-- Received: (qmail 14282 invoked from network); 19 May 1997 10:58:31 -0000 Received: from oxmail4.ox.ac.uk (163.1.2.33) by jess.oucs.ox.ac.uk with SMTP; 19 May 1997 10:58:31 -0000 Received: from sable.ox.ac.uk by oxmail4 with SMTP (PP) with ESMTP; Mon, 19 May 1997 11:58:27 +0100 Received: from [192.76.27.26] (max25.public.ox.ac.uk [192.76.27.25]) by sable.ox.ac.uk (1.2/8.8.3) with SMTP id LAA06823 for ; Mon, 19 May 1997 11:58:21 +0100 (BST) X-Sender: lawf0014@sable.ox.ac.uk (Unverified) Message-Id: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 11:59:12 +0000 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk From: lionel.smith@Law.oxford.ac.uk (Lionel Smith) Subject: proper plaintiff In Brennan v. Brighton BC, The Times 15 May (CA), the plaintiff worked on a sports centre leased to a corporation. The defendant owned the land but was contractually bound to the corporation to grant to it a 31 year lease of the centre. When the work was substantially completed, the defendant refused to grant the lease to the corporation. It was in liquidation and its liquidator did not pursue a claim. The plaintiff sued in deceit. After the limitation period had expired the plaintiff sought to add a claim in unjust enrichment. The CA affirmed the decision that the claim was statute barred but doubted the judge's decision that in any event the claim in unjust enrichment disclosed no reasonable cause of action. It was not obvious that the corporation's separate personality barred such a claim. Lionel Smith Received: (qmail 29275 invoked from network); 20 May 1997 07:16:48 -0000 Received: from ursa.cus.cam.ac.uk (cusexim@131.111.8.6) by jess.oucs.ox.ac.uk with SMTP; 20 May 1997 07:16:48 -0000 Received: from ghj1000 by ursa.cus.cam.ac.uk with smtp (Exim 1.623 #1) id 0wTjA5-0004UO-00; Tue, 20 May 1997 08:16:45 +0100 Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 08:16:45 +0100 (BST) From: "Prof. G.H. Jones" To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: Re: restitution proper plaintiff In-Reply-To: Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Both Peter B and I gave Foskett QC some help; he got to first base, but query whether he would have got further! Gareth On Mon, 19 May 1997, Lionel Smith wrote: > In Brennan v. Brighton BC, The Times 15 May (CA), the plaintiff worked on a > sports centre leased to a corporation. The defendant owned the land but was > contractually bound to the corporation to grant to it a 31 year lease of > the centre. When the work was substantially completed, the defendant > refused to grant the lease to the corporation. It was in liquidation and > its liquidator did not pursue a claim. > > The plaintiff sued in deceit. After the limitation period had expired the > plaintiff sought to add a claim in unjust enrichment. The CA affirmed the > decision that the claim was statute barred but doubted the judge's decision > that in any event the claim in unjust enrichment disclosed no reasonable > cause of action. It was not obvious that the corporation's separate > personality barred such a claim. > > Lionel Smith > > > Received: (qmail 588 invoked from network); 20 May 1997 10:48:18 -0000 Received: from oxmail4.ox.ac.uk (163.1.2.33) by jess.oucs.ox.ac.uk with SMTP; 20 May 1997 10:48:18 -0000 Received: from sable.ox.ac.uk by oxmail4 with SMTP (PP) with ESMTP; Tue, 20 May 1997 11:48:10 +0100 Received: from [192.76.27.22] (max22.public.ox.ac.uk [192.76.27.22]) by sable.ox.ac.uk (1.2/8.8.3) with SMTP id LAA12088 for ; Tue, 20 May 1997 11:48:03 +0100 (BST) X-Sender: lawf0014@sable.ox.ac.uk Message-Id: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Tue, 20 May 1997 11:48:54 +0000 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk From: lionel.smith@Law.oxford.ac.uk (Lionel Smith) approve eregion unsubscribe restitution sean@best.com Received: (qmail 26688 invoked from network); 23 May 1997 16:14:54 -0000 Received: from curtis.law.ubc.ca (HELO SMTP) (137.82.108.249) by jess.oucs.ox.ac.uk with SMTP; 23 May 1997 16:14:54 -0000 Received: from UBCLAW-Message_Server by SMTP with Novell_GroupWise; Fri, 23 May 1997 09:17:02 -0700 Message-Id: X-Mailer: Novell GroupWise 4.1 Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 09:16:34 -0700 From: Bertie McClean To: faye.woodman@dal.ca,lionel.smith@Law.oxford.ac.uk, restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: Trusts Book Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Disposition: inline I am sorry for having been so elusive. But I would indeed be interested in particpating in the proposed book. I assume what you have in mind is the preparation/cooperation in one or more chapters. I will look at the materials you referred to in your last call and get back to you. As it turns out I will be in Halifax for a conference June 11 to June 14. If it is convenient to you we might get together then? With many thanks for having thought oof getting in touch with me. Bertie McClean. Received: (qmail 4533 invoked from network); 24 May 1997 16:33:52 -0000 Received: from softdnserror (HELO tibalt.supernet.ab.ca) (198.161.21.5) by jess.oucs.ox.ac.uk with SMTP; 24 May 1997 16:33:52 -0000 Received: from mitchell.supernet.ab.ca (cgy-p9.supernet.ab.ca [206.75.159.41]) by tibalt.supernet.ab.ca (8.8.3/8.6.12) with SMTP id KAA23896 for ; Sat, 24 May 1997 10:33:42 -0600 (MDT) Message-ID: <3387181F.221@supernet.ab.ca> Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 10:32:31 -0600 From: Mitchell McInnes X-Mailer: Mozilla 2.01E-KIT (Win95; I) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: Constructive Trusts in the SCC Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit The Supreme Court of Canada recently released a decision regarding the "ancient and eclectic institution" of the constructive trust. The headnote follows. Mitchell McInnes ______________________________________________________________________ Indexed as: Soulos v. Korkontzilas Fotios Korkontzilas, Panagiota Korkontzilas and Olympia Town Real Estate Limited, appellants; v. Nick Soulos, respondent. [1997] S.C.J. No. 52 Supreme Court of Canada File No.: 24949. 1997: February 18; 1997: May 22. Present: La Forest, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci and Major JJ. ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO (48 pp.) Trusts and trustees -- Constructive trust -- Agency -- Fiduciary duties -- Real estate agent making offer to purchase property on behalf of client -- Vendor rejecting offer but advising agent of amount it would accept -- Agent buying property for himself instead of conveying information to client -- Market value of property decreasing from time of agent's purchase -- Whether constructive trust over property may be imposed and agent required to transfer property to client even though client can show no loss. Real property -- Remedies -- Constructive trust -- Agency -- Real estate agent making offer to purchase property on behalf of client -- Vendor rejecting offer but advising agent of amount it would accept -- Agent buying property for himself instead of conveying information to client -- Market value of property decreasing from time of agent's purchase -- Whether constructive trust over property may be imposed and agent required to transfer property to client even though client can show no loss. K, a real estate broker, entered into negotiations to purchase a commercial building on behalf of S, his client. The vendor rejected the offer made and tendered a counteroffer. K rejected the counteroffer but "signed it back". The vendor advised K of the amount it would accept, but instead of conveying this information to S, K arranged for his wife to purchase to property, which was then transferred to K and his wife as joint tenants. S brought an action against K to have the property conveyed to him, alleging breach of fiduciary duty giving rise to a constructive trust. He asserted that the property held special value to him because its tenant was his banker, and being one's banker's landlord was a source of prestige in his community. He abandoned his claim for damages because the market value of the property had decreased from the time of the purchase by K. The trial judge found that K had breached a duty of loyalty to S, but held that a constructive trust was not an appropriate remedy because K had not been "enriched". The Court of Appeal, in a majority decision, reversed the judgment and ordered that the property be conveyed to S subject to appropriate adjustments. Held (Sopinka and Iacobucci JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be dismissed. Per La Forest, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin and Major JJ.: The constructive trust is an ancient and eclectic institution imposed by law not only to remedy unjust enrichment, but to hold persons in different situations to high standards of trust and probity and prevent them from retaining property which in "good conscience" they should not be permitted to retain. While Canadian courts in recent decades have developed the constructive trust as a remedy for unjust enrichment, this should not be taken as expunging from Canadian law the constructive trust in other circumstances where its availability has long been recognized. Under the broad umbrella of good conscience, constructive trusts are recognized both for wrongful acts like fraud and breach of duty of loyalty, and to remedy unjust enrichment and corresponding deprivation. While cases often involve both a wrongful act and unjust enrichment, constructive trusts may be imposed on either ground. The following conditions should generally be satisfied before a constructive trust based on wrongful conduct will be imposed: (1) the defendant must have been under an equitable obligation in relation to the activities giving rise to the assets in his hands; (2) the assets in the hands of the defendant must be shown to have resulted from deemed or actual agency activities of the defendant in breach of his equitable obligation to the plaintiff; (3) the plaintiff must show a legitimate reason for seeking a proprietary remedy, either personal or related to the need to ensure that others like the defendant remain faithful to their duties; and (4) there must be no factors which would render imposition of a constructive trust unjust in all the circumstances of the case. Here K's breach of his duty of loyalty sufficed to engage the conscience of the court and support a finding of constructive trust. First, K was under an equitable obligation in relation to the property at issue. His failure to pass on to his client the information he obtained on his client's behalf as to the price the vendor would accept on the property and his use of that information to purchase the property instead for himself constituted a breach of his equitable duty of loyalty. Second, the assets in K's hands resulted from his agency activities in breach of his equitable obligation to S. Third, a constructive trust is required to remedy the deprivation S suffered because of his continuing desire to own the particular property in question. A constructive trust is also required in cases such as this to ensure that agents and others in positions of trust remain faithful to their duty of loyalty. Finally, there are no factors which would make imposition of a constructive trust unjust in this case. Per Sopinka and Iacobucci JJ. (dissenting): The ordering of a constructive trust is a discretionary matter and, as such, is entitled to appellate deference. The trial judge's decision not to order such a remedy should be overturned on appeal only if the discretion has been exercised on the basis of an erroneous principle. The trial judge committed no such error here. He considered the moral quality of K's actions and there is thus no room for appellate intervention on this ground. He was of the opinion that where there is otherwise no justification for ordering a constructive trust or any other remedy, the morality of the act will not alone justify such an order, which is a correct statement of the law. The trial judge has a discretion to order a constructive trust, or not to order one, and this discretion should not be affected by the number of available remedies. In this case, S withdrew his claim for damages. While compensatory damages were unavailable since no pecuniary loss was suffered, S could have sought exemplary damages. His decision not to do so should not bind the trial judge's discretion with respect to the order of a constructive trust. The trial judge also considered deterrence, but held that it alone could not justify a remedy in this case. Even if appellate review were appropriate, the remedy of a constructive trust was not available on the facts of this case. Recent case law in this Court is very clear that a constructive trust may only be ordered where there has been an unjust enrichment, and there was no enrichment, and therefore no unjust enrichment, here. The unavailability of a constructive trust in the absence of unjust enrichment is consistent with the constructive trust's remedial role and supported by specific consideration of the principles set out in Lac Minerals. Deterrence does not suggest that a constructive trust should be available even where there is no unjust enrichment. Despite considerations of deterrence, it is true throughout the private law that remedies are typically unavailable in the absence of a loss. Courts have not held it to be necessary where a tort duty or a contractual duty has been breached to order remedies even where no loss resulted. There is nothing which would justify treating breaches of fiduciary duties any differently in this regard. In any event, the unavailability of a constructive trust in cases where there is no unjust enrichment does not have any significant effect on deterrence. Exemplary damages are available if deterrence is deemed to be particularly important, and an unscrupulous fiduciary has to reckon with the possibility that if there were gains in value to the property, he or she would be compelled to pay damages or possibly give up the property. Received: (qmail 4731 invoked from network); 24 May 1997 16:37:12 -0000 Received: from taurus.cus.cam.ac.uk (cusexim@131.111.8.48) by jess.oucs.ox.ac.uk with SMTP; 24 May 1997 16:37:12 -0000 Received: from ghj1000 by taurus.cus.cam.ac.uk with smtp (Exim 1.623 #1) id 0wVJob-0001xD-00; Sat, 24 May 1997 17:37:09 +0100 Date: Sat, 24 May 1997 17:37:09 +0100 (BST) From: "Prof. G.H. Jones" To: restitution@maillist.ox.ac.uk Subject: Re: restitution Constructive Trusts in the SCC In-Reply-To: <3387181F.221@supernet.ab.ca> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Many thanks Gareth Jones Received: (qmail 3233 invoked from network); 31 May 1997 08:28:48 -0000 Received: from oxmail4.ox.ac.uk (163.1.2.33) by jess.oucs.ox.ac.uk with SMTP; 31 May 1997 08:28:48 -0000 Received: from sable.ox.ac.uk by oxmail4 with SMTP (PP) with ESMTP; Sat, 31 May 1997 09:28:39 +0100 Received: from localhost (lady0489@localhost) by sable.ox.ac.uk (1.2/8.8.3) with SMTP id JAA05318 for ; Sat, 31 May 1997 09:28:38 +0100 (BST) Date: Sat, 31 May 1997 09:28:37 +0100 (BST) From: Colin Riegels To: Restitution Maillist Subject: Failure of Consideration Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Once again the time of year has arrived when students pass more than a casual eye over the daily law reports in "The Times," remembering fearful stories of days past when decisions such as Westdeutsche v. Islington and R. v. P. came out mere days before finals papers. A case of similarly late arrival if not the same significance may have recently been decided by the Court of Appeal. The facts of Ellis v. Chief Adjudication Officer ("The Times" 14th May 1997) were not particularly remarkable. Mrs Ellis had given her house to her daughter on the condition that she would be able to live there for as long as was practical. As seems typical in English cases, the daughter threw Mrs Ellis out and sold the house. Mrs Ellis' application for income support was refused by the Chief Adjudication Officer on the grounds that as the daughter had reneged upon her promise, Mrs Ellis retained an interest in the house, and that decision was ultimately upheld by the court of appeal. On first blush, this simply furnishes an excellent example of restitution recognised in a non-contractual situation (although it is unclear from the typically opaque report in "The Times," it appears that there was no intent to enter legal relations). Thus it will provide a useful modern illustration to Professor Birks to go with the older "marriage" cases (Re Ames [1946] Ch 217 etc.) in supporting the view that for recovery of failure of consideration, consideration should be used in the historical sense rather than the modern contractual doctrine (see Fibrosa Spolka v. Fairbairn Lawson [1943] AC 32). Nonetheless, there are two features of Ellis v. C.A.O. that might give it potentially a much wider application. Firstly, Mrs Ellis did enjoy a period of occupation before she was unceremoniously evicted. Although it seems clear that the point was not argued before the court (the decision focuses entirely upon whether the condition was sufficiently certain) it is undeniable that Mrs Ellis did receive some part of what she had been promised, and the facts seem indistinguishable from the old "apprentice" cases (Whincup v. Hughes (1871) LR 6 CP 78 etc.) Taken with the admittedly obiter comments of the court of appeal in D.O. Ferguson v. Sohl (1992) 62 Build L.R. 95 at 105, that mere partial failure of consideration was of no significance, it seems that a credible argument can now be mounted in favour of a litigant who has only endured a partial failure. Secondly, it does raise the interesting question of how far the courts will be prepared to go in allowing restitution for failed bases. Searches for the historical origins of the doctrine of consideration have invariably been rather fruitless (see Holmes, 1 LQR 162), and in any event it must be questionable to what extent it is desirable to let historical antecedent shape our law in this modern age. It will, for the moment, remain an open question whether or not one day we will enjoy a cause of action, as do many continental systems, for the recovery of gifts made on a false protestation of friendship. Certainly, the first possible implication is to be treated as a welcome potential step along the road which has been famously neglected by Parliamentary apathy, but the second may represent the first step on a rather slipperier slope. Only time will tell, but hopefully not until after the exams. COLIN RIEGELS Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford