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J S Bloor (Measham) Ltd v Calcott - Chancery Division - Hart J - 23.11.01.
What follows is an abridged summary from the NLO headnote.

In July 1997 Bloor completed a contract to purchase thirty-eight acres of agricultural land in Leicestershire with vacant possession and planning permission for development. When Bloor went onto the site it emerged that the defendant, C, was claiming a tenancy of the land protected under the provisions of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986. C took proceedings in the county court claiming damages for trespass and an injunction restraining Bloor from entering the land. The judge held that there was a tenancy so that C was entitled to damages for trespass for crop damage caused by Bloor's contractors but that C was not entitled to an injunction because he had deceived the landlord into not taking steps to bring the tenancy to an end. The judge refused to rescind the tenancy. The Court of Appeal refused C permission to appeal. In October 1997 Bloor issued proceedings seeking a declaration that it was entitled to occupy the land and proceed with its development and that any tenancy which C might have was unenforceable against Bloor by reason of proprietary estoppel based on C's deceitful conduct. C counterclaimed for damages for breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment and for trespass. C argued that Bloor's claim to an equity was barred by issue estoppel or inconsistent with the provisions of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986. If not it was conceded that C's conduct justified the equity claimed.

In relation to the issue of restitutionary damages, Hart J held that he was bound by Ministry of Defence v Ashman (1993) 25 HLR 513 and Ministry of Defence v Thompson (1993) 25 HLR 552 to hold that a claimant in a trespass action was able to elect to claim damages either on the basis of the loss suffered by him or on the basis of the value to the defendant of his wrong. However, as a matter of causation the ability of Bloor to develop the land without having to pay a consideration for the surrender of the tenancy was not a benefit obtained by reason of the trespass. The reason why Bloor enjoyed that benefit was not its wrongful entrance on the land but because the court would not restrain Bloor from proceeding with the development on account of C's unconscionable conduct.

Jamie