I don't think that this alone can be enough. If my employer has an option whether to terminate my contract of employment that does not make them a fiduciary. If a broad definition is found to be at all useful I would say that a fiduciary is a person who is under an obligation to subordinate his interests to another. I could probably find a hole in that if I thought long enough about it.

It is this core feature of the fiduciary relationship that makes the duty of loyalty (as well as certain ancillary duties) a necessary incident of this relationship.

If we believe that fiduciaries should be deterred from breaching this duty, we should apply a remedy that takes the bite out of their breach, namely: a profits-based recovery. (Here I merely summarize and somewhat simplify my argument in The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice, 98 Michigan L. Rev. 138, 157-162 (1999) in connection to the US Sup Ct Snepp case regarding agents as unauthorized authors.)

If this is the reason why we provide this type of remedy during the pendency of the service of secret agents (and other fiduciaries), it is difficult for me to understand how (that is: why) the analysis changes once their service is terminated insofar, of course, as the information they secured while in service is concerned.

The answer is, surely, simply that they no longer owed any fiduciary duty. It seems to me that you are really arguing that Blake was wrong to have decided (in the CA and at first instance) that the fiduciary relationship had come to an end and that information obtained prior to the ending of the relationship was not protected. Your position was not the one adopted by Lord Steyn.

R