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RDG
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Dear all,
I think my response to Steve is yes, but also no. Perhaps
a pithy exposition of how I see mispredictions would help.
A misprediction which becomes apparent, because the belief
becomes falsifiable, when the transaction/contract is still executory
or partially executed will count. That is I think why frustration operates,
as a misprediction that bites when the contract is partially executed.
If the prediction became falsifiable only after full execution there would
be no relief, and most cases of misprediction on restitution fall into
this category. May be I am just repeating myself from my earlier email,
but this is the principled reason for treating some mispredictions differently.
If the contract is partially executed the misprediction affects what you
actually do. If it is fully executed it does not. If Steve is implying
there is no principled basis, as I think he is, I must disagree.
The part with which I do agree is where Steve says "The
question is not, ultimately, what the parties expected or predicted, but
what sort of circumstances their agreement provides for."
True, up to a point. If we take the risk of being mistaken
we can have no relief, and Great Peace Shipping confirms this for us.
I do not think we have to abandon mistake though. We need a cause of action,
and I do not think not having provided for the eventuality provides one.
Taking the risk, or providing for the occurrence may bar relief, but we
still need the mistake to justify relief in the first place. That said
it won't be very often, certainly not if Solle v Butcher really has gone,
and we take a rather bold Court of Appeal's word for it.
Duncan Sheehan
-----Original Message----- Duncan Sheehan wrote:-
I think what this amounts to is saying
that frustration in contract represents a special type of misprediction
that works, but does not affect the general rule that mispredictions
do not count.
... which in turn suggests that, if
there is a principled basis for combining the restitution and the contract
doctrines, it isn't to be found in the mistake/misprediction distinction
- unless of course there is a principled reason why one particular type
of misprediction is treated differently from all the others.
If we ask rather about the basis of
the transaction (or "the parties' common assumptions", if you prefer),
the similarities are more straightforward. It is enough that the parties'
agreement embodied an assumption, which turned out to be inaccurate.
Whether the mistake could in principle have been discovered before the
payment or not is beside the point. This leaves us with the problem
of saying which types of assumption are fundamental enough to matter,
but I think we have that problem anyway.
Of course, most of the cases will
in practice involve mistakes - the argument is that it is not convenient
or analytically correct to base them on that. Indeed, as we know, the
same principles have been applied where one party was not mistaken at
all, but nonetheless their transaction embodies a false assumption -
as where money is demanded and paid on the basis that it is due, the
payor already realising that it is not in fact due (Woolwich, the last
5 overpayments in Nurdin). The question is not, ultimately, what the
parties expected or predicted, but what sort of circumstances their
agreement provides for.
All of this, of course, suggests a
very narrow ambit for the doctrine of frustration, as well as "mistake".
Steve Hedley
=============================================
ansaphone : +44 1223 334931 Christ's College Cambridge CB2 3BU
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