmw.ac.uk ([138.37.6.6]) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12M8hW-000445-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Sat, 19 Feb 2000 12:09:30 +0000 Received: from alpha.qmw.ac.uk ([138.37.6.1]) by zeta.qmw.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 3.02 #1) id 12M8hM-0002oW-00; Sat, 19 Feb 2000 12:09:20 +0000 Received: from [138.37.64.106] (helo=alpha.qmw.ac.uk.qmw.ac.uk) by alpha.qmw.ac.uk with smtp (Exim 3.12 #1) id 12M8hJ-0004KD-00; Sat, 19 Feb 2000 12:09:21 +0000 X-Sender: ugtl322@alpha.qmw.ac.uk X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Version 1.4.4 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable To: Lionel Smith ,restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk From: a.hudson@qmw.ac.uk (Alastair Hudson) Subject: Re: Message-Id: Date: Sat, 19 Feb 2000 12:09:21 +0000 >Potter LJ's jugdment is, in many ways, excellent. But one thing his >Lordship did not do was to decide that dishonesty was a necessary >element of the "knowing receipt" cause of action. > >It is true that the paragraphs referred to by Aikens J contain a >detailed discussion of dishonesty, and that those paragraphs come under >the heading " 'Knowing' Receipt or Assistance" (before para 101). But >it is abundantly clear that Potter LJ was discussing dishonesty only in >relation to dishonest assistance under Royal Brunei v Tan. Thus, at >para 107, Potter LJ says: > > "That being so, and because the judge found that Mr Leach did close >his eyes to the effect of the Sims' Undertaking, it seems to me that the >findings made by the judge and the evidence to which we have been >referred put this court in a position to proceed to effect the exercise >which the judge declined to perform, namely to consider whether or not >Mr Leach's state of mind was such as to establish accessory liability on >the basis stated in Royal Brunei Airlines." > However, in col. 2 p.466 (Lloyds Banking Rep) in Twinsectra Potter LJ makes is clear that "The claim against Mr Leach falls into two parts ... "knowing receipt" in respect of =A322,000 ... and knowing assistance in relation to= the balance ...". What is interesting is that the same test is being used by Potter LJ both for dishonest assistance and knowing receipt (even though he acknowledges that one claim is receipt-based and the other not). The discussion on p. 465 col. 1 indicates consideration only of a "standard of honesty" both in the solicitor and in Leach. At no point is there a discussion of "knowledge" as applying to Leach and the solicitor here. The discussion proceeds on the basis of their "honesty" and/or "dishonesty" in relation both to receipt and assistance.=20 There are frequent references to the old knowledge-orientated ideas of "shutting his eyes to the obvious". For example on p.462, col. 2, there is mention of '"not dishonest" ..., he was referring to the state of conscious, as opposed to "Nelsonian" dishonesty ...' This indicates to me that the Court of Appeal in Twinsectra (and Arnell subsequently) are using the old categories within which to analyse the mental state of the defendant (e.g. wilfully shutting your eyes) but are concerned with whether or not that person was honest or dishonest, as opposed to whether or not that person had knowledge. There is a partial shift here: the trigger is " what an honest person would have done" (in that passage from Tan, quoted by Potter LJ at p.464 col.2) but the problems of witness credibility are the same for the judge.=20 The test is not about the knowledge of the defendant, it is about whether or not the defendant acted as an honest person would have acted.=20 Significantly Potter LJ looks at recklessly ignoring the rights of others which is moving away from fault and, as with Tan itself, looking towards objective ideas of, something like, what 'an equivalent (professional) person would do in such a situation, etc'. This seems to nudge us on towards strict liability - not getting there yet, but getting closer.=20 Clearly there has been a movement away from knowledge because Potter LJ does not explicitly use the old knowledge tests, even though he is considering knowing receipt as well as dishonest assistance.=20 The only way of understanding this, it seems to me, is Scott LJ's comment in Polly Peck No.2 that the judge needs to decide whether or not the defendant "ought to have been suspicious" in the light of what an honest person would have done.=20 Take care, Alastair Hudson **************************** Dr Alastair Hudson Senior Lecturer in Law Queen Mary and Westfield College University of London Mile End Road London E1 4NS tel: 020 7882 3164 fax: 020 8882 8733 This communication is confidential and may contain privileged information. Presuming you have read this far anyway. If so, I should point out that the message finished some time ago. You are a little like one of those people (me included) who cannot leave the cinema until the very end of the credits because of that lurking feeling that there might be more to come. However, there really is nothing more to come. As for the confidentiality provision, that all seems a little late too. You will have read any secrets mistakenly left in the e-mail already, so it is really just a begging clause asking you not to do anything naughty now that you have read them. Another example of attempting to impose order on a fundamentally chaotic universe. Well, that really is it. I must just say how much I have enjoyed this unexpected time we have spent together. Bye-bye.=20 >From paul.matthews@kcl.ac.uk Mon Feb 21 11:08:13 2000 Received: from angelo.kcl.ac.uk ([137.73.66.5]) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12MqhJ-0000Ef-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Mon, 21 Feb 2000 11:08:13 +0000 Received: from pc205.kcl.ac.uk (pc-108.law.kcl.ac.uk [137.73.78.108]) by angelo.kcl.ac.uk with SMTP id LAA01738 for ; Mon, 21 Feb 2000 11:08:12 GMT Message-Id: <3.0.5.32.20000221112139.007c8100@mail.kcl.ac.uk> X-Sender: zfla0601@mail.kcl.ac.uk X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Light Version 3.0.5 (32) Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2000 11:21:39 +0000 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk From: Paul Matthews Subject: Lecture by Lord Browne-Wilkinson Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Subscribers to the RDG may be interested to learn that Lord Browne-Wilkinson is giving a public lecture (sponsored by Withers) in the Great Hall at King's College London (Strand Campus) at 6 pm on Tuesday 29 February 2000, with the title "Restitution and Equitable Rights" (apparently dealing with criticisms of Westdeutsche Landesbank etc). Free, without ticket. Just turn up if you're interested. There is wine afterwards. Paul Matthews >From jpmoore100@hotmail.com Tue Feb 22 11:46:46 2000 Received: from law2-oe15.hotmail.com ([216.32.180.119] helo=hotmail.com) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with smtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12NDm9-0001D2-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Tue, 22 Feb 2000 11:46:46 +0000 Received: (qmail 38486 invoked by uid 65534); 22 Feb 2000 11:46:13 -0000 Message-ID: <20000222114613.38485.qmail@hotmail.com> X-Originating-IP: [212.250.67.84] From: "Jonathon P. Moore" To: Subject: Tracing and Bank accounts Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2000 11:45:45 -0000 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_000C_01BF7D2A.5B002DA0" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.00.2919.6600 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.2919.6600 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_000C_01BF7D2A.5B002DA0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Members of the list may not be aware of a recent note by the list = Chairman: Tracing in Bank Accounts: The Lowest Intermediate Balance Rule on Trial, = Lionel Smith, (2000), 33 Canadian Business Law Journal 75 For my own part, I find the article utterly convincing in its rejection = of the reasoning and result in Law Society of Upper Canada v. = Toronto-Dominion Bank (1998) 169 D.L.R. (4th) 353 (Ont CA) . =20 The note incidentally achieves two other things. First, it = compendiously summarises some of the most important points made in = Lionel's book on Tracing. It also shows the danger of judges rejecting = logical principles of law because of what they individually perceive to = be a fair result. =20 Jonathon Moore ------=_NextPart_000_000C_01BF7D2A.5B002DA0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Members of the list may not be aware of = a recent=20 note by the list Chairman:

Tracing in Bank Accounts: The Lowest Intermediate = Balance Rule=20 on Trial, Lionel Smith, (2000), 33 Canadian Business Law Journal 75

For my own part, I find = the article=20 utterly convincing in its rejection of the reasoning and result in = Law=20 Society of Upper Canada v. Toronto-Dominion Bank (1998) 169 D.L.R. (4th) 353 (Ont CA) = . =20

The note incidentally = achieves two=20 other things.  First, it compendiously summarises some of the most=20 important points made in Lionel's book on Tracing.  It also shows = the=20 danger of judges rejecting logical principles of law because of what = they=20 individually perceive to be a fair result. 

Jonathon Moore

 

 
------=_NextPart_000_000C_01BF7D2A.5B002DA0-- >From nobody@webserver.1ecc.com Thu Feb 24 22:55:12 2000 Received: from adsl-206-170-148-220.dsl.snfc21.pacbell.net ([206.170.148.220] helo=webserver.1ecc.com ident=root) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12O7A6-0001ec-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Thu, 24 Feb 2000 22:55:11 +0000 Received: (from nobody@localhost) by webserver.1ecc.com (8.9.3/8.9.3) id OAA26537; Thu, 24 Feb 2000 14:48:20 -0800 Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2000 14:48:20 -0800 Message-Id: <200002242248.OAA26537@webserver.1ecc.com> Content-type: text/html From: info@firstecc.com To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: Legal Web Site Still don't have an Interactive WEB Site? Have Directory Listing or a Web Page? Almost everyone has joined in on the Internet revolution, including you, but what is in store for the future of the World Wide Web? Traditional advertising will soon be completely swept away by the more powerful, more effective, more cost-conscious Internet. First E-Commerce Corporation specializes in designing interactive web sites for the legal community. Whether you already have a web page or simply advertise on the 'net, you are probably not seeing the results you'd like. Most legal pages contain generic information and are difficult to locate. The key to the success of a web site is the amount of traffic that it brings. With our experienced web site developers and graphic designers, we can help you in creating greater visibility, expanding your client base, as well as provide a means for increasing services to existing clients. The sites that we design are not simply informative, but interactive as well. Visiting your site should be something that the visitor enjoys experiencing again and again, a reference tool for both you and your clients. Our sites send the message that your Firm is innovative and can use the most up to date technology to tackle their legal issues. We hold the winning formula that will prove you are one step ahead and can offer the quickest, easiest, most cost-effective services to your clients. Our web site package will enable your clients access to forms and documents that can be downloaded from your site 24 hours a day. You will be able to automatically bill clients for these additional services, while sending the message that your assistance is always available. This will increase your billable hours without increasing the man-hours to do it. The Internet revolution has carried over to the courts as well, and our web sites enable you and your clients to file legal documents electronically. Our database-enabled site is the first of it's kind, and allows easy access to legal forms and thousands of legal documents for both attorneys and clients. The First e-Commerce Corporation package is revolutionizing the way law firms conduct their daily communications with clients. Come join the revolution and let us develop a site for your Firm that makes you stand out from the crowd. Contact: Lonnie Brookins Tel: 408-727-3883 x101 Fax: 408-727-3882 E-Mail lonnie@firstecc.com www.firstecc.com

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FOR DETAILS CALL 1 888 248 0765 THANK YOU to be removed email pro@natas.kfa.cx >From A.M.Tettenborn@exeter.ac.uk Mon Feb 28 09:46:39 2000 Received: from hermes.ex.ac.uk ([144.173.6.14] helo=exeter.ac.uk) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12PMlD-0006lF-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Mon, 28 Feb 2000 09:46:39 +0000 Received: from pc0274.ex.ac.uk [144.173.75.19] by hermes via SMTP (JAA1429274); Mon, 28 Feb 2000 09:46:31 GMT Message-Id: <3.0.5.32.20000228094628.007d8100@pop.ex.ac.uk> X-Sender: amtetten@pop.ex.ac.uk (Unverified) X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Light Version 3.0.5 (32) Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2000 09:46:28 +0000 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk From: Andrew Tettenborn Subject: profitable breaches of contract Cc: lawschool@exeter.ac.uk Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable A case reported as a news item in the Telegraph for 26.2.00, Nottingham Uni v Fishel, is of interest to restitution lawyers and academics generally. A clinical lecturer at Nottingham makes a tidy sum on the side without the university's permission, and using university facilities. This is a breach of his contract with the university. Elias J (an ex-academic, alumnus of Exeter and previous lecturer at Cambridge) holds, it seems, that he is accountable for this sum on the basis of breach of fiduciary duty, but refuses restitutionary damages for breach of contract as such. A copy of the Telegraph report: A TEST-TUBE baby pioneer faces having to pay his former university employers a substantial part of profits estimated at =A3400,000 that he made from private practice work after a High Court ruling yesterday. Mr Justice Elias ruled that Dr Simon Fishel was in breach of his fiduciary duty to Nottingham University when keeping the profits of treatment carried out abroad using university embriologists under his supervision. He also found that Dr Fishel, although not dishonest, was in breach of his contract of employment with the university. But as it did not cause loss to the university, he should not have to pay them any damages for this, said the judge. Dr Fishel, who is 47 and was head of the university's fertility clinic from 1991 to 1997, was taken to court by his former employers who claimed that he had made substantial secret profits from private practice which should have gone to them. During the High Court hearing in London, the judge was told that despite his substantial salary which topped =A3138,000 in 1996, Dr Fishel charged patients for treatment given during his visits to foreign clinics and kept the money for himself and to pay the embryologists and other university staff who went with him. His profit-making business of running infertility clinics abroad had brought in fees of up to =A310,000 but although he had used the name of the university's fertility unit and the university's employees and secretarial facilities, none of the money had gone to his employers, it was claimed. Dr Fishel, of East Bridgford, Notts,argued that he was not doing outside work but inventing, testing or improving techniques as part of his research functions and that the fact that he was paid for the work was irrelevant. In his reserved judgment yesterday Mr Justice Elias said he was satisfied that Dr Fishel at all times genuinely thought that the work he was carrying out abroad was for the benefit of Nurture, the Nottingham University Research and Treatment Unit in Reproduction, of which he was clinical director. He added: "I do not think that Dr Fishel did in fact prejudice the interests of the unit by putting his financial interests first, although I think he may have come very close to this." But under the terms of his contract, Dr Fishel had to obtain consent to work outside the university for money and he had not done this. He was therefore in breach of his contract, said the judge. If the account of profits due to the university as a result of the judgment cannot be agreed, a further hearing would be necessary to determine them. The court also has to decide who should pay the estimated =A3500,000 cost of the action. After the judgment, the university's registrar, Keith Jones, said the university felt the judgment fully justified its decision to bring the action to protect the principles of loyalty. Dr Fishel, who not in court for the judgment, claimed afterwards that the university had spent =A3750,000 of public money - "enough to pay the tuition fees of 700 students, in pursuing this grievance through the courts". AMT Andrew Tettenborn MA LLB Bracton Professor of Law Tel: 01392-263189 / +44-392-263189 (international) Fax: 01392-263196 / +44-392-263196 (international) Personal Fax: 0870-0889339 / +44-870-0889339 (international) Snailmail: School of Law, University of Exeter, Amory Building, Rennes Drive, Exeter EX4 4RJ England >From lionel.smith@law.oxford.ac.uk Mon Feb 28 11:11:53 2000 Received: from oxmail1.ox.ac.uk ([129.67.1.1] helo=oxmail.ox.ac.uk) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12PO5h-00081y-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Mon, 28 Feb 2000 11:11:53 +0000 Received: from sable.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.4]) by oxmail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.10 #1) id 12PO5h-0003HB-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Mon, 28 Feb 2000 11:11:53 +0000 Received: from fellow22.sthughs.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.228.82]) by sable.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 3.13 #1) id 12PO5h-00048F-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Mon, 28 Feb 2000 11:11:53 +0000 Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: lawf0014@sable.ox.ac.uk Message-Id: In-Reply-To: <3.0.5.32.20000228094628.007d8100@pop.ex.ac.uk> References: <3.0.5.32.20000228094628.007d8100@pop.ex.ac.uk> Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2000 11:09:14 +0000 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk From: Lionel Smith Subject: profitable breaches of contract Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ; format="flowed" There is a headnote (but not a judgment, yet) of the Fishel case in New Law Online. Non-UK members might also be interested to learn that another claim to profits appeared in the weekend newspapers here, relating to "renegade spy" David Shayler, a former MI5 agent who now lives in Paris. The UK government failed in earlier attempts to have him extradited and they are now suing him civilly for breaches of contract, confidence and copyright. There is also a claim against one of the newspapers which published Shayler's allegations/revelations. Accounts of profits are sought against both defendants. The government appears to be arguing that the information supplied by Shayler is crown copyright, which seems a bit ambitious. Can information be copyright, or only a particular manifestation of it? Perhaps the argument is that any time an MI5 agent conveys secret information, the manifestation is ipso facto crown copyright since (s)he is or was a servant of the Crown. Lionel >From charles.mitchell@kcl.ac.uk Mon Feb 28 11:43:15 2000 Received: from angelo.kcl.ac.uk ([137.73.66.5]) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12POa3-00009z-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Mon, 28 Feb 2000 11:43:15 +0000 Received: from pc102.kcl.ac.uk (pc187.law.kcl.ac.uk [137.73.78.187]) by angelo.kcl.ac.uk with SMTP id LAA01315 for ; Mon, 28 Feb 2000 11:43:14 GMT Message-Id: <3.0.6.32.20000228114823.007995b0@law-mail.kcl.ac.uk> X-Sender: stty2277@law-mail.kcl.ac.uk X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Light Version 3.0.6 (32) Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2000 11:48:23 +0000 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk From: Charles Mitchell Subject: Shayler case Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" The problem with arguing that secret information should be regarded as Crown copyright is obviously that by its nature the information is not something which the Crown would wish to sell. This reminds me of the argument which is sometimes made about A-G for Hong Kong v Reid, that the Hong Kong government must be taken to have lost something at least as valuable as the bribes Reid was paid, an argument which chooses to ignore the fact that the HK government was not in the business of selling immunities from prosecution. ________________________________________________________________________ Dr Charles Mitchell Lecturer in Law School of Law King's College London Strand LONDON WC2R 2LS tel: 020 7848 2290 fax: 020 7848 2465 >From Hector.MacQueen@ed.ac.uk Mon Feb 28 14:45:54 2000 Received: from holyrood.ed.ac.uk ([129.215.16.14]) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12PRQo-0003JE-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Mon, 28 Feb 2000 14:45:54 +0000 Received: from hector.ed.ac.uk (dialup-105.publab.ed.ac.uk [129.215.38.105]) by holyrood.ed.ac.uk (8.8.7/8.8.7) with ESMTP id OAA26048; Mon, 28 Feb 2000 14:45:44 GMT Message-Id: <200002281445.OAA26048@holyrood.ed.ac.uk> From: "Hector MacQueen" To: "Charles Mitchell" , Subject: Re: Shayler case Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2000 12:59:50 -0000 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Priority: 3 X-Mailer: Microsoft Internet Mail 4.70.1155 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Just a footnote to this: surely one of the points of copyright is that generally, and the ECJ case of Magill (1995) always excepted, you don't have to sell; you can normally keep your exclusivity if you wish, and this is one of the reasons why copyright systems generally make the infringer liable to disgorge her profits. Hector MacQueen ---------- > From: Charles Mitchell > To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk > Subject: RDG: Shayler case > Date: 28 February 2000 11:48 > > The problem with arguing that secret information should be regarded as > Crown copyright is obviously that by its nature the information is not > something which the Crown would wish to sell. This reminds me of the > argument which is sometimes made about A-G for Hong Kong v Reid, that the > Hong Kong government must be taken to have lost something at least as > valuable as the bribes Reid was paid, an argument which chooses to ignore > the fact that the HK government was not in the business of selling > immunities from prosecution. > ________________________________________________________________________ > > Dr Charles Mitchell > Lecturer in Law > School of Law > King's College London > Strand > LONDON WC2R 2LS > > tel: 020 7848 2290 > fax: 020 7848 2465 > > ____________________________________________________________________________ ____ > This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an > international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of unjust > enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe restitution" in the body of a > message to . To unsubscribe, send "unsubscribe > restitution" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, > send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith of > St. Hugh's College, Oxford, U.K., tel. (0)1865 274 966, email > . >From charles.mitchell@kcl.ac.uk Mon Feb 28 15:36:18 2000 Received: from angelo.kcl.ac.uk ([137.73.66.5]) by bagpuss.oucs.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 2.12 #1) id 12PSDZ-0003rm-00 for restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk; Mon, 28 Feb 2000 15:36:17 +0000 Received: from pc102.kcl.ac.uk (pc187.law.kcl.ac.uk [137.73.78.187]) by angelo.kcl.ac.uk with SMTP id PAA07513; Mon, 28 Feb 2000 15:36:15 GMT Message-Id: <3.0.6.32.20000228154125.007b0b00@law-mail.kcl.ac.uk> X-Sender: stty2277@law-mail.kcl.ac.uk X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Light Version 3.0.6 (32) Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2000 15:41:25 +0000 To: "Hector MacQueen" From: Charles Mitchell Subject: Re: Shayler case Cc: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk In-Reply-To: <200002281445.OAA26048@holyrood.ed.ac.uk> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Several people have written to me, both on- and off-list, to point this out, and I stand corrected! (Must brush up on my copyright law.) I would still argue in line with what I said about Reid, though, that it would be artificial to regard the Crown as having lost the opportunity to sell the information in the Shayler case when it would never have willingly taken this opportunity, given the nature of the information. And on this point a further analogy also suggests itself to me, viz the unreality of the 'lost opportunity to bargain' analysis of Wrotham Park Estates, given that Brightman J accepted in the case that the plaintiff would never willingly have released the covenant. At 12:59 28/02/00 -0000, you wrote: >Just a footnote to this: surely one of the points of copyright is that >generally, and the ECJ case of Magill (1995) always excepted, you don't >have to sell; you can normally keep your exclusivity if you wish, and this >is one of the reasons why copyright systems generally make the infringer >liable to disgorge her profits. > >Hector MacQueen > >---------- >> From: Charles Mitchell >> To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk >> Subject: RDG: Shayler case >> Date: 28 February 2000 11:48 >> >> The problem with arguing that secret information should be regarded as >> Crown copyright is obviously that by its nature the information is not >> something which the Crown would wish to sell. This reminds me of the >> argument which is sometimes made about A-G for Hong Kong v Reid, that the >> Hong Kong government must be taken to have lost something at least as >> valuable as the bribes Reid was paid, an argument which chooses to ignore >> the fact that the HK government was not in the business of selling >> immunities from prosecution. >> ________________________________________________________________________ >> >> Dr Charles Mitchell >> Lecturer in Law >> School of Law >> King's College London >> Strand >> LONDON WC2R 2LS >> >> tel: 020 7848 2290 >> fax: 020 7848 2465 >> >> >____________________________________________________________________________ >____ >> This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an >> international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of >unjust >> enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe restitution" in the body of a >> message to . To unsubscribe, send >"unsubscribe >> restitution" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, >> send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith >of >> St. Hugh's College, Oxford, U.K., tel. (0)1865 274 966, email >> . > ________________________________________________________________________ Dr Charles Mitchell Lecturer in Law School of Law King's College London Strand LONDON WC2R 2LS tel: 020 7848 2290 fax: 020 7848 2465