But there is a line to be drawn. It is wrong to say that Blake is free of all obligation. But equally it is wrong to apply the same rules as if he were still a trusted employee, when manifestly he is not. The problem with Steyn's dictum is that it pretends there isn't a difficulty as to which side of the line Blake's case falls.

Hanoch's suggestion is that, even though the fiduciary duty is terminated, it should still apply to "information they secured while in service". But this can't work. It is a regular problem in employment law *which* "information secured in service" fiduciaries are allowed to take with them when they change jobs. Obviously fiduciaries are allowed to keep information which relates generally to doing their job, and obviously they are not allowed to steal lists of clients; but where to place the line between is not always obvious. Applying this to spies, it would be surprising if ex-spies were absolutely forbidden from acting as security consultants, even though this has to involve items of information acquired in service. It would also be surprising if David Cornwell ("John le Carre"), a writer whose imagination draws extensively on his brief period as a spy, were to be treated as an errant fiduciary, and thus stands to lose his livelihood unless he writes about something else.

The lower court judgments, then, are concerned precisely with defining whether the information Blake had revealed was of the sort that his former employers still had a legitimate interest in. The clincher, for the trial judge, was that "in the present case there is no allegation that the information disclosed by Mr Blake ever was secret or confidential. But, more important, it is not contended that the information was, at the time of disclosure, either of these things. It is not alleged in the statement of claim, nor is there any evidence that the disclosure of the information contained in the book might, or in the event did, cause any damage to the national interest." In the light of that, it is hard to see why Blake's case falls on the prohibited side of the line. Steyn addresses every point except the one actually in issue.

As to the (rather well-worn) deterrence argument: If George Blake was not deterred from treachery by the shame, the expense and the sheer bloody inconvenience of a conviction under the Official Secrets Act, then the additional impact of a threat to confiscate his royalties if he published his memoirs in the UK rather than abroad seems minimal.

Steve Hedley

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