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RDG
online Restitution Discussion Group Archives |
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Ben Mc Farlane
referred to:
the label "quasi-contract" preventing a personal
claim in Sinclair v Brougham because the D did not have the power to contract
for the repayment of the loan. Did it really? Or was it just the perverse consequences
emanating from their Lordships' misunderstanding of the notion of quasi-contract?
Good classification and affixing appropriate labels are not the same thing.
Whether we call a particular branch of the law quasi-contract or restitution
is one thing, what cases we group under the chosen heading is another.
My point was that, while the direct consequences may be purely academic
(and in many cases I concede that they will not), the indirect consequences
of the specific choices of rules we make in implementing a coherent legal
system justify the academic exercise of classification. Assuming that
there is no DIRECT practical consequence in this case (because setting
aside the judgment surely constitutes a total failure of consideration
and, well, let us assume Lord Archer is in bad faith), Ben mentioned a
hypothetical case where the defendant might be in good faith. To know
whether or not such a defendant would be entitled to CoP is an important
INDIRECT practical consequence of a debate which, in the absence of DIRECT
practical consequences, some would prefer to label futile.
Matthew Scully. <== Previous message Back to index Next message ==> |
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