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You wrote, "Thus, in most cases property rights is a response as defined by Birks. However, at the same time it must be recognised that a pre-existing equitable interest may also act as causative factor as demonstrated by Foskett v. McKeown."

I am not acquainted with Prof. Birks' definition; but, on their plain, meaning I believe your sentences to have the support of this passage in Co. Litt. at 345b, "'Right' Jus sive rectum(1) (which Littleton often useth) signifieth properly, and specially in writs and pleadings, when an estate is turned to a right, as by discontinuance, disseisen, &c ... Title, properly, (as some say) is, when a man hath a lawfull cause of entry into lands whereof another is seised, for the which he can have no action, as title of condition, title of mortmaine, &c. ... But legally this word (Title) includeth a right also, as you shall perceive in many places in Littleton: and title is the more generall word; for every right is a title, but every right is not such a right for which an action lieth; and therefore Titulus est justa causa possidendi quod nostrum est(2), and signifieth the means whereby a man cometh to land , as his title is by fine, feoffment, &c."

I understand Coke to be defining "right" as something to be declared or enforced by the court (or, indeed, as a right to sue or a cause of action) on proof of "title", so that until the "title" be challenged by some wrong doing, actual or fictitious (including collusive, as by fine), so as to give a claimant locus standi and the court jurisdiction, there would be no "right" but only "title".

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1. "Jus" and "rectum" are the two Latin expressions which may be translated as "right" in the sense in which Coke is using that word.

2. The Latin means, "Title is the lawful cause of possessing what is ours." In my submission, this embodies the distinction between "title" and "property", which Chalmers implicitly drew in the Sale of Goods Act 1893 and which (rather than any of the reasoning in the House of Lords or the Court of Appeal) is the true explanation of the decision in National Employers Insurance v. Jones [1990] 1 A.C. 24.