Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2001 16:22:44 -0400 Reply-To: Lionel Smith Sender: Enrichment - Restitution & Unjust Enrichment Legal Issues From: Lionel Smith Subject: OJLS MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed The RDG seems to have gone very quiet. Those of us who could not make it Glasgow must assume that as always, the SPTL meeting was a rousing success. In the new OJLS, there is a review article by Rebecca Williams on Alison Jones' book, Restitution and European Community Law. Lionel ____________________________________________________________________ This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of unjust enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe enrichment" in the body of a message to . To unsubscribe, send "signoff enrichment" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith of McGill University, tel. (+1) 514 398 6635,email . ========================================================================= Date: Thu, 4 Oct 2001 15:03:55 -0400 Reply-To: Lionel Smith Sender: Enrichment - Restitution & Unjust Enrichment Legal Issues From: Lionel Smith Subject: Disgorgement & company law MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed CMS DOLPHIN LIMITED v SIMONET (23 May 2001, L Collins J) is a fairly typical case of leaving the company and trying to take the customers along. It is interesting for a discussion of how to deal with the situation where the gain is made not by the breaching fiduciary but by a company he controls (paras 98-105, accepting effectively knowing assistance and also knowing receipt as grounds for the gain-based claim against the company). Also, the last section (called Remedies ...) covers some details of the taking of the account, considers election, and also reveals that the judge would have applied Blake (for breach of the contract of employment) had he thought it necessary. Lionel ____________________________________________________________________ This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of unjust enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe enrichment" in the body of a message to . To unsubscribe, send "signoff enrichment" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith of McGill University, tel. (+1) 514 398 6635,email . ========================================================================= Date: Sat, 6 Oct 2001 12:33:16 +0100 Reply-To: James Edelman Sender: Enrichment - Restitution & Unjust Enrichment Legal Issues From: James Edelman Organization: Magdalen College, Oxford Subject: Non-compensatory Damages in Australia MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit In Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v Australian Rugby Union Ltd [2001] FCA 1040 (3 August 2001) http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federal_ct/2001/1040.html the Full Federal Court in Australia considered awards described loosely and often interchangeably as 'restitutionary damages', 'account of profits' and 'disgorgement damages'. The context involved a corporation that had, purchased sporting tickets at a premium from a party that had contracted not to. The corporation used those tickets to create hospitality packages (akin to sporting 'boxes'). A majority of the FFC refused to award disgorgement damages (crediting this term to Lionel Smith and using it interchangeably with an account of profits) for a breach of contract. The FFC refused to follow the Blake case and stated that damages for breach of contract in Australia are only compensatory until the High Court pronounces otherwise. They also held that it is not possible to "slot an account of profits into remedies for torts" although they recognised the existence of "restitutionary damages" for torts. In dissent, Justice Emmett would have awarded an account of profits for the tort of inducing breach of contract because the potential availability of an injunction is "the type of situation that makes an account of profits a just response to prevent THG and ICM from deriving a benefit from its wrongdoing." ____________________________________________________________________ This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of unjust enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe enrichment" in the body of a message to . To unsubscribe, send "signoff enrichment" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith of McGill University, tel. (+1) 514 398 6635,email . ========================================================================= Date: Sun, 7 Oct 2001 19:34:02 +0100 Reply-To: Gerard.McMeel@BRISTOL.AC.UK Sender: Enrichment - Restitution & Unjust Enrichment Legal Issues From: Gerard McMeel Subject: Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge Comments: To: James Edelman In-Reply-To: <001b01c14e5a$b1375060$06294381@magd.ox.ac.uk> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset="us-ascii" The House of Lords will issue speeches in Etridge on Thursday of this week (October 11), on the question of undue influence, on appeal from [1998] 4 All ER 705. ---------------------- Gerard McMeel gerard.mcmeel@bristol.ac.uk ____________________________________________________________________ This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of unjust enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe enrichment" in the body of a message to . To unsubscribe, send "signoff enrichment" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith of McGill University, tel. (+1) 514 398 6635,email . ========================================================================= Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2001 13:29:33 +0100 Reply-To: Francis Rose Sender: Enrichment - Restitution & Unjust Enrichment Legal Issues From: Francis Rose Subject: FW: LMCLQ; Lloyd's Rep MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable =20 -----Original Message----- From: Francis Rose To: 'law-discuss@maillist.ox.ac.uk'; 'ENRICHMENTS@LISTS.MCGILL.CA' Cc: 'christopher.jones2@informa.com'; 'vanessa.larkin@informa.com'; 'jubriel.hanid@informa.com' Sent: 10/16/01 1:13 PM Subject: LMCLQ; Lloyd's Rep In my capacity as editor of LMCLQ, I have recently been notified of = some raised eyebrows concerning the renewal subscriptions for the journal. The problem seems to have arisen as a result of reorganisation within Informa/LLP, the publishers, and in particular because the new system quoted the full price for 2002 without taking account of different categories of subscription or of academic discounts. Below are, I believe, the correct prices (at least for UK subscribers). Francis Rose Gen. Ed., LMCLQ University of Bristol N.B.: Bound volume (b.v.) service includes loose parts and b.v. LMCLQ=20 B.v. service: =A3250 Discount price with b.v.: =A3167.50 Loose parts only: =A3170 Discount price: =A3113.90 LLOYD'S REP (=3D b.v. service only) Full price: =A3590 Discounted price: =A3395 Apparently academic discounts may vary, depending on how many products (books and serials if you prefer) are purchased. If you or your institution has a query re pricing, you should contact your sales person or Customer Services. In addition, there is a dedicated sales person for academics and libraries, so, if you wish to obtain a discount, you can work you charm on him (not me; I'm impervious). He is Chris Jones and is contactable at: christopher.jones2@informa.com =20 Tel.: 020-7453-2269 ____________________________________________________________________ This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of unjust enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe enrichment" in the body of a message to . To unsubscribe, send "signoff enrichment" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith of McGill University, tel. (+1) 514 398 6635,email . ========================================================================= Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2001 16:55:00 +0100 Reply-To: Charles Mitchell Sender: Enrichment - Restitution & Unjust Enrichment Legal Issues From: Charles Mitchell Subject: First thoughts on RBS v Etridge Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" The HL's judgment in Etridge is LONG, and I expect I am missing something, but on my first reading of Lord Nicholls' speech, he says that to put the burden of disproving undue influence onto a defendant in a presumed UI case, a claimant must show (a) a relationship of trust and confidence (or some variant on that), and (b) a transaction that calls for explanation, because the nature and circumstances of the transaction are such that the claimant would not have entered into it, had she not been unduly influenced. Looking at (b) more closely, we can see that Lord Nicholls is adopting an understanding of 'manifest disadvantage' which does not turn on whether the claimant is worse off as a result of entering into the transaction, but rather on whether the claimant would have entered the transaction without having been unduly influenced. So, for example, the fact that she makes a gift to the defendant inevitably leaves her worse off, but that in itself does not make her gift 'manifestly disadvantageous' to her - whether or not her gift is manifestly disadvantageous will turn instead on whether the circumstances of her gift, its size, and the nature of her relationship with the donee are such that she would not have made it but for the donee's undue influence. Lord Nicholls' understanding of manifest disadvantage is consistent with dicta in Allcard v Skinner and Natwest v Morgan, although I am not too sure that judges since then have understood the concept in the same way - Nourse LJ in Barclays v Coleman, for example, seems to think that any transaction which leaves you worse off is manifestly to your disadvantage (which is easy to prove in a lot of cases, and which is why he thinks the concept essentially redundant - a view which Lord Nicholls rejects). But authorities aside, I have a problem with Lord Nicholls' formulation. If we start by defining a manifestly disadvantageous transaction as a transaction which a claimant would not enter unless undue influence is practised upon her, and we require a claimant to show that she has entered such a transaction before we will switch the burden of proof, and ask the defendant to disprove undue influence, then what can a defendant say in the event that the court decides that a claimant has proved manifest disadvantage? By definition, the court must have accepted already that she was unduly influenced and the case is over. I feel pretty sure that Lord Nicholls did not mean to say this. Comments anyone? Charles Mitchell ________________________________________________________________________ Dr Charles Mitchell Lecturer in Law School of Law King's College London Strand LONDON WC2R 2LS tel: 020 7848 2290 fax: 020 7848 2465 ____________________________________________________________________ This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of unjust enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe enrichment" in the body of a message to . To unsubscribe, send "signoff enrichment" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith of McGill University, tel. (+1) 514 398 6635,email . ========================================================================= Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2001 12:54:02 -0400 Reply-To: Lionel Smith Sender: Enrichment - Restitution & Unjust Enrichment Legal Issues From: Lionel Smith Subject: Re: First thoughts on RBS v Etridge In-Reply-To: <3.0.6.32.20011016173112.007b43d0@law-mail.kcl.ac.uk> MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed I have not had a chance to look at it yet beyond a skim. Lord N's approach sounds not wholly dissimilar from that of Wilson J in Goodman Estate v Geffen. She did not say, in terms, you had to show a transaction which calls for explanation; but she said you had to show md if the transaction was in the form of a bargain between arm's length parties, but that you did not if the transaction was effectively a gift (in that case, it was a donative trust). As to this question, >But authorities aside, I have a problem with Lord Nicholls' formulation. >If we start by defining a manifestly disadvantageous transaction as a >transaction which a claimant would not enter unless undue influence is >practised upon her, and we require a claimant to show that she has entered >such a transaction before we will switch the burden of proof, and ask the >defendant to disprove undue influence, then what can a defendant say in the >event that the court decides that a claimant has proved manifest >disadvantage? By definition, the court must have accepted already that she >was unduly influenced and the case is over. I would have thought independent legal advice or something analogous would be one response which might work? If the only evidence so far is as to (a) the nature of the relationship (b) the nature of the transaction, then what is missing (& what I think he is leaving room for) is evidence as to the actual circumstances under which it was entered into (in particular the actual independence or otherwise of the plaintiff's judgment at that time). Everything else is just generating a presumption on that issue isn't it? Charles replied >I thought of this, and should have mentioned it in my original message. >Wouldn't the court expect to be told whether or not she was independently >advised BEFORE deciding whether the transaction was one into which she >would not have entered unless unduly influenced - certainly I would expect >defence counsel to be jumping up and down saying that she was independently >advised BEFORE the court decided the manifest disadvantage point. And this >gets us back to my original problem. To which I would say, increasingly feeling out on a limb as I have hardly looked at, perhaps he is expressing himself in terms of the analytical framework & in terms of what must be pled, rather than in terms of how the issue would actually present itself to the trial judge. Charles also said >There is also another issue here, viz what the provision of independent >advice is supposed to prove - Lord Hobhouse seems to think that it proves >that the claimant wasn't unduly influenced, but Lord Scott thinks >otherwise, and surely Lord Scott is more realistic. Explaining that a >transaction is to my disadvantage is not going to change my mind about >doing it if I am already so in love with/under the thumb of my intended >donee that I WANT to do something for them that is to my disadvantage. I think a 3d party bank needs to prove either that there was no ui, OR that if there was, it neither knew nor ought to have known about it, & I suppose independent legal advice is relevant to both of those issues in different ways. I also think that the speech of Lord Scott in relation to the cases that went to trial is very important (see eg para 219), like the judgment of Sopinka J. in Goodman v Geffen, on the relationship between the presumption and that which is presumed, and the role of the trial judge where there is evidence as to whether or nor there was undue influence in the actual transaction. L ____________________________________________________________________ This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of unjust enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe enrichment" in the body of a message to . To unsubscribe, send "signoff enrichment" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith of McGill University, tel. (+1) 514 398 6635,email . ========================================================================= Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2001 09:20:01 +0100 Reply-To: Charles Mitchell Sender: Enrichment - Restitution & Unjust Enrichment Legal Issues From: Charles Mitchell Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Further to Lionel's message, I would agree that I am >expressing [myself] in terms of the analytical >framework & in terms of what must be pled, rather than in terms of how the >issue would actually present itself to the trial judge. But I would reply that the analytical framework set out by Lord Nicholls, and the way in which presumed UI cases are pled, are important. Of course, in practice all the relevant evidence is going to be argued over by the parties in one way or another, and the judge is going to have to take a view on what he thinks really happened. But what worries me is that Lord Nicholls places great emphasis on the whereabouts of the burden of proof, envisages that once a claimant has fulfilled his two initial requirements, she can sit back and make the defendant disprove UI, but appears to build into his second (manifest disadvantage) requirement the expectation that the claimant must prove UI in order to demonstrate that the transaction was manifestly disadvantageous to her. If this is right, then the burden of proof won't be switched to the defendant until the court has decided the central issue in the claimant's favour, and put this issue beyond disproof. This follows from the fact that before the burden of proof switches to the defendant, the claimant must first of all have discharged the initial burden of proof which lies on her to prove that she was unduly influenced, and once the claimant has persuaded a court of this, the defendant can't disprove UI without getting the court to contradict itself. Charles ________________________________________________________________________ Dr Charles Mitchell Lecturer in Law School of Law King's College London Strand LONDON WC2R 2LS tel: 020 7848 2290 fax: 020 7848 2465 ____________________________________________________________________ This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of unjust enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe enrichment" in the body of a message to . To unsubscribe, send "signoff enrichment" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith of McGill University, tel. (+1) 514 398 6635,email . ========================================================================= Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2001 11:03:23 +0100 Reply-To: Joshua Getzler Sender: Enrichment - Restitution & Unjust Enrichment Legal Issues From: Joshua Getzler Subject: Re: First thoughts on RBS v Etridge Comments: To: Lionel Smith MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Interesting that National Bank of Australia v Garcia is not discussed in the new Etridge, even though the HCA there attacks the O'Brien test and pushes Dixon J's problematic formulation in Yerkey v Jones in its stead. It is a shame that Yerkey is the fulcrum of this debate, because Dixon J's undue influence doctrine is much better stated in Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR at 134-5. No mention there of manifest disadvantage beyond the entering of the transaction itself. Would it not be simpler to reduce the manifest disadvantage test to nothing thing more than a factual indicium of possible influence infecting the consent, and still allow presumed undue influence to operate in its absence? ____________________________________________________________________ This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of unjust enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe enrichment" in the body of a message to . To unsubscribe, send "signoff enrichment" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith of McGill University, tel. (+1) 514 398 6635,email . ========================================================================= Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2001 11:15:40 +0100 Reply-To: C.Barker@soton.ac.uk Sender: Enrichment - Restitution & Unjust Enrichment Legal Issues From: Kit Barker Subject: Re: First thoughts on RBS v Etridge Comments: To: Charles Mitchell In-Reply-To: <3.0.6.32.20011016165500.00834760@law-mail.kcl.ac.uk> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=US-ASCII Hi Charles, I confess thay i have not had time as yet to read the judgment and therefore express this opinion with caution, but i am not sure that the apparrent conundrum in your final paragraph necessarily follows from your premises. The manifest disadvantage criterion, appears, as you say, to identify transactions in which there is potential for abuse... such that the bank is put on notice and may have to take steps to satisy itself about propriety. The fact that a transaction is of a type that MIGHT be suspicious or influenced in this way does not mean that it HAS been, so that proof of "manifest disadvantage" in the the terms described does not preclude the bank from proving that in fact it was freely entered into. Any help ? I wil try to provide a more informed view when i have waded through the paperwork (!) Kit On Tue, 16 Oct 2001 16:55:00 +0100 Charles Mitchell wrote: > The HL's judgment in Etridge is LONG, and I expect I am missing something, > but on my first reading of Lord Nicholls' speech, he says that to put the > burden of disproving undue influence onto a defendant in a presumed UI > case, a claimant must show (a) a relationship of trust and confidence (or > some variant on that), and (b) a transaction that calls for explanation, > because the nature and circumstances of the transaction are such that the > claimant would not have entered into it, had she not been unduly influenced. > > Looking at (b) more closely, we can see that Lord Nicholls is adopting an > understanding of 'manifest disadvantage' which does not turn on whether the > claimant is worse off as a result of entering into the transaction, but > rather on whether the claimant would have entered the transaction without > having been unduly influenced. So, for example, the fact that she makes a > gift to the defendant inevitably leaves her worse off, but that in itself > does not make her gift 'manifestly disadvantageous' to her - whether or not > her gift is manifestly disadvantageous will turn instead on whether the > circumstances of her gift, its size, and the nature of her relationship > with the donee are such that she would not have made it but for the donee's > undue influence. > > Lord Nicholls' understanding of manifest disadvantage is consistent with > dicta in Allcard v Skinner and Natwest v Morgan, although I am not too sure > that judges since then have understood the concept in the same way - Nourse > LJ in Barclays v Coleman, for example, seems to think that any transaction > which leaves you worse off is manifestly to your disadvantage (which is > easy to prove in a lot of cases, and which is why he thinks the concept > essentially redundant - a view which Lord Nicholls rejects). > > But authorities aside, I have a problem with Lord Nicholls' formulation. > If we start by defining a manifestly disadvantageous transaction as a > transaction which a claimant would not enter unless undue influence is > practised upon her, and we require a claimant to show that she has entered > such a transaction before we will switch the burden of proof, and ask the > defendant to disprove undue influence, then what can a defendant say in the > event that the court decides that a claimant has proved manifest > disadvantage? By definition, the court must have accepted already that she > was unduly influenced and the case is over. > > I feel pretty sure that Lord Nicholls did not mean to say this. Comments > anyone? > > Charles Mitchell > > > ________________________________________________________________________ > > Dr Charles Mitchell > Lecturer in Law > School of Law > King's College London > Strand > LONDON WC2R 2LS > > tel: 020 7848 2290 > fax: 020 7848 2465 > > ____________________________________________________________________ > This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, > an international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law > of unjust enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe enrichment" in > the body of a message to . To unsubscribe, > send "signoff enrichment" to the same address. To make a posting to > all group members, send to . The list is > run by Lionel Smith of McGill University, tel. (+1) 514 398 6635,email > . ---------------------- Mr Kit Barker Senior Lecturer in Law Overseas Admissions Selector E-mail: cb2@soton.ac.uk Tel: +44 (0)23 8059 3294 Fax: +44 (0)23 8059 3024 ____________________________________________________________________ This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of unjust enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe enrichment" in the body of a message to . To unsubscribe, send "signoff enrichment" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith of McGill University, tel. (+1) 514 398 6635,email . ========================================================================= Date: Sun, 21 Oct 2001 10:21:36 +0100 Reply-To: Steve Hedley Sender: Enrichment - Restitution & Unjust Enrichment Legal Issues From: Steve Hedley Subject: Proceeds of Crime - new Bill Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" UK readers may be interested to know that the government introduced a bill last Thursday (Proceeds of Crime Bill) to broaden the law in this area. It is available on the net, and makes interesting reading. It is in pdf format, and is long (444 clauses and 9 schedules). http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/pabills.htm In particular: 1/ In any criminal case which ends up before the Crown Court, the court has power to order confiscation of any benefits obtained through the crime (clause 6). 2/ Where the defendant had a "criminal lifestyle" then it is presumed that all property s/he owns was derived from crime, and is therefore forfeit, unless the defedant can prove the contrary. Also, property transferred by the defendant to others for less than full value is a "tainted gift" and is also liable to forfeiture (clauses 77-78). "Criminal lifestyle" is defined in clause 75 as meaning (i) conviction for certain specified offences (specifically drug trafficking and money laundering, though the secretary of state may add to this list as the whim strikes him); or (ii) the offence was "committed over a period of at least 6 months"; or (iii) there is a "course of criminal activity" consisting of at least 3 offences, or at least 2 offences in the last 6 years. 3/ The proceeds of any criminal conduct are subject to a civil claim (by clause 245 et seq). Proof (including proof of criminality) is by the civil standard, not the criminal standard (clause 246(3)). It is irrelevant that the proceeds were only obtained through expenditure of some kind (247(2)(a)) - it is not a "profit" measure in a pure sense. So if (for example) an itinerant hamburger salesman parks his van on a double yellow line for a night of business, then he is liable to an action for his gross receipts for that night's trading (not merely his net receipts or his "profit", however measured). To say that it takes us back to the medieval position, whereby the assets of a felon were forfeit, is clearly an understatement. It is not entirely clear how any of it relates to other civil claims that may be brought against the defendant, though the overall approach suggests that anyone who cannot assert a proprietary claim over the assets in question can whistle for them. AG v. Blake becomes an easy case, but only because the government is both prosecutor and wronged employer. Steve Hedley =================================================== FACULTY OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE telephone and answering machine : (01223) 334931 e-mail : steve.hedley@law.cam.ac.uk messages : (01223) 334900 fax : (01223) 334967 Christ's College Cambridge CB2 3BU =================================================== ____________________________________________________________________ This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of unjust enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe enrichment" in the body of a message to . To unsubscribe, send "signoff enrichment" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith of McGill University, tel. (+1) 514 398 6635,email . ========================================================================= Date: Sun, 21 Oct 2001 11:44:58 +0100 Reply-To: Eoin O'Dell Sender: Enrichment - Restitution & Unjust Enrichment Legal Issues From: Eoin O'Dell Subject: Re: Proceeds of Crime - new Bill Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Hello all, Two Irish statutes form the template for the UK Proceeds of Crime Bill, 2001. They are the Proceeds of Crime Act, 1996 and the and the Criminal Assets Bureau Act, 1996, respectively: http://www.bailii.org/ie/legis/num_act/poca1996160/ http://www.bailii.org/ie/legis/num_act/caba1996231/ Anyone wondering about the Human Rights Act implications of the UK Bill might like to know that the Irish statutes have survived many challenges to their constitutionality, most recently in the Supreme Court last Thursday (ironically enough, on the same day that the UK government introduced its Bill): http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/ireland/2001/1019/courts2.htm The cases challenging the validity of the Acts rely not only upon the Irish Constitution but also upon the European Convention on Human Rights (not directly, however, but indirectly as a means of interpreting the consitution) which is suggestive that the UK Bill could survive Human Rights Act scrutiny, at least in a UK court, though what the European Court of Human Rights might make of the Irish Acts or the UK Bill is anybody's guess. All the best Eoin. EOIN O'DELL BCL(NUI) BCL(Oxon) Editor, Dublin University Law Journal. Barrister, Lecturer in Law, Trinity College, Dublin 2, Ireland. (353/0 1) 608 1178 (w) 677 0449 (fx); eodell@tcd.ie (All opinions are personal. No legal responsibility whatsoever is accepted.) ____________________________________________________________________ This message was delivered through the Restitution Discussion Group, an international internet LISTSERV devoted to all aspects of the law of unjust enrichment. To subscribe, send "subscribe enrichment" in the body of a message to . To unsubscribe, send "signoff enrichment" to the same address. To make a posting to all group members, send to . The list is run by Lionel Smith of McGill University, tel. (+1) 514 398 6635,email .