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I
do not know the terms of the Uniform Commercial Code nor how far they
exclude the common law. I, therefore, wonder whether or not Misa v. Currie
(1876) 1 App. Cas. 554, insofar as it deals with the banker's lien, might
be relevant.
-----Original Message-----
From: Look C Ho I am not sure if this question has been discussed before.
It is whether advances a bank makes available against uncollected cheque
deposits create a debt owed by the depositor to the bank, with specific
reference to the US Court of Appeals (Eight Circuit) decision in Laws
v United Missouri Bank 98 F3d 1047 (1996), which I believe is going
on appeal to the US Supreme Court soon. The facts are simple. UMB regularly allowed debtor
to write checks on uncollected cheque deposits. In other words, debtor
was able to draw down its provisional credit before those deposited
cheques were cleared. UMB maintained two balances for the debtor's account,
ie the 'ledger balance' and 'collected funds balance'. The ledger balance
was the sum of all collected and uncollected deposits, less debits to
the account such as checks presented for payment. The collected funds
balance was collected funds less debits. UMB's practice was to pay checks
drawn on the debtor's provisional credits so long as it would not result
in a negative ledger balance. As debtor approached insolvency, it took
advantage of this facility to fund its business operations. In other
words, the debtor was kiting cheques in order to survive. Although the
debtor avoided an overdraft position by maintaining a positive ledger
balance, its negative collected funds balance continued to grow. UMB
became concerned and told the debtor that it would no longer pay on
the debtor's uncollected deposits. So the debtor borrowed from another
bank and transferred $4m of the loan to UMB, thereby wiping out the
negative collected funds balance. Soon the debtor filed for Chapter
11 bankruptcy protection. The trustee then sought to recover from UMB
the $4m as an avoidable preference. Under the US Bankruptcy Code, the trustee must prove
that the $4m was to satisfy an antecedent debt. Held that there was
no antecedent debt because advances against uncollected deposits did
not create a debt. The reason is that the bank did not see the advances
as a credit decision, but merely a service decision. A debt would arise
only at the point of dishonour. Since all the kited cheques were honoured,
there was no debt. On the face of it, the court was plain correct. Taking
an event-response approach, a debt, being a legal obligation, could
only be triggered by unjust enrichment in this situation. Banks make
the funds available on the basis that those deposited cheques would
be cleared in due course. Unless and until there is a dishonour, there
can be no failure of basis, thus no debt. But there seems to be one difficulty in fitting this
'restitutionary' reasoning into the specific statutory words. The reason
is this. The court held also that there was in any event no preference
because when the cheques were deposited, the Uniform Commercial Code
granted UMB a security interest in those cheques and their proceeds
'to the extent to which credit given for the cheques has been withdrawn
or applied". In other words, in receiving the $4m, UMB did not receive
more than it would have received in a liquidating bankruptcy. But "security interest" is defined in the UCC as "an
interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance
of an obligation". Applied to this context, what could that "obligation"
be? Obligation to pay the bank for those advances? If so, this must
be a debt. So was the court having the cake and eating it? Even if one takes the position that the debtor is only
obliged to pay the bank if the cheques are dishonoured, arguably the
bank has a contingent claim against the debtor, the contingency being
dishonour. If so, there is again a debt. "Debt" is defined in the Bankruptcy
Code as "liability on a claim". "Claim" is defined in the Code as "right
to payment, whether or not such right is contingent." Any comments? Does this show that statutes are inherently
unprincipled? Look C Ho <== Previous message Back to index Next message ==> |
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