![]() |
RDG
online Restitution Discussion Group Archives |
||||||||||||
![]() |
![]() |
||||||||||||
|
Charles
Mitchell wrote, of the judgment in Bank
of America v Arnell,
The third argument, which also succeeded, was
that D1 had acted in breach of fiduciary duty to the company when he caused
it to transfer the funds out of its account and into his personal account.
I am quite unable to see why a breach of fiduciary duty to the company
should have been capable of generating a proprietary interest in favour
of the bank, and Aikens J does not explain the thought processes which
led him to this conclusion. A similar mode of proprietary recovery has recently
appeared or been confirmed (although I don't think it solves the mystery
alluded to by Charles). In Jyske
Bank (Gibraltar) Ltd v Spjeldnaes (29 July 1999) the CA, interpreting
the Rolled Steel case [1986] Ch 246, considered the effect of a disposition
by a company brought about by its managing director in breach of fiduciary
duty (assuming that the disposition is not ultra vires). It was held (as
I understand it) that such a transaction cannot be voidable. It may be
valid if the outsider can rely on ostensible authority, or if the company
ratified the excess of authority. But it was said that in a case where
the outsider knew of the want of authority in the md, not only was the
transaction void but the property transferred under it was held in trust
for the company by the outsider. So a fortiori where (as in Charles' case)
the outsider transferee and the insider director were the same person.
(It still does not solve Charles' mystery because the Jyske claim benefits
the company.)
Of course the voidness of the contract does not logically
entail the voidness of the conveyance (Westdeutsche),
but if (quite unlike Westdeutsche) the voidness of the contract arises
through the combination of (a) lack of authority in the agent to make
it and (b) knowledge by the other party of that lack, then it kind of
makes sense that the conveyance should be void as well, since the same
features apply to it (assuming of course what is almost certainly true,
that there is as much lack of authority for the conveyance as for the
contract). If this is correct then (at least as to the asset initially
transferred, rather than its proceeds) we are not in the realm of unjust
enrichment but of the retention by the company of its pre-existing rights.
Personally I would want to ask whether, if the conveyance is to be void,
the original asset transferred might actually be held at law by the company;
but in most cases the transfer will be converted into proceeds, which
would then be held in trust. In payments of money via banks this will
happen in the initial transfer itself.
Both Twinsectra
and Jyske Bank consider whether one can sue to enforce an agreement (or
security given thereunder) while still maintaining against another party
that the transaction is void (and not ratified) or voidable. Both seem
to say it is possible, taking a strong view of the power of election between
remedies. In Jyske Bank, enforcing security for transactions in the form
of loans was said not to amount to ratifying them as loans, so that the
plaintiff could still sue in knowing receipt and knowing assistance, and
could claim the traceable proceeds as trust money. In Twinsectra it was
said (para 99)
"the distinction of importance here is that between non-consensual transfers
and transfers pursuant to contracts which are voidable for misrepresentation.
In the latter case, the transferor may elect whether to avoid or affirm
the transaction and, until he elects to avoid it, there is no constructive
(resulting) trust; in the former case, the constructive trust arises upon
the moment of transfer. The result, so far as third parties are concerned,
is that, before rescission, the owner has no proprietary interest in the
original property; all he has is the "mere equity" of his right to set
aside the voidable contract."
but then at para 113 it was said, as I read it, that you can keep open
your election as to avoidance even after you have sued to judgment in
contract on the transaction.
Finally the judgment in Jyske Bank can be seen as supporting Simon Gardner's
argument ((1996) 112 L.Q.R. 56) that despite the attempt along these lines
in Royal Brunei, it is impossible to decide whether a defendant has been
dishonest without considering the defendant's knowledge. Less certain
on this point was the CA in Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (1999) 11
Admin LR 281, applying Royal Brunei to the dishonesty element of one way
of committing the tort of misfeasance in public office. There it was said
that dishonesty and knowledge are in a relationship like unto chicken
and egg. But surely while you need knowledge for dishonesty, you do not
need dishonesty to have knowledge ...
Lionel <== Previous message Back to index Next message ==> |
||||||||||||
![]() |
![]() |
» » » » » |
|
![]() |
|||||||||
![]() |